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ART. I.—*Critik der reinen Vernunft*; von IMMANUEL KANT. Siebente Auflage. Leipzig. 1828.

IN our number for April, we have classed the several modern doctrines of Science, sketched their history from Descartes down to Kant, and determined Kant's position and problem. His problem is, as we have seen, the purely scientific problem; that is, Is science possible? Yet it is not precisely in this form that he himself proposes it. To even a tolerably attentive reader of the *Critic of Pure Reason*, the real problem will appear to concern the conditions, extent, and bounds of human science, rather than the possibility of human science itself.

By a rigid analysis of the intellectual phenomenon, Kant discovers that every fact of knowledge involves a synthetic judgment, and hence he proceeds to inquire, How are synthetic judgments formed? What is their reach? What their validity? In asking and answering these questions, he disguises, both from himself and his readers, the real problem with which he is concerned. The science, that is, the *knowing*, properly so called, is all and entirely in this very synthetic judgment. If this judgment be impossible, if it be invalid, then is science impossible, and human knowledge a mere delu-

sion. So, after all, Kant is inquiring into the possibility, as well as into the conditions, validity, extent, and bounds of science.

Assuming this, we may say, in the outset, that the whole inquiry into which Kant enters is founded in a capital blunder, and can end in no solid or useful result. To ask if the human mind be capable of science is absurd; for we have only the human mind with which to answer the question. And it needs science to answer this question, as much as it does to answer any other question. Suppose we should undertake to answer this question, and should demonstrate by an invincible logic, as Kant himself professes to have done, that science is impossible, our demonstration would be a complete demonstration of its own unsoundness; for the demonstration must itself be scientific, or be no demonstration at all. If the demonstration be scientific, it establishes the fact of science in demonstrating to the contrary; if it be not scientific, then it is of no value, and decides nothing, as to our scientific capacity, one way or the other.

Kant professes to start at a point equally distant from both dogmatism and skepticism. He neither affirms, nor denies; he merely criticises, that is, investigates. But is the critic blind? To criticise, to investigate,—what is this but to discriminate, to distinguish, to judge? Can there be an act of discrimination, of judgment, without science? If you assume, then, your capacity to enter into a critical investigation of the power of the human mind to know, you necessarily begin by assuming the possibility of science, and therefore by what logicians term a *petitio*. Kant attempts the investigation, and in so doing assumes his capacity to make it; and, therefore, contrary to his profession, begins in pure dogmatism. He begins by assuming the possibility of science, as the condition of demonstrating its impossibility,—for the impossibility of science is what he professes to have demonstrated, as the result of all his labors.

We might hesitate a moment before bringing this

charge of absurdity against a man of Kant's unquestionable superiority, did we not seem to ourselves not only to perceive the absurdity, but also its cause. Kant's fundamental error, and the source of all his other errors, is in attempting, like most psychologists, to distinguish between the subject and its own inneity, and to find the object in the subject, — the *not me* in the *me*. We believe his much wronged and misapprehended disciple, Fichte, was the first to detect and expose this error. If Kant had comprehended, in the outset, the simple fact subsequently stated by Fichte in the postulate, the *me* is *me*, he never would, he never could, have written the *Critic of Pure Reason*; for he would have seen that if the *me* is *me*, the *not me* is *not me*, and therefore that the object, or whatever is objective, since distinguished from the subject, is not and cannot be *me*, nor the inneity of the *me*. This simple truism, which is nothing but saying, what is, is, completely refutes the whole Critical Philosophy. We would therefore commend to the admirers of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* of the master, the careful study of the *Wissenschaftslehre* of the disciple.

Kant's great and leading doctrine is, that, in the fact of knowledge, the form, under which the object is cognized, is determined not by what it is in itself, but by the laws of the subject cognizing. He complains that hitherto metaphysicians have supposed, that the form of the cognition depended on the object, and that our cognitions must conform to the intrinsic character of the objects cognized. He himself reverses all this, and contends, that, instead of our knowing being obliged to conform to the manner in which objects exist in themselves, the objects themselves must conform to our manner of knowing. We do not see objects so and so, because such and such is their mode of existence, regarded as existing independent of our cognition of them; but because such and such are the laws of our own understanding, that is to say, such and such is our own inneity. The external world, for instance, is not necessarily in itself what it appears to us, but it appears to

us as it does because our inneity, or intuitive power, compels it so to appear. So of every other actual or possible object of cognition. In themselves considered, there is necessarily no difference between fish and flesh; and the difference, we note, is not determined by them as objects, but by ourselves as subjects, and exists not in them, but in our taste. Change our inneity, and you change all objects of knowledge. This is the great, the leading Kantian doctrine; and the reason why metaphysical science has made no more advance is, because metaphysicians have overlooked this doctrine, and obstinately persisted in believing that there is really some difference between fish and flesh, wine and water, beside what is inherent in the taste of the eater or drinker!

But if the form of the object is determined by the forms of the subject, then, instead of going into an investigation of the innumerable and diversified objects of knowledge, in order to determine the foundations and conditions of science, we should go into an investigation of the subject itself, of this very inneity which the subject imposes upon all its cognitions. The grounds, conditions, and laws of science, are then to be obtained from the study of the subject instead of the object. We must know ourselves, as the condition of knowing all else. The object of the *Critic* is, therefore, to investigate the subject, and determine its part in the fact of experience.

In order to place the matter as clearly before our readers as possible, and to enable them to seize, as distinctly and as firmly as the nature of the case admits, the precise problems which Kant undertakes to solve, we extract liberally from his Introduction.

“That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt; for how else should the understanding be brought into exercise, if not through objects which affect the senses, and partly of themselves furnish representations, and partly excite our intellectual activity to compare, to connect, and to separate them, and thus to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is called experience? In respect of time, there is no knowledge prior to experience, with which all begins.

"But if all begins *with* experience, it does not follow that all springs up *out of* experience; for it may happen that even our empirical knowledge is composed of what is received from sensible impressions, and of what our own understanding, merely excited to action by the sensible impressions, *supplies from itself*; though we may not, indeed, till long practice has made us attentive to it, and skilful in separating it, be able to distinguish the latter element from the former.

"It is therefore, to say the least, a question demanding a closer investigation than it has heretofore received, and also a question not to be answered at a single glance, whether we really have any cognitions which are independent of all experience, and even of all sensible impressions. We may call these cognitions *a priori*, and distinguish them from the empirical cognitions, which have their origin *a posteriori*, that is, in experience.

"This expression, cognition *a priori*, is not sufficiently definite, to designate the complete sense of the proposed inquiry. For we are accustomed to say of many empirical cognitions, that they are possible *a priori*, because we do not derive them immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which rule, however, is itself borrowed from experience. Thus, we say of a man, who undermines the foundation of his house, that he may know *a priori* that it will fall, and that he has no occasion, in order to know that it will fall, to wait for actual experience of its falling. But he cannot know this wholly *a priori*; for it is only from experience that he can know that bodies are heavy, and therefore must needs fall, if that which upholds them be taken away.

"In our inquiry, we shall understand by cognitions *a priori*, not such as may be independent of this or that particular fact of experience, but such as are absolutely independent of all experience. To these are opposed empirical cognitions, or such as are possible only through experience. Our cognitions *a priori* are either *pure* or *mixed*. Only those are pure which have no empirical mixture. For example. Every change has a cause. This is a proposition *a priori*, but not pure; for the conception of change, which it contains, is derivable only from experience." — pp. 1, 2.

From this, Kant proceeds to show that we are, even in our ordinary condition, in possession of cognitions *a priori*.

"It is necessary here to find a sure mark, or criterion, by which a pure cognition may be distinguished from an empirical cognition. Experience may, indeed, teach us that something

may be made in this or that way, but not that it could have been made in no other way. If, then, in the first place, we find a proposition, which, at the same time that it is conceived, is also conceived as *necessary*, it is a judgment *a priori*; and if, moreover, it is underivable from any other proposition, which is also conceived as necessary, it is absolutely *a priori*. In the second place, empirical judgments are never truly and strictly universal, but have, at most, only an assumed and a comparative universality, (through induction,) so that we can only say from experience, So far as we have hitherto observed we have discovered no exception to this or that rule. A judgment, then, which is conceived as strictly universal, that is, as admitting no exception to be possible, cannot be derived from experience, but must be absolutely *a priori*. Empirical universality is only an arbitrary extension of validity, is merely a conclusion from what is true in most cases to what is true in all, as in this proposition,—All bodies are heavy. On the contrary, when strict universality belongs to a judgment, that universality shows that the judgment has a peculiar origin, namely, in the power of cognition *a priori*. Necessity and strict universality are, then, the certain marks of a cognition *a priori*, and they belong inseparably to each other. But since it is sometimes easier to show the empirical limitation than the contingency of the judgment, or since the absolute universality which we attribute to a judgment is frequently more obvious than its necessity, it will be well to use these two criteria separately, of which either is sufficient by itself alone.

“That there are necessary, and, in the strictest sense, universal, and therefore *pure*, human cognitions *a priori*, it is not difficult to show. If we wish for an example from science, we may take the mathematical axioms; if an example from the common use of the understanding, we may take the proposition, Every change has a cause. In this last example, in point of fact, the conception of cause so obviously involves the conception of its necessary connexion with the effect, and of the strict universality of the rule, that the conception of cause would be wholly lost, if we should undertake, as Hume does, to derive it from the frequent association of that which follows with that which precedes, and from the habit which we thus acquire, (therefore possessing merely a subjective necessity,) of connecting our representations. Moreover, without recurrence to similar examples for proof, we might demonstrate that our cognitions really contain *a priori* principles, by demonstrating the absolute indispensableness of such principles to the possibility of experience. For whence could experience deduce its own

certainly, if all the rules according to which it proceeds were themselves empirical, and therefore contingent? We could in such case hardly receive them as first principles. But it suffices for our present purpose, to have indicated the pure use of the understanding as a fact, together with its criteria.

“ But it is not merely in the judgments, but also in the conceptions, that a certain cognition *a priori* is evident. Abstract from your empirical conception of body, one by one, color, hardness, softness, weight, impenetrability, all that is empirical in the conception, and there still remains the *space*, which this body, that has now disappeared, occupied, and the absence of which it is not possible to conceive. In like manner, abstract from your empirical conception of some object, corporeal or incorporeal, all the properties which you have learned from experience, you must still leave it the quality by which you conceive of it as substance, or as pertaining to substance (though this conception of substance is more definite than that of object in general). The necessity, therefore, with which this conception forces itself upon you, obliges you to confess that it has its seat in the understanding.” — pp. 2–5.

• All actual knowledge begins with experience, and prior to experience there is no actual knowledge; but every actual cognition, or fact of experience, if we understand Kant, is composed of two parts, one *empirical*, obtained from the sensible impression, the other *a priori*, furnished by the understanding itself from its own resources. The marks or criteria of the cognition *a priori* are universality and necessity. Whatever is conceived of as absolutely universal and necessary is *a priori*. The cognition *a priori* makes up one part of every actual cognition. Into every actual cognition or fact of experience, as the absolutely indispensable grounds and conditions of its possibility, enter, then, the conceptions of the universal and the necessary. This means, if we comprehend it, all simply, that we never do, and never can, conceive of the particular and contingent, save through conception of the universal and the necessary. This fact we are not disposed to question; but the further statement which Kant makes is not quite so evident, namely, that the conceptions of the universal and necessary are underivable from experience, and must, therefore, be cognitions *a priori*. Whence his proof, that, in

apprehending the particular and contingent, we do not also apprehend, as real objects, the universal and necessary, instead of supplying them from our own innateness?

But we must let Kant speak yet longer for himself. Having assumed that there are cognitions *a priori*, he proceeds to show that philosophy needs a science which determines their possibility, principles, and extent.

"What is still more important than what precedes is, that there are certain cognitions which leave entirely the field of even possible experience, and, through conceptions to which no objects in experience correspond, seem to extend the boundaries of science itself beyond the limits of experience. And it is precisely in these cognitions which transcend the sensible world, and in reference to which experience can neither guide us nor correct our judgments, that lie the most important investigations of our reason, investigations in our view altogether preferable to any thing the understanding can collect in the field of the understanding, and much sublimer in their aims, and which, therefore, we must needs prosecute at all hazards, even at the risk of error. No considerations of doubt, disregard, or indifference can induce us to abandon them. These unavoidable problems of the Pure Reason itself are, GOD, FREEDOM, IMMORTALITY. But the science whose aims and preparations are directed solely to the solution of these problems, and which is called metaphysics, begins its process in dogmatism, and undertakes the solution with full confidence in itself, without having made any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason to obtain it.

"It would, however, seem to be very natural, that, after having left the territory of experience, we should not proceed forthwith to construct a system with cognitions which we have obtained we know not whence, and on the strength of principles with whose origin we are unacquainted, or without having, by previous examination, fully assured ourselves of the solidity of the foundation; that we should rather ask the question, which should have been asked long ago, namely, How is the understanding able to attain to cognitions *a priori*, and what are their reach, their legitimacy, and their worth? Nothing, in fact, were more natural, if by *natural* we understand what is proper to be done; but if we understand by *natural* what usually happens, then nothing can be more natural, or easy to comprehend, than that this inquiry should have remained hitherto unattempted. For a part of this knowledge, namely, the mathematical, has from early times been in posses-

sion of certainty, and by that fact created a favorable expectation of a like certainty in regard to the rest, notwithstanding the rest is of quite a different nature. Moreover, when once out beyond the circle of experience, we are sure of never being contradicted by experience. The charm of extending our cognitions is so great, that we will not, unless stumbling upon an evident contradiction, be restrained in our progress. But with proper care we can avoid contradiction in framing our fictions, and without their ceasing on that account to be fictions. The science of mathematics affords us a striking example of how far we may go in cognition *a priori*, without the aid of experience. This science, indeed, concerns itself with objects and cognitions, only so far as they may be intuitively represented; but this difficulty can be easily surmounted, for the intuition itself may be given *a priori*, and therefore be little else than mere conception. Captivated by this proof of the power of reason, the impulse to extension perceives no limits. The light dove, in her free flight in the air whose resistance she feels, may fancy that she would succeed all the better in airless space. So Plato left the sensible world because it set too narrow bounds to the understanding, and ventured forth on the wings of Ideas into the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not remark that he made no progress by his efforts, since he had no resisting medium to serve for his support, on which he could rest, and to which he could apply his strength to propel the understanding forward. But it is the usual fate of human speculation to prepare its edifice as soon as possible, and then, for the first time, to inquire whether its foundation has been well laid. Then are sought all kinds of excuses to console us for its want of fitness, or to put off so late and so dangerous an investigation. During the construction of the edifice, we are freed from care and suspicion, and flattered with an apparent solidity, by the fact, that a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysis of conceptions which we already possess of objects. We are thus supplied with a multitude of cognitions, which, though nothing but elucidations and explanations of what had already been conceived, but in a confused manner, are nevertheless esteemed, at least as to the form, to be new views, notwithstanding they do not extend the matter, or content, of our conceptions, but merely disentangle it. Now, since this analytic process furnishes us with a real cognition *a priori*, which has a sure and useful progression, the reason, as it were unconsciously, smuggles in along with it assertions of quite a different nature, and adds to given conceptions others,

which, though *a priori*, are wholly foreign to them, without our knowing how it is done, or its even occurring to us to ask. It will be well, then, to begin by pointing out the difference between these two kinds of cognitions, that is to say, the difference between *analytic* judgments and *synthetic* judgments.

"In every judgment in which is conceived the relation of the subject to the predicate, (I notice here only *affirmative* judgments, for, after these, the application to negative judgments can present no difficulty,) this relation may be of two kinds. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something contained in it, though in a manner concealed; or B lies wholly outside of A, with which, however, it stands closely connected. In the first case, the judgment is *ANALYTIC*; in the second, it is *SYNTHETIC*. Analytic judgments (affirmative) are those, therefore, in which the union of the subject and predicate is that of identity; whilst those in which this unity is conceived without identity are to be named synthetic. The first may also be called *explicative* judgments, and the second *extending* judgments; because the former by means of the predicate add nothing to the conception of the subject, but merely resolve this conception, by analysis, into the several partial conceptions already contained, though confusedly, within it; but the latter add to the conception of the subject a predicate not contained within it, nor by any possible means deducible from it. For instance, when I say, All bodies are extended, I express an analytic judgment, for I have no occasion to go out of the conception of body to find that of extension, which I connect with it. The predicate is contained in the conception of body, is always thought with it, and I have only to analyze the conception of body in order to find it. But when I say, All bodies are heavy, the predicate, heaviness, is by no means included in my conception of the subject, that is, of body in general. It is a conception added to the conception of body. The addition, in this way, of the predicate to the subject is a synthetic judgment.

"All empirical judgments, as such, are synthetic. For it would be absurd to ground an analytic judgment on experience, since I am not obliged to go out of the conception itself in order to form the judgment, and therefore can have no need of the testimony of experience. That a body is extended, is a proposition which stands firm *a priori*. It is no empirical judgment. For, prior to experience, I have all the conditions of forming it in the conception of body, from which I deduce the predicate, extension, according to the principle of contradiction, by which I at once become conscious of its necessity, which I

could not learn from experience. But, on the other hand, I do not include, in the primitive conception of body in general, the predicate, heaviness; yet this conception of body in general indicates, through experience of a part of it, an object of experience, to which I may add from experience other parts which also belong to it. I can attain to the conception of body beforehand, analytically, through its characteristics, extension, impenetrability, form, &c., all of which are included in the primary conception of body. But I now *extend* my cognition, and, as I recur to experience, from which I have obtained the conception of body in general, I find along with these characteristics the conception of heaviness. I therefore add this, as a predicate, to the conception of body. The possibility of this synthesis rests, therefore, on experience; for both conceptions, though one contains not the other, yet belong as parts to a whole, that is to say, to experience, which is itself a union of synthetic, though contingent, intuitions.

“But in the case of synthetic judgments *a priori*, we have not this assistance. Here we have not the advantage of returning and supporting ourselves on experience. If I must go out of the conception A in order to find another conception B, which is to be joined to it, on what am I to rely, and by what means does the synthesis become possible? Take, for an example, the proposition, All that which happens has a cause. In the conception, Something happens, I conceive, indeed, an existence which precedes, and from which analytic judgments may be deduced; but the conception of cause is absolutely foreign to the conception of precedence, and indicates something altogether different from that which happens, and is therefore not contained in the conception of it. How, then, from that which happens in general, do I attain to something entirely different from it, and come to know that the conception of cause, though not contained in the conception of that which happens, is yet connected, and *necessarily* connected, with it? What is in this case the unknown = X on which the understanding relies, when it fancies that outside of the conception A it discovers the predicate B wholly foreign to it, and which nevertheless it believes joined to it? It cannot be experience, for the principle in question unites the conception of effect with that of cause, not only with a great degree of generality, but with the expression of absolute necessity, and therefore wholly *a priori*, and by means of mere conception. Now it is on such synthetic, that is, *extension*, principles, that rests all our speculative cognition *a priori*; for, though the analytic are of the greatest importance, and even indispensable, yet

only for the sake of obtaining that clearness and distinctness in our conceptions demanded as a sure ground of an extending synthesis, which alone is to be accounted as a new acquisition."—pp. 5–11.

These extracts are sufficient to show us that Kant holds, 1. That we are in possession of cognitions *a priori*; 2. That these cognitions are the indispensable ground and conditions of all actual cognition; 3. That they stretch away beyond the field of even possible experience; 4. That among these which extend beyond even possible experience, are those cognitions which lie at the foundation of our loftiest faith and sublimest hopes concerning God, Freedom, and Immortality; 5. That it is precisely of these that philosophy needs a science which shall determine their possibility, principles, and extent; and 6. Till we have such a science, we have no solid foundation for any religious or ethical faith, indeed for any branch of knowledge whatever.

The inquiry into which Kant enters concerns precisely these cognitions *a priori*, and his aim is to construct the science of their possibility, principles, and extent. His aim is high, and his inquiry one of no mean importance,—if the case stands as he assumes. Are these cognitions *a priori*, which extend beyond all actual, beyond all possible experience, able to sustain our religious, ethical, and scientific superstructures? Here is the question Kant raises, and which he says should have been raised, and answered, long ago, but which, unhappily, has remained hitherto neglected, and consequently hitherto *no progress* has been made in metaphysical science.

The assumption of Kant, that thus far no progress has been made in metaphysical science, is in the outset a strong presumptive proof that he himself is in the wrong. A man who comes forward with a pretended discovery in any branch of human science, requiring him to consider all who have hitherto cultivated that branch to have been wholly in the wrong, proves by that fact alone that his discovery is to be looked upon with no little doubt and distrust. It is reserved for no man, in our

day and generation, to take the initiative in any branch of human thought ; and he who can discover no merit in his predecessors gives very good evidence that he has no merit of his own. Kant's unqualified condemnation of all the metaphysical labors of humanity, prior to himself, is, for us, a sufficient proof that his own system has no solid foundation, and that his labors have no permanent value.

But we must examine these cognitions *a priori* a little closer. What are they ? They are a constituent part of every actual cognition, and, in addition, its ground and condition. *It is only by virtue of these that experience is possible.* We pray our readers to remember this. Deny these, you deny the possibility of experience ; deny, then, the validity of these, and you deny the validity of experience. And yet, these cognitions are supplied by the subject, and have no objective validity ! The cognition (*Erkenntniss*), which stretches beyond even possible experience, has, according to Kant, no objective validity, that is to say, has no value in relation to any reality exterior to the subject. The moment we venture forth with Plato, on the wings of Ideas, beyond the world of the senses, we are in the empty space of the pure reason, and as unable to succeed as would be the light dove, which cleaves the air, to fly in mere airless space. A cognition, extending beyond the sensible world, is a pure conception, and a pure conception is an *empty* conception, a conception in which nothing is conceived. Of this class are all our judgments *a priori*, which are again the ground of all our judgments *a posteriori* !

Our cognitions *a priori* are of two kinds, analytic and synthetic. The analytic judgments do not extend our knowledge ; they only clear up and place distinctly before the mind what was previously conceived, though confusedly ; only the synthetic judgments add to the sum of our knowledge. In these there is, at least, a *seeming* extension of knowledge. Take the proposition, All that which happens has a cause. Now the conception of cause is different from the conception of

something happening. In this proposition, then, I add the conception of cause to the conception, Something happens. Now, how am I able to do this? And what is the real value of this synthesis, or addition? I cannot obtain this synthesis from experience, for experience can give me only the conception, Something happens; never, the conception, All that which happens *has a cause*. This last conception, namely, of causality, without which there would, and could, be no extension of knowledge, must be supplied, Kant tells us, by the understanding itself, in which it lies *a priori*, ready to be applied to experience of an actual case of causation. Then what is its value? It is—and this is the great doctrine of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*—it is a mere conception, an empty conception in which nothing is conceived. Here, then, we are. The whole fabric of human science rests on cognitions *a priori*, and these cognitions are but mere empty conceptions. Here, then, we are, following this great modern philosopher, in *dem leeren Raum des reinen Verstandes*. If there be meaning in language, this is nothing but the Hindoo doctrine of Maya, namely, that all science is a mere illusion. It is hardly worth one's while to master the crabbed style and barbarous terminology of Kant, to be taught this, which after all, like all other teaching, must needs be a delusion.

The full discussion of the facts which Kant has had in view, when asserting cognitions *a priori*, we reserve, till, in a subsequent article, we come to consider the categories of the pure understanding. Here we can only remark, that, while we admit what Kant calls cognition *a priori*, we deny it to be cognition *a priori*. We deny both the reality and the possibility of cognitions *a priori*. Cognition *a priori* is a contradiction in terms. Cognition is the act of cognizing. If nothing be cognized, it is not cognition. Conception in which nothing is conceived is an impossibility. Can there be *seeing* where there is not somewhat that is *seen*? If the cognition be cognition, it must be *a posteriori*; for it must needs be preceded both by that which cognizes

and by that which is cognized. Only two terms, in the nature of things, can be *a priori*, namely, the subject cognizing, and the object cognized. If you identify the cognition with the subject, you deny it to be cognition, by defining it to be that which cognizes; if you identify it with the object, you also deny it to be cognition, by affirming it to be that which is cognized. If you make it a product of the subject or of the object, or of both acting conjointly, you admit it to be cognition indeed, but deny it to be *a priori*; for it must needs be preceded by the subject or the object, or by both, and therefore *a posteriori* and empirical. Take which position you will, you must abandon the notion of *cognitions a priori*.

Cognition, again, is the act of cognizing. To contend that it is *a priori* were to contend that cognition precedes cognizing; that is to say, precedes itself! This were as if one should say, We know before knowing. To assert that we need a science which determines the possibility, the principles, and the extent of our cognitions *a priori*, then, is simply to assert that we need a science which determines the possibility, the principles, and extent of that portion of our experience which is prior to all experience, and is the indispensable ground and condition of the possibility of experience! Into such absurdities, if we speak of *cognitions a priori*, we necessarily fall.

But we must not dismiss such a man as Kant in this summary way. We ask, therefore, again, What does he really understand by cognition *a priori*? Does he mean the cognition of objects in what the Greeks called the intelligible world (*νοήματα*) as distinguished from the world of sense and imagination (*αἰσθηματα* and *φαντάσματα*)? Not at all; because cognition of these intelligible objects would be as much matter of experience, as the cognition of objects perceptible by the senses. To make the matter as plain as we can, we say, here are two particular and contingent objects, A and B, between which subsists the relation of cause and effect. A causes B. A and B, according to Kant, are two sensible rep-

representations (*Vorstellungen*) or intuitions (*Anschauungen*). The relation of cause and effect is, possibly, an empirical conception. But the intuitions of A and B were possible only on condition of intuition *a priori* of space and time; that is to say, of the place *where*, and the time *when*; and these again are possible only on condition of intuition *a priori* of space and time in general. In the second place, this particular and contingent conception of cause is possible only on condition of conception *a priori* of cause in general, and of necessary cause. The conception of cause in general and of necessary cause, in the case supposed, is the cognition *a priori*; and the cognition of the possibility of the application of this cognition *a priori* to the particular and contingent fact of causation assumed is the *transcendental* cognition.

Now, the question we raise concerning the cognition *a priori*, that is, the *pure* cognition, and the transcendental cognition, is, whether they are really intelligible objects, *νοήματα*, or whether they are not. Kant decides, at once, that they are not; for, if they were, they would not be *a priori*. What, then, are they? Remember, they precede all actual cognition, and are the grounds and conditions of the possibility of actual cognition. They are not on the side of the object, are not derived from the object, but exist prior to the apprehension of the object, in the understanding, from which they are supplied. What are they, or what can they be, but the power of the subject to cognize?

We must bear in mind that our inquiry lies wholly within the region of the subjective faculty of intelligence. It does not concern the *knowing*, but the *power* or ability to know; not experience, but the possibility and conditions of experience. This possibility and these conditions are not the object, nor derivable from the object, but, according to Kant, lie already *a priori* in the understanding; that is to say, they lie already in the understanding, prior to any actual fact of experience. These pure and transcendental cognitions are not, then, if we understand Kant, produced by the understanding,

nor are they the understanding in operation, that is to say, operating on occasion of a fact of experience; they are not the actual thinking of non-empirical elements, on occasion of the empirical fact; but they are the *power* or *ability* of the subject, in a fact of experience, to think and apply to that fact what is not contained in it, nor derived or derivable from it, and yet without thinking which, the fact of experience itself could not have occurred. They are not the *thinking* of that which transcends experience, but the *ability* to think it. This, in simple terms, is all that we can understand by the pure and transcendental cognitions. If we are right in this, and we are confident we are, then these cognitions are nothing more nor less than the constituent elements of the cognitive faculty, of the understanding, without which it would not be the power to understand. They are, then, the understanding itself; that is, the power of the subject to understand; that is, again, all simply, as we say, the *innateness* of the subject.

Kant calls his work a *critic*, and of course designedly; he calls it a critic of the *pure* reason; that is, of reason, when abstraction is made of all experience, of all exercise of reason, and of all that results from its exercise. In other words, pure reason is the faculty itself, as we may say, "*in potentiâ, non in actu*"; that is, reason as the *vis cognitrîx*, the force that knows, taken entirely independent of the *act* of knowing, or cognition. Now, it is reason in this sense, reason as the power of reason, that Kant undertakes to criticize. He assumes in this, that the pure reason may be subjected to analysis. He then assumes the pure reason itself, that is, the subjective faculty of reason, of intelligence, to be complex, and therefore susceptible of decomposition. The decomposition of this faculty gives, as its original, fundamental elements, the cognitions in question; which shows us that these cognitions, in Kant's view, are not products of reason, nor reason operating, but its constituent elements, therefore it itself.

This last conclusion, however, is ours, not Kant's. Kant's labor is that of analysis; his aim is, to decompose

the power of thought. He is not, with Condillac and others, decomposing thought as a fact, but the power, of the exercise of which, thought is the product. He is decomposing, not the act, but the principle of the act; not the thinking, but, properly speaking, the force that thinks. But here is the precise point where his error commences. The understanding, taken substantively, is the cognitive force; but Kant does, and does not, so take it. He fancies a distinction between the force cognizing, and that by virtue of which it is able to cognize. Reason, therefore, is reason by virtue of a somewhat that is distinguishable from it as intelligent force. In other words, the power to know is the power to know, by virtue of containing in itself elements which we may distinguish from itself. Hence, while he would make the pure and transcendental cognitions constituent elements, so to speak, of the cognitive power, he would still make them rather the instruments it uses, than it itself. In his view, they are a somewhat medial between the cognitive force as substance, and cognition, or the knowing, taken phenomenally. They are neither the *vis* nor the *actus*, but the endowments, attributes, or properties of the force cognizing. This is Kant's actual doctrine as exactly seized and stated as it is possible for us to seize and state it.

But here is a grand error, the very error we have so frequently pointed out as the source of all the errors of our modern psychologists, the assumption of a distinction between the subject and the innateness of the subject. Kant, through his whole *Critic*, assumes that the faculty is distinguishable, though not separable, from the subject. But there is no ground for this assumption. The distinction of faculties in man, as of properties in animals and inanimate beings, we of course admit; but this distinction of faculties, or of properties, is a distinction *in* not *from* the subject. This is the great and essential fact, which Kant either overlooks or denies. Thus, he defines the conception of substance to be the conception of the *substratum* that underlies and upholds the properties or faculties. Thus, we may abstract from

an object, corporeal or incorporeal, all the qualities revealed to us by experience, and still the conception of substance will remain, and the object still be considered as existing. Now, this we deny *in toto*. Abstract from a given object, corporeal or incorporeal, or, to make the statement as strong as possible in Kant's favor, abstract from your conception of object in general, all conception of qualities and properties, and there will remain the conception of — NOTHING. Substance defined, as Kant defines it, to be a mere substratum, is nothing but the veriest logical abstraction. Even the definition in the schools, of substance (*sub-stans*, standing under), as that which supports accidents, is inadmissible, unless we are careful to distinguish between essential properties, qualities, or faculties, and *accidents*. The property, or quality, is not an accident, and therefore distinguishable from the substance in which it inheres, or upon which it may be supposed to be superinduced. The quality, or property, is not distinguishable *from* the substance. We may conceive of substances in which we may distinguish qualities, or properties, different from those we distinguish in other substances; but we cannot conceive of one and the same substance with different properties, much less, a substance with no properties. *

* Realism and Nominalism are, after all, more nearly related than is sometimes supposed, and if they could only come to a mutual understanding, they would be, not two, but one. The error of the old Realists was in not distinguishing between logical abstractions and *genera* and *species*, properly so called. Man in general is not the notion of man that remains, after all notion of what is peculiar to each individual is abstracted, but the *generic* power, of which individuals are the products. It is only in the individual that the generic is to be studied; and it can be learned only so far as we learn what in each individual pertains to him as a substantive existence. In each individual we must distinguish both being and phenomenon. The individual, as being, is the force that acts; as phenomenon, the product of the acting. It is the distinction between activity, or the power that acts, and the acting. The first is *essential*, the other *phenomenal*. The phenomenal reveals the essential; and the essential in the individual is the medium of attaining to a knowledge of man in general, or the generic man. Instead, then, of abstracting all individuals in order to arrive at the general, we must learn what is essential in each and every individual; for the general is richer than any one

The distinction is not between the property and the subject, nor between the quality and the substance ; but a distinction in the subject, of which the property, or quality, is predicated. So, the distinction of faculties in man is a distinction *in* man, not between man and his faculties. I cannot say *I and* my faculties. The faculties do not stand below me, or by my side, a somewhat (*quidditas*) which I make use of in acting, feeling, or knowing ; nor are they agencies distinct from that agency which I call *me*, and acting, as it were, on their own account. It is not my activity that acts, my sensibility that feels, my understanding that knows, but I myself. It is always *I* that is the active, sentient, and intelligent force. When I say *I*, I necessarily affirm all that the personal pronoun *I* can be used to cover. We must remember here Fichte's postulate. The *I* is *I*, and therefore, $I = I$. If I am always the equivalent of myself, then must I be equal in volition to what I am in feeling, in feeling to what I am in cognition, and in cognition to what I am in either volition or feeling ; and, if always the *I* is *I*, then must I be identical in each and in all three. Not my activity acts, nor do I act because I *have* activity, or the power to act, but because I *am* it ; not my sensibility feels, but I feel ; yet I do not feel because I *have* sensibility, or the power to feel, but because I *am* it ; not my reason knows, but I know ; and I know, not because I *have* reason, or the power to know, but because I *am* it. I being always and everywhere equal to myself, that is to say, being always and everywhere myself, and not another, I must needs act, feel, and know in all and every one of my phenomena. The distinction of faculties is not, then, a distinction between me and my faculties. In this sense there are no faculties.*

individual, indeed than all individuals ; for all individuals, taken together, do not exhaust it, since its power to produce new and diverse individuals remains.

* If any one would see the absurdity of distinguishing between the me and the faculties, he need only study Gall, Spurzheim, and George Combe, or any of our phrenological, neurological, or pathological professors. None of these miserable quackeries, these burlesques on all science, could ever for one moment have been entertained by

The error has originated in a false and vicious notion of substance. If Kant had meditated profoundly the little tract of Leibnitz, entitled "*De primæ Philosophiæ Emendatione et de Notione Substantiæ*,"* he would have saved himself and his readers no little trouble. Kant, as we have seen, held that the primitive conception of substance is that of substratum, or that which underlies and upholds the attributes, qualities, properties, or faculties. In this view of the case, all the diversity admissible in the universe would be merely a diversity of accidents. Substance, so far forth as substance, would be always and everywhere the same. There might be *accidental* differences among beings, but no *substantial* differences. As substantive, all beings would be one and identical; and multiple and diverse only in relation to their accidents. Thus, as substance, man and animal are one, and man differs from the animal only in the superinduction of a peculiarly human quality upon a substance common to him and the animal world. Thus, it has been contended that there is an ascending scale from the lowest animal up to man, and the ascent consists in adding, in the case of each degree, a quality to those possessed by the degree just below. The superior retains all that belongs to the inferior, and adds a new quality. Thus, man is the *résumé* of the whole animal world, combining in himself all the qualities of all the various orders of existence below him, and adding to them certain qualities which none of them have. Thus man may be defined, for instance, a monkey — *with additions*.

It was this same erroneous notion of substance, that misled Spinoza and involved him in his pantheistic fatalism. Defining substance to be that which stands under (*sub-stans*) or supports accidents, he must needs

even such men as George Combe and our brave *Doctor* Buchanan, after whom a silly multitude runs gaping, if it had only been generally taught that the faculties are powers distinguishable, or rather distinctions, *in the me, not from it*.

* Leibni. Opp. ed. Erdmann, P. I., p. 121; ed. Dutens, Tom. II., P. I., p. 18. See also *Système Nouveau de la Nature et de la Communication des Substances*, &c., § 3; Erdmann, P. I., p. 124; Dutens, Tom. II., P. I., p. 49.

reject all existences as substantive, which were dependent on any thing out of themselves for support. Only that which needs nothing beyond itself to sustain it is, in the true and proper sense of the word, substance. In this sense, only the infinite and self-existent Being can be substance. Then God is the only substance, and the only substance is God. Then nothing exists but God and his accidents, that is, his attributes, that is, again, his modes. The mode, or attribute, is simply God under a given aspect, or phase, of his being. Consequently, all is God, and God is all, and there is no creator or creation, no providence, no freedom, no duty, no morality, no rewards, no punishments, but an infinite, eternal, and invincible Necessity.

Leibnitz, who studied all systems profoundly, and had a mind of equal acuteness and comprehensiveness, saw the rock on which Spinoza and so many others had split, and avoided it by correcting the prevailing notion of substance. We may, indeed, define substance, with the Schoolmen, to be that which supports accidents, but only on condition that we keep distinctly in view the difference between *accident* and *attribute*, quality and phenomenon. The true definition of substance, as Leibnitz states, and as we shall have occasion to demonstrate when we come to consider specially the category of substance, in connexion with M. Cousin's reduction of Kant's fifteen categories to the two categories of substance and cause, or, more properly, *being* and *phenomenon*, is that of active or acting force (*vis activa*, what the Germans call *Kraft*). Substance is always, in the language of Aristotle, *ἐντελέχεια*, and involves, as Leibnitz says, effort (*conatum involvit*), that is, an acting from within outwards. Active force (*vis activa*) is not the attribute of substance, a something (*quiddity*) subsidiary to our notion of substance, but *is* substance, and the being ceases to be, in ceasing to be active force. Analyze your conception of substance, that is to say, of something which is, and abstract all not essential to the conception itself, and there will remain, as the fundamental, simple, indecomposable, ultimate conception of substance, that of simple active or acting force.

Whatever can be conceived of as existing at all, or in any sense be a subject of human investigation, must be included, as M. Cousin has demonstrated, either in the category of substance or in that of cause; or, more accurately, in the category of the *doer* or in that of the *doing*; or again, as we ourselves say, either in the category of *being*, or in that of *phenomenon*. The phenomena of any given being may be manifold and diverse, but the being itself must be a monad, a unity; for, if the conception of being be that of active force, the introduction of more than one active force into the bosom of a given being would be to dissolve its unity, and to declare it to be, not one being, but as many distinct beings as you assume distinct forces. Every being is, therefore, necessarily a monad, whether we choose to accept the monadology of Leibnitz or not.

Now, man must exist either as being or as phenomenon. Condillac, in resolving the *me* into sensation, allowed him only a phenomenal existence; Leroux, in defining the individual man to be "*sensation-sentiment-connaissance*," indivisibly united, makes the individual purely phenomenal, and allows him an *essential* or ontological existence only in the race. I, as an individual man, am the sensation-sentiment-cognition of humanity; and the me, *le moi*, is not *me* as an individual existence, but is humanity. Humanity is the activity, the sensibility, the reason, of which I am the action, the feeling, and the knowing. Humanity is the *doer*, I am the *doing*, and my life is the *done*. But humanity, again, is to God what I am to humanity. God is the activity, the sensibility, the reason, of which humanity is the respective phenomena. Thus, the force that acts, feels, and knows in humanity is God; and the force that acts, feels, and knows in me is humanity, the identical force that acts, feels, and knows in all men. But, as the force which acts, feels, and knows in me is that of humanity, and as that of humanity is God, it follows that the force which acts, feels, and knows in me is God, which is a reversal of the doctrine of St. Paul, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμεν. *In Deo vivimus et move-*

mur et sumus. That is to say, God lives, moves, and has his being in us, instead of our living, moving, and having our being in him !

Rejecting this view, and assuming man to exist as a being, to have a substantial existence, then he exists as a simple acting force, and must be in his primitive essence a monad, or a unity. Now, bearing this in mind, we may easily perceive that the faculties must needs be distinctions in the bosom of this monad or simple force which I call I myself; not qualities, properties, attributes, or accidents, to be distinguished from it. There are but three possible views which we can take, for instance, of the faculty of intelligence, the faculty which is commonly termed understanding, or reason. 1. It is the force that knows; 2. It is the instrument, or means, by which another force knows; or 3. It is the product of the exercise of a cognitive force. This last it cannot be, because it would still leave the whole question open as to the force that knows. If it is the second, that is to say, a somewhat distinguished from me, but which I use, and by virtue of which I am able to know, then, it is in itself separate and distinct from me, and I in myself am unintelligent, that is to say, incapable of intelligence, which involves a contradiction; for my power to know is affirmed, in the affirmation of my ability to use this somewhat (*quiddity*) which you denominate the faculty of intelligence; which again involves another contradiction, that of affirming the faculty of intelligence to be at once *me* and *not me*, contrary to our postulate, What is, is, — the *me* is *me*, and therefore is not and cannot be *not me*.

Nothing remains now but the first view, namely, that understanding, or reason, that is to say, the cognitive faculty, is the force that knows, or cognizes. In cognition, there must needs be an agent that cognizes. Now, this agent is the understanding, taken ontologically, as force, not as the product or the instrument of force. The understanding, then, is force knowing, or intelligencing. This force must be identically and integrally me; or it must be distinct from me. If distinct from me, it

is a separate, and, so far as I am concerned, an independent being, and is not *me*, but another *me*, and, therefore, in no sense a predicate of me. But here is still another difficulty. The moment you affirm the faculty of intelligence to be a cognitive force, and distinct from me, you declare intelligence cannot be a predicate of me. I am, then, in myself, incapable of intelligence. Now, how am I, essentially, that is to say, in my essence (*esse*), unintelligent, incapable of intelligence, ever to know? The *knower* would not be *me*, but a faculty of intelligence proved to be *not me*. How am I, essentially unintelligent, to be placed in such a relation with intelligence as to believe, and to have the right to affirm, that its acts, which are cognitions, are not its, but mine?

In activity there is a force that acts, which makes the effort; in sensibility there is a force that acts, for it demands an effort on the part of the subject to receive a sensation, as much as it does to perform an act in any other sense. Assume a being wholly passive, incapable of the least motion on its part, that is to say, a being absolutely dead, could it feel? could it receive an impression? could it experience a sentiment? Of course not. Then in sensibility there is a force that feels. In understanding there is a force that knows. Now, is the force that acts, *me* or *not me*? the force that feels, *me* or *not me*? the force that knows, *me* or *not me*? Of course it is in each case *me*, I, myself. Then activity is simply myself acting; sensibility myself feeling; understanding myself knowing. I am myself each and all three, for each is only myself under a given aspect.

This granted, the distinction *between* the subject and the faculty, that is, between the subject and its inneity, must be abandoned. The faculty *is* the subject, that is, the subject under a given aspect. Now, since we have already identified the pure and transcendental cognitions with the faculty of intelligence, it follows that they *are* the subject, and nothing else. They are the understanding, and the understanding is the subject as cogni-

tive. We can now easily grasp the essential features of Kant's doctrine of science.

The actual cognition, we have seen, consists of two parts, the cognition *a priori*, and the cognition *a posteriori*,—the portion derived from experience, and the portion supplied by the subject experiencing. The empirical portion is merely the sensation, consequently, the actual cognition is sensation *plus* the subject,—the old doctrine attributed to Aristotle, with the famous reserve suggested by Leibnitz : *Nihil in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*, — *NISI IPSE INTELLECTUS*: Nothing can be in the mind but what is first in the senses,—except the mind itself. Here is the germ of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, and all that Kant has done has been to develop and systematize the doctrine contained in this celebrated maxim.

We commend this fact to those zealous Kantians among us who are loud in condemning Locke for his alleged sensualism. The charge of sensualism against Locke comes with an ill grace from a follower of Kant ; for, so far as it concerns the *objects* of knowledge, the Englishman is much less liable to it than the German. Locke, indeed, recognized only sensation as a source of primary ideas, yet he held, that logic, or what he calls Reflection, is capable of extending our knowledge, and of attaining, by way of deduction, of inference, from sensible *data*, to realities transcending the limits of sensation itself,—which Kant denies, and labors at length to refute, in his “Transcendental Dialectics.”

The great and important fact, which Kant seems to us to have recognized, is that contained in the reserve of Leibnitz already quoted, — *nisi ipse intellectus* ;—namely, that, in every fact of experience, the subject enters for a part, and must count for something ; and that, prior to experience, the understanding is not, as Locke alleged, a mere blank sheet void of all characters and of all ideas. It is the assertion of this fact, that has deceived so many in regard to the true character and worth of the Critical Philosophy, and made them

look upon the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* as a successful refutation of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Yet even here the difference between the two is more apparent than real, and, so far as real at all, is to the advantage of Locke.

Kant's doctrine concerning cognition *a priori*, pure cognition, and transcendental cognition, translated into the language of mortals, is, all simply, that a being, in order to know, must, prior to knowing, be able to know, — a doctrine which, so far as we recollect, Locke does not call in question. Locke, it is true, represents the mind, that is to say, the intelligent subject, prior to experience, to be a mere blank sheet, or piece of white paper, but obviously only in reference to actual objective knowledge, and he really means no more than Kant himself means by his assertion, that all our knowledge begins with experience. Kant asserts nothing as being prior to experience, but the subject inherently capable of experience; for this is the sum and substance of his whole doctrine concerning the pure and transcendental cognitions; but Locke asserts all this, for he does not resolve, as his pretended disciple, Condillac, does, the *me* into sensation, but asserts it as a substantive existence, and as an active and intelligent force, which he treats under the twofold aspect of sensation and reflection. He distinctly and expressly recognizes the *me* as a force capable of receiving sensations, and of working these sensations up "into that knowledge of objects which is called experience." If Kant asserts any thing more, we have not discovered it.

The simple truth is, that, touching objective knowledge, the only matter which Locke termed knowledge, Kant has made no advance on Locke, but virtually adopts Locke's general doctrine. He leaves, in the beginning, Locke where he is, and attempts to get behind experience, and make a critic of the experience-power; not the cognition, but the cognitive power (*Erkenntnisvermögen*); that is to say, to determine whether the sensation and reflection of Locke, or the knowledge, so called, obtained by them, or rather through them, could

claim any validity, or be worthy of any reliance. At best, he would only have left us the power of communicating with what lies outside of us, which Locke asserted; but, in reality, he has not left us even so much. For he has attempted to show that no experience is or can be valid without both synthetic judgments and synthetic conceptions, *a priori*, and that these judgments and conceptions are of no value, being nothing but pure, that is, empty conceptions. So that, with him we are worse off than we were with Locke; for if Locke was defective in not recognizing the subject in its completeness, Kant is still more defective, in that he, with Hume, recognizes in man no power of intelligence at all. Kant himself believed, many have since believed, that his *Critic* is a refutation of Hume; we regard it as the most masterly defence of Hume that man may be expected to produce. If Kant is right, man is incapable of demonstrating the reality of any existence outside of the subject, and the subject, for the want of a resisting medium, finally loses all apperception of itself, for Kant contends that the *me* can have intuition of itself only in the intuition of the diverse, that is, of the *not me*; and so all science vanishes, all certainty disappears, the sun goes out, the bright stars are extinguished, and we are afloat in the darkness, on the wild and tempest-roused ocean of universal Doubt and Nescience. Alas! we do not misrepresent the philosopher of Königsberg, for he himself, in the preface to his second edition, tells us, that the result of his whole investigation is, to rebuke dogmatism, "to demolish science to make way for faith."

The *Critic of Pure Reason*, we all know, is confessedly atheistic; it leaves no space for faith in God, and Kant was obliged to write his *Critic of the Practical Reason* in order to restore the faith it had overthrown. That is to say, the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* destroys all evidence of the existence of God, leaving us only a dim and flickering faith in our own *me*; but the reason always aspires to unity, to completeness, to the *whole*, which aspiration can be satisfied only by admitting the

notion of a God. In other words, the soul is conscious of a *want*; only God can meet this want; *ergo*, God is! The reasoning, by which Kant gets from the atheism of the *Critik der reinen Vernunft* to the quasi-theism of the *Critik der practischen Vernunft*, is admirably hit off by the following passage from that able, but not over and above saintly, Heinrich Heine, in his *D'Allemagne*, with which we conclude the present article.

"After the tragedy comes the farce. Kant had hitherto taken the terrible tone of an inexorable philosopher, carried heaven by assault, and put the whole garrison to the sword. You saw, extended lifeless on the ground, the old ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological body-guards of God, and God himself, deprived of demonstration, lay swimming in his own blood; henceforth no more divine mercy, no more paternal goodness, no more future rewards for present sufferings; immortality of the soul is *in agony*. . . . Nothing is heard but the death-rattle and lamentations. . . . And Old Lampe, an afflicted spectator of this catastrophe, drops his umbrella; an agonizing sweat and great tears flow down his cheeks. Then Immanuel Kant is touched, and shows that he is not merely a great philosopher, but a brave man. He reflects, and, with a half gracious, half malicious air, says:

"'Yes, Old Lampe must have a God, without which no happiness for the poor man. Now, man ought to be happy in this world,—this is what the *Practical Reason* says. . . . I mean, yes, I myself mean,—that the practical reason, therefore, guaranties the existence of God.' In consequence of this reasoning, Kant distinguishes between *theoretic* reason and *practical* reason. And by the aid of this, as with a magic wand, he resuscitates the God which the theoretic reason had slain.

"Perhaps Kant undertook this resurrection not merely through friendship for poor Old Lampe, but through fear of the police. Did he act from conviction? Has he, in destroying all the proofs of the existence of God, wished to show us how deplorable it is to know nothing of God? He in this appears to do very much like my Westphalian friend, *who broke all the lamps of the Rue Grohnd of Göttingen, and in the darkness made a long oration on the practical necessity of lamps, which he had stoned in a theoretic manner in order to show what we should be without their beneficent light.*"*

* *D'Allemagne*, Tome I., pp. 170–172.

ART. II. — *Church Unity and Social Amelioration.*

THE great majority of our wise and liberal politicians, and not a few of our equally wise and liberal clergy, whose god is what they call *toleration*, profess to regard the division of the Christian world into separate and hostile communions as a very great blessing, and altogether preferable to a state of unity and catholicity; because these hostile communions, these jarring and rival sects, tend, by their mutual ambition and jealousies, to check and restrain each other, and thus prevent any one from gaining the preponderance. In their view, all communions are *sects*, and one, perhaps, not more or less so than another. There is no true church communion, separation from which constitutes sectarianism, but all communions are alike sectarian; and the aim of every friend of liberty should be, to prevent any one of them from gaining the ascendancy, and swallowing up or suppressing the rest.

Now, what is the secret thought of these friends of sectarianism? Why, it is that the Christian church is a disease in the social body, which, since we cannot expel it altogether, we must study to break up, and scatter through the system as much as possible, so that it may not concentrate its virulence on any one point. This was avowed to us in just so many words, the other day, by the excellent conductor of one of our city religious newspapers, which bears the name of *Christian*, and makes more than ordinary pretensions to piety, spirituality, and Christian philanthropy.

Now, what can more completely demonstrate a total want of faith in the church of God? If men believed that the church was founded by God himself, and that the Son of God, who is God, is its head, and always with it, — that it was founded by Infinite Wisdom and Love, and must needs be protected by the same Infinite Wisdom and Love, for the express purpose of exercising authority over men, even over their very consciences, could they regard it as a disease, or fear that its

power could ever be too great, or in any possible contingency become dangerous? In plain terms, if they believed the church to be God's church, and its authority God's authority, could they possibly believe it necessary to guard against it, to interpose barriers to its progress, and to place restraints on its powers? Of course not. They do, then, really believe the church to be of man, of human origin and growth, and, like all things human, liable to abuse, and therefore needing to be restrained. The age, we are aware, is bold in its blasphemies, and all but boundless in its impieties; but we doubt whether, in its sublime politics, it would dare contend that we should restrain within due bounds the power of the All-Wise and Merciful God, and that some safeguards against the tyranny of the Almighty should be sought out. Evidently, therefore, the age regards the church as purely *human*.

Then, again, if these politicians and liberal clergymen believed the church to be of God, to be a Divine Institution, they would regard as evil whatever tended to break its unity, and for the very reason, that, in breaking its unity, they weakened its power, and impeded its operations. They would see and feel, that, the more they extended the power of the church, the further would they extend the kingdom of God on earth; for they would understand by the church the visible instrument, in the hands of the Redeemer and Saviour, of extending and consolidating his moral dominion over the hearts and consciences of men. Their jealousy of church dominion, and their friendship for sectarianism, both go to prove that they are no believers in the church, that they hold that the church has no office to perform in the affairs of mankind, that it is not needed for their moral progress, but is itself a moral disease, of which it would be desirable to be cured altogether, if possible. And yet, these men would be thought to be pious men, and would take it as a proof of our extreme *illiberality*, nay, of our utter want of Christian charity, if we questioned their right to be called and treated as Christians!

One hardly knows what to think. Infidelity, incre-

dulity, indifference, and, what is worse than all, a cold, freezing rationalism, which can hardly claim to be as near to faith in Christ as the old-fashioned Deism, but which nevertheless is baptized, *christened*, with the Christian name, and claims to be Christianity in its greatest purity and simplicity, have taken so deep and so strong a hold on the community, that one hardly dares speak in the name of Christ, and for Christ's church, lest men straightway propose that he should be put into a strait jacket, or sent to the lunatic asylum.

We read, the other day, the speeches and proceedings of a Fourierist convention in the city of New York. Its president was an old and intimate friend of ours; several of the speakers were individuals with whom we have been often associated, and for whose sincerity we would vouch with our life. These men have, no doubt, high and benevolent aims, and really believe they are pursuing a course likely to benefit humanity. There these men met and repelled, with great indignation, the charge of infidelity, or of unfriendliness to Christianity, brought against Fourierism, and resolved that Fourierism is Christian, and that whoso says to the contrary is a slanderer. All very fine, Gentlemen, but who has constituted you judges of what is Christianity, and who will vouch for your own Christian faith, or be our surety that you yourselves are not, under the name of Christianity, setting forth as rank infidelity as was ever set forth by Paine, Volney, or Baron d' Holbach? We see in your speeches nothing but a subtle Pantheism, or a disguised Epicureanism. Your very starting point is at the opposite pole from Christianity, and your method is directly the reverse of that enjoined by the ever-blessed Son of God. You assume the perfection of human nature, the essential holiness of all man's instincts, passions, and tendencies, and contend that the evil in the world comes from causes extraneous to man; from causes which restrain, repress, his natural instincts and passions, and hinder their free, full, and harmonious development. This is your starting-point. Christianity, all the world knows, teaches that evil comes from within,

from man's abuse of the freedom essential to his being as man, and that, in consequence of this abuse, man's nature has become exceedingly disordered, his appetites and affections depraved, his moral tastes vitiated, so that he craves and relishes the meat that perisheth, rather than the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. This is its starting point, and yet, though you directly contradict it, we must not question your soundness as Christian believers, lest we be guilty of slander!

Christianity, again, is a system of means divinely devised and instituted for the recovery of man from sin, his restoration to justice and sanctity, and his growth in knowledge and love. This system of means you reject, and substitute therefor the discoveries of Fourier, and for the Christian Church, its ministries, sacraments, and disciplines, the Fourier phalanx, with groups, series, and alternations of labor. Not the Son of God has disclosed the law of life, not prophets and apostles have discovered the laws by which man is to be recovered, and social harmony produced, — but one Charles Fourier, a merchant, or merchant's clerk, of Lyons. And yet, you are good Christians, and it is a slander to question the eminently Christian character of Fourierism!

Christianity assumes that the evil originates in man's abuse of his freedom, that here is the cause of that evil in nature and outward circumstances, which reacts upon him with such terrible vengeance; it therefore proposes, as its method of recovery, to lay the axe at the root of the tree, to cut off the evil in its source, by purifying the heart, out of which are the issues of life. Teaching that our appetites, passions, and affections are disordered, depraved, and therefore not to be trusted, it lays down, as its first and great command, Deny thyself, take up the cross, and follow the Master. It would correct the outward by first correcting the inward, bring man into universal harmony by bringing him spiritually into union with God. Let man be right internally, and nothing in the outward will be evil to him, for all things work together for good to them that love the Lord. You reverse this; the natural instincts, appetites, pas-

sions, and affections of man, you hold, are all only so many revelations of the will of the Creator, and the fact that man possesses these is a sure indication that it was the will of God that they should be gratified. Instead of saying, *DENY THYSELF*; you say, very properly, taking your point of departure, *PLEASE THYSELF*; and if thou canst not do it in society as it is, then reform, remodel, reorganize society, so thou canst please thyself, gratify, to the fullest, each and all of thy passions. If thou art inclined to chastity, and canst satisfy thyself with being the husband of one wife, or the wife of one husband, well and good, — join the group of the constant; if not, if thou hast a craving after change and variety, and wouldst have a wide experience, pass on to another group, instituted expressly for such as thou, and in which thou mayest, without fear or reproach, indulge thy taste for variety and change, to thy heart's content.*

* We do not overstate the matter. See *Popular View of the Doctrines of Charles Fourier*, By Parke Godwin, New York, J. S. Redfield, 1844, chapter VIII. Mr. Godwin, it is true, dissents from Fourier, for whom, however, he makes an elaborate apology; but Mr. Godwin is too able a reasoner, too clear-sighted, and too well acquainted with Fourier's doctrines, not to see, that Fourier, in what he says of the relation of the sexes, is perfectly consistent with his fundamental principles. Both Fourier and his disciple, Godwin, feel that their principles require them to make ample provision, within the phalanx, for satisfying the cravings and passions of the inconstant and disorderly, and both feel that the moral conscience of Christendom revolts at the bare thought of such a provision. They assume that all which man is naturally prompted to do is right for him to do, and their study is to devise a method whereby man may easily, without let or hindrance, do whatever he is inwardly prompted to do. In other words, all man's desires are holy, and should have their legitimate satisfaction; the desires of individuals differ, and the object of the groups and series is to provide for this difference. If, then, a number of men and women are found in a phalanx, whose desires stretch beyond the Christian rule, why, they must form a group especially for the gratification of their inconstancy. The whole Fourier theory demands this, and our Fourierists should boldly avow it, or else abandon Fourierism itself. We have no respect for the man who timidly recoils before the consequences of his own system. If he cannot look all these consequences in the face without quailing, be they what they may, let him abandon his system. Fourierism is all summed up in these few words, "*Please thyself*; and as thou canst not, in society as it is, — reorganize society,

Yet we are slanderers, if we question at all your Christian character !

“ But these are all pure-minded, pure-hearted, spiritual, lofty, all but saintly men ; admitting that they may err in some of their views, you must own that they are *Christians*, at least, in their *lives*.” What mean you by men’s lives ? The whole of what they think, say, and do ? If so, how can you call that man a *Christian* in his life, who uses the whole weight of his character and talents to bring Christianity into disrepute, and who proclaims boldly, in tones of earnestness, and of apparent philanthropy, doctrines which legitimate, nay, sanctify, the foulest lust, and the grossest passions of our corrupt and fallen nature ? The man, who, in his private life, in secret, breaks every commandment in the decalogue, is a saint in comparison with him who corrupts the public conscience, perverts the principles of men and women, and under cover of morality, of a Divine Law, authorizes all that the revealed law of God forbids. We hold no man to be a Christian man in his life, who promulgates anti-Christian or immoral doctrines. God has revealed to us the truth ; he has instituted an interpreter of his Word ; and error of doctrine is without excuse. A man may always know, if he will, what is the truth. If he will not, if he will not suffer himself to learn of God, and to be decided by God’s Word, it is from the pride of his own heart, it is from moral depravity, it is from setting himself up against God ; and no man who sets himself up against God is or can be a Christian.

Then, again, this Fourierism is nothing but a disguised Epicureanism. The chief end of man is, according to it, pleasure, or happiness. The end proposed is, simply, to enable man to enjoy all his natural instincts and passions, so that he shall experience no evil, be exposed to no jar or discord, and never find any cross ; and this, not by purifying his heart, and bringing

so that thou canst.” This is its great ethical rule, and whoso is not prepared to adopt it, in its fullest extent, should not undertake to be a Fourierist.

him into harmony with nature and with God, but by bringing all out of man into harmony with man. What, according to Fourierism, is duty? Simply to enjoy, to provide for satisfying the passions. What is it to obey God? To constitute the town or parish so that man shall find, in its organization, no restraint on any of his passions or desires. Where, we demand, is duty in the Christian sense, — *duty* to love man, to love God, to live for God, and give one's self up to the commands of God? Nowhere. I find in your teaching nothing which appeals to any other motive in man than interest, or love of pleasure. I see nothing incompatible with the most perfect Epicureanism, save that the individuals who are seeking to introduce the reform are not necessarily selfish, but may be disinterested. But what, save Epicurean motives, do they hold out to induce us to join them? What in us do they address? Do they appeal to our sense of duty? No. They undertake to show the capitalist that it will be a profitable investment of capital, and the laborer that it will be a profitable investment of labor, and the voluptuary that he will there find a pleasing gratification for all his senses. The devil has grown bold, in very sooth, and no longer takes even the trouble to put on a disguise. It ceases to be necessary for him to put on the guise of an angel of light; he may venture forth in his own person, with his cloven foot and trident tail and all, and men will follow him in crowds, and swear he is a Divinity; nay, *the* Divinity; and cry, "All hail, great Prince of Darkness! Welcome, thrice welcome among us!" Wealth and pleasure are the baits with which the devil allures us to our ruin, and wealth and pleasure are the attractions held out by our Fourierists. Yet, in the face and eyes of the command, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth," and of what our Lord says, "If a man seek to save his life he shall lose it," they are good Christians, and we are slanderers if we intimate any discrepancy between Fourierism and Christianity.

We know very well that Fourierists speak of God, of Christ, of revelation, and even of the Church; but what

do they mean by these awful, sublime words? Mean? Why, God is the force acting in our passions and instincts, blossoming in the trees, glowing in the stars, and constituting the sum and substance of what is; Christ is the ideal of perfect manhood, which, at the same time, is the ideal of perfect Godhood, and his significance is the identity of the human nature with the Divine; and revelation means, that, inasmuch as the force acting in us, in our instincts, passions, &c., is God, what these crave must needs be the revelation or manifestation of the will of God. The Church is the house which man builds for God, not the house which God builds for man. Some men are to promenade their eyes over all existing sects, select out the true, and mould it into one complete and harmonious whole. Thus you will have the *one* faith; this one faith, working in the minds and hearts of men, will gradually gather around it, or rather build up around it, an institution which will represent or express it to the world, and that will be the *one* Catholic Church! So they are not only Christians, but Catholics; who, then, shall dare, henceforth, to question their orthodoxy, or hesitate to receive them as competent witnesses and judges of the orthodoxy of Fourierism? Fourierism is Christian in *their* sense, and if they are Christians. But, my good friends, the Church, that is, the Church of God, if it be any thing, is an institution founded by God himself for man, not an institution developed from man, or gradually formed through the workings of men's notions of Christian truth. The one Catholic Church is this divinely founded and sustained institution, and if you do not mean this institution by your Church, then call your Church by another name: if you are not Catholics, in the sense defined by the Catholic Church herself, then, do not deceive yourselves and others by calling yourselves Catholics.

But we did not intend to go so fully into the religious, or rather, irreligious, character of Fourierism. We referred to it, merely as one of the evidences of how completely the sense of religion has been lost; so com-

pletely, — and we say it with deep humiliation, for the charge we imply might but a few years since have been brought with equal justice against ourselves, — that men of no mean intelligence, and of honest intentions, and even benevolent aims, fancy themselves firm believers in the Gospel of our blessed Lord, when rejecting it entirely as the kingdom of mediatorial Grace, when denying its fundamental dogmas and precepts, and admitting it at all only as a bungling statement of the veriest Naturalism. The patient is never in a more dangerous condition than when he believes himself to be in perfect health. The last century was characterized by open, avowed, unblushing infidelity ; the present century, thus far, has to no inconsiderable degree been characterized by an infidelity equally intense, and all the more dangerous from its believing itself to be faith. The German Rationalism of Paulus, Röhr, and others, is worse than the Deism of Voltaire, or the Atheism of d' Holbach ; and Rationalism itself is comparatively orthodox by the side of the mawkish Sentimentalism of De Wette, the pantheistic Spiritualism of Schleiermacher, and the Naturalism of Strauss and his feeble echoes in this country. Infidelity, using, and with apparent sincerity, the language of faith and piety, is the most dangerous species of infidelity the devil has as yet succeeded in inventing. Our age is full of this species of infidelity. Our literature is full of it ; our speculations overflow with it ; it drops from the sanctuary ; it flows out in the political oration, and penetrates even the decision of the judge. We are all good believers ; we are all enlightened, liberal believers ; we believe in all sacred books ; we hold the sacred books of all nations to have been inspired, — all religious to be of God ; for they are of man, and man is God ; and wherefore, then, call us unbelievers ? Sure enough. Nevertheless, a great work is to be done, not merely to bring men back to the simplicity of the Gospel, but to make them perceive even a fundamental difference between the New Testament and the Koran, the Christian Church and the institutions of the Arabian impostor.

The worst feature of our age is its miserable eclecticism. It reads all, collects and accepts all, and comprehends nothing. It starts with the notion, that all religions, all worships, all symbols, all rites, are *symbols* of facts, of partial truths; or, in other words, that each represents a correct, but partial, view of truth. Thus, Paganism has its truth; Mahometanism its truth; Christianity its truth; Catholicism its truth; Protestantism its truth; Calvinism its truth; Arminianism its truth; Trinitarianism its truth; Unitarianism its truth; but no one is *the* truth, the *whole* truth. Christianity is a special department of religion in general, and of course can comprehend only a part of what is essential to religion. Alas! Where is this to end? Did not Jesus say, "I *am* the way, THE TRUTH, and the life?" Do you credit him? Then how dare you say that Paganism or Mahometanism has a truth which is not in all its integrity in Christianity? Are all the so called Christian denominations merely *sects*? Or shall we say, that, in point of fact, among these, after all, is the one true Catholic Apostolic Church? Does the true Apostolic Church still subsist? If you say it does not, you give the lie to Christ, who declared that he would build his Church upon a rock, and the gates of hell should not prevail against it; if you say it does exist, can you conceive it possible for there to be any *truth*, in any of the sects, which it has not in its purity and in its integrity? Do, then, take some position; either accept the Son of God, or reject him; either accept the Church as it is, or reject it altogether. For if it has become corrupt, it is a false Church, was always a false Church, and always must be a false Church; and if it be not corrupt, but the true Church, then to refuse to accept it is to refuse to submit to God.

We press this point upon those who are demanding social ameliorations. We showed in the article in our April number, headed, No Church, No Reform, that there is no reform possible without the ministry of the Church, which not only represents our faith in the supernatural, but which actually embodies supernatural

power, and brings down the Holy Ghost to the aid of human effort. We now say, and proceed to show, that this Church must be ONE and CATHOLIC, or still it can afford us no aid. No Church, no Reform, we began by saying ; we now say, No Reform under Sectarianism. With the Christian world cut up into hostile sects, each with its special idea, special point of view, special law, no scheme of reform, however wisely devised, or however just and practicable in itself, can avail any thing.

This position we could demonstrate from history, and we hold it not difficult to prove that the general condition of society, in a temporal as well as in a spiritual point of view, has deteriorated, and been steadily deteriorating, ever since the great schism in the sixteenth century ; but we choose, for the present, to take a shorter course, and to demonstrate it by considerations which all can appreciate, and which none can gainsay.

We will add here, however, that we may avoid all occasion for misapprehension, that we are not opposed to industrial associations, nor do we at all question the importance — if you will, the necessity — of organizing industry on new and better principles ; but we are decidedly opposed to all associations for reform in any case, or in any department, not founded on the principles, and under the sanction and control, of the Church. Either God has established the Church as the medium of the good he designs us to receive or to work out, or he has not. The Church either is this medium, or it is not. If it is not, then we have nothing more to say, and nothing to do but to fold our hands and remain inactive, till Providence interferes anew in our behalf ; if it is this medium, the divinely appointed instrument of human regeneration, of social as well as individual progress, then we should be contented with it, and confine ourselves to its principles, and to such modes of action as it ordains. A multitude of associations have sprung up in our midst, that we shall one day see cause to regret. The Church is superseded in the affections of a great majority of our church-going people, by Abolition Societies, Moral Reform Societies, Temperance Societies,

and the like. Temperance is, no doubt, a cardinal virtue ; but associations out of the Church, for the suppression of intemperance, ought not to be tolerated, can be tolerated, by no consistent Churchman ; for they say at once, the Church is inadequate to the work of maintaining the morals of the community, which is to condemn the Church in the severest terms, and to declare it utterly unworthy of our support.

Associations within the bosom of the Church, authorized and controlled by it, as a part of its own ministry, as it were, may be very proper, and of the highest utility. So associations formed for the purpose of ameliorating our social condition, of rendering more just and equal our industrial relations, to remove the great disparity of conditions which now obtains, to elevate the poorer and more numerous classes, physically as well as morally and intellectually, — formed, not on Fourier principles, but on those of the Gospel, under the express sanction and control of the Church, we are far from believing would be mischievous ; nay, we believe they might do much, very much, towards realizing the kingdom of God on the earth, and hastening forward the time when the whole earth shall be the Lord's, and all its inhabitants, filled with his spirit, and sealed for immortality. But these associations, by whatever name they are called, must look not to Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, or to Robert Owen, for the theory of life on which they must build, and the exposition of the principles after which they must organize the human race ; but to Christ the Son of God, and to the authorized interpreters of his will ; and moreover, they must associate, not because they would gain more in wealth and pleasure, but because they would make greater sacrifices for God, and attain to higher degrees of Christian sanctity. The feelings, the convictions, which carry men into the association, must be those which led to the establishment of monasteries and convents, although the rules may be different. Yet we have some doubts, whether the associations which do not recognize celibacy, as one of the fundamental rules, will ever suc-

ceed. The experiment of a married order, which was tried in the thirteenth century, failed, became so corrupt that it was suppressed by the authority of the Church ; and the miserable remains of the party concerned are now known only as an heretical sect, which passes generally under the name of Beghards, — the forerunners, as some term them, of Protestantism, — really so, we may believe, of the Anabaptists. But be all this as it may, we mean to offer no objections to such associations, for industrial reforms, or the reorganization of industry, as may be formed, as we have said, on the principles of the Gospel, and under the sanction and control of the Church.

But here comes up a serious difficulty. What do you mean by the Church ? Do you mean that the association should be formed on the principles, and under the sanction and control, of some one of the religious *sects* ? If so, *which* sect ? And why that sect rather than another ? Here we are. We have proved that we can accomplish nothing without the Church ; but we see now that we can accomplish nothing with it, if it be but a mere aggregate of conflicting and hostile sects. Suppose we get the phalanx established. While we are working to get it established, zeal for association, the excitement of the labor itself, sustains us, and we do not feel very deeply the absence of religious faith and worship. We satisfy ourselves with the idolatrous worship we offer to Association. But we will suppose this labor over, that the phalanx, or township, is organized, the groups and series all constituted, the music-box wound up, and set to playing the tunes it is constructed to play. Well, one of two consequences must necessarily follow : 1. Either total indifference to all religious matters, and then the association must fall to pieces for the want of an organic principle ; or, 2. Sectarian controversies will arise, and the phalanx will be dissolved through the bitterness and alienation of the members.

Fourierism proposes to organize families into the phalanx or township ; townships into counties ; coun-

ties into states; and states into one grand harmonic association for the race. The phalanx, in its grand scheme of association, is the unit, of which groups, series, and individuals are the fractions. Now this unity, or integer, that is to say, this *whole* number, is composed of say some fifteen hundred or two thousand individuals, distributed into groups and series according to their natural temperaments, aptitudes, and attractions; and of course, unless perfect harmony can be maintained between the individuals in the series, and between the series in the group, and the groups in the phalanx, there can be no *phalansterian* harmony, the whole plan fail, and Fourierism fall to the ground. Fourier and his disciples seek the guaranty of this harmony in human nature. They say, man and nature are constructed originally in harmony, that one is adapted to the other. The principles of this harmony Fourier has discovered; he has ascertained all the original passions of human nature, and, by the rule of permutations and combinations, determined the number of changes and variations it is possible to introduce; then he has passed from man to nature, and ascertained the same in regard to that, and has given the result of the whole in his Theory of Association, or Doctrine of Universal Unity. Now, once arrange all the outward circumstances which are to affect men, according to the ascertained laws and possible changes and variations of man and of nature, and, of necessity, the desired harmony is produced and secured. So a Fourierist cannot comprehend the necessity of any thing to preserve the harmony of the phalanx, when once it is established. The security is in the *phalansterian* arrangement itself, and cannot fail, unless either man or nature shall undergo a fundamental change.

But this, plausible as it may seem, is not conclusive. If man and nature were originally created in harmony, if one was perfectly adapted to the other, and started, so to say, in tune, whence the present discord? And if, notwithstanding the original harmony and perfect mutual adaptation, this discord has been possible, what

shall hinder it from being still possible after the organization of the phalanx?

The Fourierist must assume one of two things; either that man is free, or that he is not. If he is not free, and is only a sort of musical box, he may again get out of harmony, for he has nothing to keep him in harmony, which he had not at first; if he is free, therefore capable of abusing his freedom, what shall guaranty us that he will not abuse it again, as he did in Eden? The Fourierists resolve that they are Christian believers; then they must own that man had in Eden every desire gratified as perfectly as will be the case in the phalanx, and yet he abused his freedom, sinned, and involved all humanity in the guilt of his transgression. Shall we be told that there will be no temptation to sin? Why not, and as much as there was in Eden? Why may not the serpent find his way into the phalanx, and a new Eve, moved by curiosity or wantonness, put forth her hand and pluck the forbidden fruit? More than all this, is it certain that no man can sin without an external temptation or solicitation to sin? Nay, do our Fourierists need to be told, that the very prosperity they promise would be itself a source of sin, that man under it would wax proud, rebellious, and therefore sinful? "Jeshuron waxed fat and kicked." When men grow fat, we must expect them to kick, and against all laws, human and divine.

We say, then, that you cannot find in human nature the organic principle you need, nor the necessary guaranties of harmony, even if once introduced. This organic principle and these guaranties can be found only in religion, in the life of the Gospel. If this life, which is the life of love and sacrifice, be suffered to die out, and men become indifferent to all spiritual matters, with their thoughts and affections confined to this life and to this planet, with all their appetites and passions gratified, they become too near akin to the brutes that perish, to be able to maintain any thing like social order, or a communal arrangement. The phalanx would have no bond, no principle which would hold it together, even as to its form.

But, on the other hand, suppose the members to be deeply interested in religious matters, but belonging to different and hostile sects, would there be harmony in the phalanx? O, they would tolerate each other's differences! Toleration is, however, the very thing which is impossible to a sincere and earnest mind, for any thing which is not held to be indifferent. Now, you must either make the members more interested in something else than they are in religion, so much so, that they become indifferent to religion, and then the phalanx fails through religious indifference; or you must suffer them to hold religion to be the paramount consideration, the one thing needful, and then toleration is out of the question. Sincere, earnest individuals, members of different communions, will not, cannot, have that warm, cordial fellow-feeling without which the Fourier phalanx cannot operate. So again, differences of faith and worship would alienate one phalanx from another. The Protestant phalanx will hold no intercourse with the Catholic, and the Calvinistic phalanx and the Unitarian will be merely two phalanxes drawn up for battle. The same remarks are applicable to all other divisions. If, then, we are to have association at all, under any circumstances which can promise any thing, we must get rid of sectarianism, and have one only Catholic Church.

In our view, contrary to the views of the associationists, the Church is the highest, the paramount association; and without unity, harmony, in that, it is in vain to look for it in any thing below it. We can never consent to an order of things which would raise industrial associations above the Church, or render our interest in what concerns our industrial relations superior to our interest in what pertains to our relations to the eternal God, and to the world to come. The religious interests, represented by the Church, must always be, in every normal state of society, the great and engrossing interests; if they are so, you can effect nothing in subordinate interests, while in relation to these religious interests you are divided, separated, alienated, and hos-

tile. Our first duty, then, is, if we would effect any thing by way of association, to return to the unity of the Church, through which we may come to one faith, one baptism, one calling, one spirit. Having, thus, unity in that which is highest, we may easily obtain it in that which is lowest. We pray our associationists to consider this, and learn that the Church question is the first and paramount question. Return to the unity and catholicity of the Church,—and then?

And then, what? Perhaps then it will be found that the *phalansterian* organization of society will not be necessary; perhaps then it will be found that to organize society, with a special view to wealth and enjoyment, is not, after all, either the Christian method, or that which man's highest good here or hereafter demands. But be this as it may, we shall have then an authority competent to resolve our doubts and to direct our labors.

It is strange how slow we are to believe Him who rebuked us for being troubled about many things, and declared that "one thing only is needful." If we would diminish the poverty and suffering of the world, we should not labor to multiply material riches, or to facilitate the acquisition of this world's goods, but to restrict men's bodily wants, and turn their activity in a moral and spiritual direction. St. Bernard, living on the water in which pulse had been boiled, laboring at the head of his monks, is more to be envied than Apicius at his feast; and far better was it for Lazarus, who begged the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table, than for the rich man who fared sumptuously every day. On wishes, wishes grow; one desire gratified, a stronger takes its place; one demand answered, another and a greater is made. The richest man in this world's goods has more wants he cannot satisfy, than has the poorest beggar himself; and to die of starvation is not more terrible, view the matter rightly, than to die of a surfeit. You must once more make voluntary poverty honorable, and canonize anew, not your rich old sinner, gorged with the spoils of the widow and orphan,—whose

eyes stand out with fatness, whose heart vaunts itself against the Lord, —but the man who voluntarily submits to poverty, that he may lay up riches in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal. You cannot serve God and mammon ; and the Fourier attempt to reconcile the service of the one with that of the other will turn out a miserable failure, and cover with merited disgrace all concerned in making it.

God has told us what is the kingdom of heaven, in what it consists, and how we may enter therein. He has not left us to the dim, uncertain light of our own unillumined minds, but has himself pointed out the way ; has himself given us the law which is a lamp to our feet and a light to our path. We must follow his law, walk in his way, or all our efforts, however well meant, however sincere and earnest, will be worse than vain. O, why can we not consent to believe that God is wiser than man, and that his thoughts are above our thoughts, and his ways better than our ways ? Believe me, my friends, we show more wisdom in adhering to God's word, in following his Church, than we do in leaving the fountain of living waters, and hewing out cisterns for ourselves, broken cisterns that can hold no water. Raise man above the world, if you would make him blessed while in the world.

ART. III. — *Theory of Morals: An Inquiry concerning the Law of Moral Distinctions, and the Variations and Contradictions of Ethical Codes.* By RICHARD HILDRETH. Boston: Little & Brown. 1844. 12mo. pp. 272.

WHEN an author tells us, in his preface, that his work is written in strict accordance with the inductive method of investigation, we are sure, if his work concerns religion or morals, that he is either about to disgust us with his nonsense, or to shock us with his blasphemy. Mr. Hildreth, in this brief treatise on *Morals*, succeeds in doing both. Only the rank infidelity of his doctrine, and his blasphemous sneers at the existence of God, in every sense in which his existence is distinguishable from that of Nature, and at all who believe in God and rely on his providence and grace, give it sufficient character to render one pardonable for even taking the trouble to condemn it. It is an exaggeration, in morals, of what Mr. Parker's "Discourse on Matters pertaining to Religion" is in theology; and, without the grace to confess it, is as absurd as Bentham's Utility, as skeptical as Hume, and as positively atheistic as D' Holbach.

Mr. Hildreth begins his work by condemning all those moralists who believe in the eternal distinction between good and evil; and by assuming that all our knowledge is confined to a knowledge of our own constitution; that we do not, and cannot, know things in themselves, but merely what they appear to us; that is to say, we can know only our own subjective modes and affections. And after having assumed this, he has the consummate impudence to talk of morals, of moral distinctions, of justice and injustice, of virtue and vice! "The constitution of our own nature," he tells us, "not the absolute constitution of things, is the proper object of human research; and only in the constitution of man can we find, if we find at all, the origin of human opinions and actions." So all in the life of man originates in man, and we need not to look beyond man himself, for the

explanation of his history. Man, then, must be sufficient for himself; then, so far as concerns himself, in the place of God! With all this for his point of departure, it is easy to foresee, our author must ultimately arrive — NOWHERE.

Let the matter be understood. Mr. Hildreth promises us a *Theory of MORALS*. Morals must have some foundation; but he assigns them no foundation, or, at most, only such foundation as they may have in the constitution of man himself. The morals, then, of which he can, at best, give us a theory, whether true or false, are not morals in the proper sense of the term, but only what man, as he now is, holds to be morals. That is, he gives us not a theory of morals, but a theory of men's *NOTIONS* of morals. But as we can know nothing beyond ourselves, the truth or falsity of these notions, objectively considered, we can never know; therefore we can never know whether what we call moral really be moral or the reverse.

This is to begin a theory of morals by denying the possibility of any science of morals. All morality necessarily presupposes an objective law, — a law out of man, above man, and to which man is accountable; which he is under obligation to obey; obedience to which constitutes his virtue, and the rectitude of his act, and disobedience to which constitutes his vice, and the injustice of his act. The conception of this law, to which we are accountable, is essential to the very idea of morality. Without conceiving of this law, no moral character, or moral distinction, is in the remotest degree conceivable. Is there such a law? Is it known or knowable? What does it enjoin? If there be no such law, or if no such law is or can be known by us, then man is not a moral being, and it is sheer nonsense to talk of a theory of morals.

Mr. Hildreth nowhere recognizes a Moral Law, nor even a Moral Lawgiver. *Duty* is a word not needed in his vocabulary; accountability is a conception he does not appear even to have entertained. He has studied Benthamism till his head is more confused, if possible,

than was ever Bentham's own head, and till even his heart appears to have lost all its native appreciation of right and wrong. There evidently can be no morality without a moral law; no moral law without a moral lawgiver, nor without a moral lawgiver who has the sovereign right to impose the law,—that is, to command; whose word is a command, whose will is law. All morality, then, has necessarily its foundation in theology; and no man who denies the existence of God can recognize, consistently, any moral obligation whatever. The attempt to separate between religion and morals, and to obtain a solid foundation, independent of religious faith, for our moral superstructure, has always proved, and must always prove, no less disastrous to morals than to religion. Atheism, or even Pantheism, is incompatible with the recognition of moral distinctions. The foundation of all moral conception is the conception of God, and of God as Sovereign Lawgiver.

Now, Mr. Hildreth sneers, from the beginning of his book to the end, at those who, as he expresses it, believe "in a personal God." We are aware that we have had some few transcendental philosophers, if philosophers they are, who have really fancied, that, in denying the personality of God, they were not making a profession of Atheism; but because these men and women, or rather, boys and girls, have dreamed silly dreams, and talked nonsense while seriously believing themselves to be speaking as oracles of wisdom, we know not that we should be debarred from calling men and notions by their right names. Doctrines pass current among us, are even entertained by many of whom we should have a right to expect better things, which, if not disguised by a peculiar terminology, which, if called right out, in good, plain English, by their proper names, would be regarded with all but universal horror, and recoiled from as from the Evil One himself. The transcendental dishonesty of dressing out infidel notions in the language of piety and faith, imported from Germany and propagated among us by the Dial-istic philosophers and poets, or rather philosopherlings and poetasters, has caused infinite con-

fusion in the minds of good, plain, honest people, and cannot be condemned in terms too pointed or too severe. We call the man who denies the personality of God an Atheist, and we can rank him nowhere but with "the fool" of the Psalmist, who says "there is no God"; only he is rather an exaggeration of the Psalmist's fool, for he not only says there is no God, but has also the folly to try to persuade himself and others, that in denying God he does not deny him.

Mr. Hildreth assumes everywhere throughout his book, that to believe in a personal God — that is, in a God at all, a God who is, and knows that he is, and who doeth according to his will in the armies above and among the inhabitants of this lower world, and whose providence extends to all events, from the rearing of the infant colony, the overwhelming of the empire, to the consoling of the humble and contrite heart, and the falling of the feeble sparrow — is the very height of absurdity, worthy only of a sneer, too egregious a folly to be seriously refuted. And yet, Mr. Hildreth has been brought up in a professedly Christian community, received an education from professedly Christian parents, at a professedly Christian university, and we should not be surprised, if he should even fancy himself a Christian, and take the charge of Atheism, which we bring against his doctrine, as a foul misrepresentation! But will he tell us what he means by an *impersonal* God? In what sense can his impersonal God be distinguished from Nature? And has he the effrontery to maintain, in open day, that a doctrine which identifies God and Nature is compatible with a belief in God at all? In this case, the radical conception of God as *creator* is rejected, and replaced, at best, only by the *natura naturans* of Spinoza, which no possible ingenuity can make the equivalent of *God creating*. Spinoza admits but one only substance with its infinite modes; and according to him, what we call the universe, and which is resolvable into thought and extension, is nothing but these two modes of the infinite Substance, which, according to him, it matters not whether called God or Nature.

Here you have merely *substance* and *mode*, where you should have *cause* and *effect*, creator and creation. The difference between the two is immense. The mode is a mere distinction in the substance itself, not a somewhat to be distinguished *from* the substance. Consequently, it is identically the substance itself, under a special aspect. Hence, God and the universe, conceived as substance and mode, are conceived to be identical; and therefore we may say, indifferently, the universe is God, or God is the universe. But the distinction of cause and effect, of creator and creation, is of an altogether different nature; it is a distinction, not in God, but *between* God and his creation, whereby the one is distinguished from the other, as a man's thought is distinguished from himself, or he himself from his volition. If we deny this distinction, if we deny that God exists independently of his works, that he works freely, sovereignly, from will, purpose, intention, design, we deny the fundamental conception of God, and are virtually Atheists. Now, in denying the personality of God, and identifying God and Nature, we do deny all this.

This established, we find our author talking of *Morals*, and undertaking to give us a *Theory of Morals*, after having denied the Lawgiver. God denied, where is the sovereign whose word is a command, whose will is law? You cannot have a law, unless you have a lawgiver. Well, where is your lawgiver? Nature? Do you know what you mean? What is Nature, but your own constitution? What are its laws, but your own natural tendencies, instincts, appetites, propensities, passions? What is it, then, to say that Nature imposes the law, but to say that man is bound to act out himself, follow his own inclinations, and live as he listeth; that is, but to say, that man is without law, is under *no* law, and may revel in the wildest license to which his nature prompts? Is this your theory of *morals*? But even waiving this, we demand what right Nature has to impose the law, and whence the ground of my right or of my duty to obey Nature? What we demand, as the foundation of morals, is not only a lawgiver, but a lawgiver who has the *right*

to *impose* the law. Even admitting Nature could impose a law, whence would that which Nature imposes derive its strictly legal character? A man who knows so much as our author, who puts on such lofty airs, and with a mere puff demolishes all the great moralists, from Moses and Plato down to the author of "*Archy Moore*," ought not to have left so important a question unnoticed.

Mr. Hildreth is, substantially, a Benthamite, — for his slight modification of Benthamism amounts, practically, to nothing at all; and Jeremy Bentham was, as one of Dickens's characters says of another, "a humbug." There is no use in trying to smooth the matter over, or to invent fine phrases to cover up the intolerable stupidity, ignorance, and dogmatism of that prince of Utilitarians, — a man innocent of all philosophical conceptions and of all philosophical tendency, wise in his own estimation only, because obstinately ignorant of the wisdom of others, — an exaggeration of the very worst features of John Bull, crying out against cant and humbug, and all the time the very prince of canters and humbuggers, and the most egregious dupe of them both. We deny not that Jeremy Bentham may have had some good intentions. We deny not that the man even had a heart, — for we are assured that he once actually loved, and continued to love to the day of his death, — but all in his mind was a confused jumble, and he never succeeded in getting even one tolerably clear notion of the science of morals, either in its principle or in its details. The author of "*Archy Moore*," in the work before us, succeeds no better. He does not appear to want ability; he even gives evidence of having been originally endowed with talents of a very high order; and his capacity as a writer, when he chances to blunder on the right side, is more than respectable. But he has never clearly and distinctly grasped the real problems of the science he professes to treat; he has read some, thought some, but has never cleared up his thoughts, and determined their exact import and value.

After rejecting what he calls the *Platonic* theory of morals, the Selfish, the Stoic, and the Epicurean sys-

tems, our author proceeds to set forth his own, which is, That such actions as produce, or are supposed to produce, or tend to produce, immediately or ultimately, pleasure to sensitive beings other than the actor, are *right* actions; and that such as produce, are supposed to produce, or tend to produce, pain to sensitive beings other than the actor, are *wrong* actions. "The word *good* is employed," he says, "to describe any thing that gives us pleasure; the words *bad* and *evil*, any thing that gives us pain, whether a moral pleasure or a moral pain, *or a pain or a pleasure of any other kind*." So, then, when I perform an action which tends to the pleasure of others, I do good, and perform a *right* action; and, if I do it with the design or intention of giving pleasure, I am virtuous. On the other hand, when I perform an action which tends to give pain to others, I do *evil*, perform a *wrong* action, and I, if I have done it designedly, am *vicious*.

But will Mr. Hildreth inform us, whence he derives his proofs that good and evil are resolvable into simple pleasure and pain? If I ask him, What is good? He answers, Pleasure. Moral pleasure? Yes, or any *other kind* of pleasure. If I ask, What is evil? He answers, Pain. Moral pain? Yes, or any other kind of pain. Pleasure and pain are the exact synonymes of good and evil, — with the single exception, that the pleasure be that of some being other than the actor, and also the pain. But whence this exception? If pleasure is good, why is not *my* pleasure as much a good as the pleasure of any other being? And what reason can be assigned why it is less right for me to promote my own pleasure than it is to promote the pleasure of others? If pain is evil, I would like to know why *my* pain is less an evil than another man's pain? And why it is not as wrong for me to pain myself as to pain another? Whence, then, we ask again, the ground of this exception? We do not deny, that an action, to be a right action, must possess the quality of contributing to the good of some other being or beings than the actor; but we say, if pleasure is good, no reason can be assigned why the pleasure of the actor should be excluded.

Then, again, if all pain caused to others is evil, and the causing of it wrong,— then the pain I cause my child when I correct it, my friend when I admonish him of his faults, or that which the surgeon causes in amputating a gangrenous limb, is evil, and the act of causing it wrong, and, therefore, an act that should not have been done. If pleasure is good, and the causing of it, *in all cases*, right, when it does not chance to be the pleasure of the actor, — then the pleasure I should give the thief, by enabling him to steal, or the felon, by enabling him to escape the fangs of justice, or the pleasure I should give by enabling men to gratify their depraved appetites and passions, would be good, and the promoting of it right, and I virtuous in promoting it! Is our moralist prepared to stand by all this? If not, he would do well to ask leave to amend his definition. Pleasure is not the exact synonyme of good. There are guilty pleasures, and many there are “ who take pleasure in unrighteousness.” Is it less wrong for me to aid others to the pleasures of unrighteousness, than it is to indulge them myself? Pain is not always an evil, but is sometimes, especially the pain of remorse, and pain imposed by the minister of God by way of penance, often the means even of a great and permanent good. Pleasure is not good, unless it possess some quality beside that of being pleasure; and pain must possess some quality beside that of being pain, in order to be evil. Only *lawful* pleasures are good, and only *unlawful* pains are evil.

Here comes up, again, the question of the Law, and therefore of the Lawgiver. What pleasures are *lawful*? What pains are *unlawful*? Will Mr. Hildreth answer, Such pleasures are lawful as tend to the good, advantage, or utility of beings other than the one who causes them? And unlawful pains such as tend to the evil, disadvantage, or harm of beings other than the one who causes them? Then his doctrine, if he resolve good into utility, will be Utilitarianism, and differ from Benthamism only in excluding the actor himself from the number whose advantage is to be sought, and from the number whose harm is not to be sought.

Suppose we resolve pleasure into good, and good itself into utility, will Mr. Hildreth tell us what is his criterion by which he determines what is or is not for the greatest advantage of others? What is the test of utility? How do you determine whether this particular act, before which I am deliberating, is or is not useful? But utility itself is not ultimate. For a thing is useful only as it contributes to some end, and harmful only as it prevents or hinders the realization of some end. Nor is this all. That is not harmful that prevents the realization of a *bad* end; nor that useful which facilitates the realization of an end not good. Hence, before we can define what is useful or harmful, we must define what are good and bad ends; which can be done only by determining what is absolutely good and what is absolutely evil. So the adoption of the utilitarian rule relieves no difficulty. Before I can know what is useful to others, I must know what is the end they ought to seek; and before I can know that, I must know what is the end of creation itself; that is, the end for which God made and sustains the universe,—a knowledge which Mr. Hildreth represents as wholly out of the question.

Nor would this be all. I should be obliged not only to know the end of creation, and the end of the particular beings in question, but also the precise bearing of the act I propose to perform on that end, whether to hinder or to facilitate it. Do we know this of any action we are called upon to perform? Who seeth the end? Who can tell what are to be the effects of his act? Who knows but that which he soweth in joy and hope may spring up in sorrow and anguish? Have not our best intentions for others often proved mischievous? How often is it that philanthropy, pure and ardent, in the pursuit of a special object, tramples on more rights than it secures, and causes greater evil by the way than it realizes in the end? The whole history of our race is full of examples of this sort, and our own country, and our own section of it, affords, at this moment, its full share of these examples. How, then, are we to deter-

mine what is a useful or a harmful act? What is, we ask again, the test of utility?

But even this does not exhaust the difficulties of the subject. Morality implies, always, obligation. Suppose I know what is for the good, the advantage, or even the pleasure of others, whence follows it that I am bound to labor for it? What is the ground of my obligation to do good to others, to promote their advantage, or their pleasure? Here our author is singularly deficient. Here is his definition of duty, which, so far as our reading extends, he may claim as peculiarly his own. "Duties, or obligatory actions," are "actions the performance of which is expected from all men." Expected by whom? And on what ground? Why, poor man, in thy infidel darkness, thou hast lost even the ordinary sense of words. Duty is that which a man is *bound* to perform. It necessarily implies, independent of man, a law that binds, and a sovereign lawgiver that imposes the law. This is what all the world understands by *duty*. Are there duties in this sense? Answer, yes, or no. If not, then say so, reject the term, and not in a cowardly manner seek to escape, by using the word *duty* divested of its ordinary meaning, the odium which every man justly incurs, who denies all moral obligation.

Our author contends for benevolence, disinterestedness, that we should labor to promote others' happiness without any regard to our own. This would seem to be somewhat, nay, to be much, and will impose upon many, and make them believe him the advocate of pure and lofty moral principle. But we have no right to seek even the happiness of others but by lawful means, that is to say, by right means. Because my motive is good, because I am conscious that I am disinterested, that I am ready to lay down my life for others, it does not follow that my conduct is right, and that I am wholly guiltless in what I do. God is, say Mr. Hildreth what he will; and God is the Moral Governor of the universe, and has prescribed to us the path in which we are to walk. He has fitted means to ends, and it is only when we adopt the means he has appointed, and seek

to do good in the way he has ordained, that we can be justified in laboring for the good of others. Right ends can be rightfully sought only by right means. The sentiment of benevolence, then, must operate lawfully, in an orderly manner, in obedience to the law of God, or it is no more to be indulged than selfishness. Here is a principle which reformers, radicals, come-outers, disorganizers, would do well to bear in mind, for it is a principle they are exceedingly prone to neglect. It is little credit to a man that he has a zeal for the good of others, if it be not a zeal according to knowledge. Here is wherefore so many, who would do good, who band together for noble ends, and labor with all zeal and diligence, do yet prove the greatest plagues and tormentors of their kind. Ten chances to one, a man with the crotchet of philanthropy in his head, proves to be possessed by the devil in the guise of an angel of light. Let men be careful, how, Uzza-like, they reach forth the hand to steady the ark of God.

But this is not all. Wherefore am I bound to be benevolent? Why are acts of disinterestedness and sacrifice excellent and praiseworthy? We, of course, with the limitations suggested, do not question the fact; but in a theory of morals the ground of all this should be shown. Does Mr. Hildreth show this? Not at all. He nowhere shows me how I am to know what is a right action, for he nowhere shows me how I am to know what will be useful to others; and, more than all this, he fails utterly to show me why I am under obligation to seek it, even in case I should ascertain it. What, then, is the value of what he has done? What light does he throw on any ethical problem, or any question of casuistry? None at all. Yet he talks as a man who has mastered his subject, and as one who has the right to speak *ex cathedrâ*. The arrogance of his tone is only equalled by his insensibility to all religious truth. His work seems to have been written for the express purpose of furnishing a moral code to transcendentalists and come-outers.

But we have not yet done with Mr. Hildreth. The

most important bearing of his definition remains to be considered. He defines a wrong action to be an action which causes or tends to cause pain to others ; a right action, one which causes or tends to cause pleasure to others. But these others must be *sensitive* beings. This definition is expressly designed to exclude religion from the domain of morality. Moral actions are, usually, he tells us, divided into three classes: 1. Duties to ourselves ; 2. Duties to others ; 3. Duties to God. The definition excludes the first class ; for nothing we can do to ourselves, or indulge in, is wrong, save so far as it causes pain to others, or diminishes our disposition or ability to please them. The third class are also excluded ; because God, being impersonal, a mere unconscious force, is incapable of being pleased or displeased, of approving or disapproving. Consequently, to do, or to forbear doing, this or that, because it is pleasing or displeasing to God, is a great absurdity. Morality knows no God, knows no divine command, must have reference to no divine pleasure or displeasure. Consequently, they are altogether in the wrong who represent the love and worship of God as moral duties, or who deny that the atheist is, or can be, a moral man. God, according to our author, is a mere creature of the human imagination, a mere human personification of the forces of Nature, and, of course, can have no influence over a true sage !

Mr. Hildreth proceeds to divide all moralists into two classes, — the Forensic moralists and the Mystics. Forensic systems of morals are those in which the *other beings*, whose pleasure we are to seek, “are men, or occasionally animals” ; “the mystical systems of morals are those in which it is the pain or pleasure of the Deity, by which the moral character of actions is to be tested. Such an act is praiseworthy, because it pleases God ; in other words, because it gives God pleasure ; such an act is wrong, because it is displeasing to God ; in other words, because it gives God pain ; such an act is indifferent, because it does not affect God in any way.”

We see that he means here, by the mystical systems, those which have a religious foundation, and which

make the will of God the rule of moral action; but does he state the case fairly? Who ever dreamed of giving God pleasure or pain, in the sense Mr. Hildreth implies? Does Mr. Hildreth hold it a moral action to tell the truth? To the religious moralist, God is the Good, and nothing is good that is not godlike. God is the standard. But God is a living being, an infinite personality, that is to say, an infinite *will*, and therefore is he rightly said to approve what conforms, and to disapprove what does not conform, to him. In seeking the pleasure of God, we are simply seeking to obey his law, that is, to do that which he approves, that is, to do that which conforms to his will, that is to say, again, that which conforms to himself. Nobody supposes, that, when we refuse to conform to his will, he suffers pain; or that, when we conform, he experiences what we term the emotion of pleasure. To please God is simply to conform to his will; to displease him is simply to disobey him.

"The mystical theory, however, when it is made the foundation of practical morals, is usually amalgamated with the selfish theory; that is, with the theory, that virtue consists in securing our own greatest happiness. This amalgamation easily takes place; for since, according to the mystics, every thing depends on the volition of God; and as God is supposed to act, at least to a certain extent, as men act, *to be influenced by feelings of gratitude*; hence, those who please God will certainly be rewarded by him in the end, and those who displease him will be punished. But as this present life does by no means exhibit any such rewards and punishments, *mysticism has been led to adopt the hypothesis of a future retribution*; a doctrine which the semi-Stoics and the semi-Epicureans have also found themselves obliged to adopt, as the only means of giving any plausibility to their idea of the coincidence of virtue and happiness." — Ch. I., §§ 38, 39.

Mr. Hildreth nowhere accepts what he calls the mystical theory; he means to sneer at it, and to hold it up to our abhorrence. He therefore intends to scout the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, and to discard every system of morals that depends at all on a future state of existence. We have evidently gone far in our downward progress. It is hardly to be presumed, that

our community, designedly, with full consciousness of what it is doing, would reject Christianity; and yet it calls in question every article of the Christian's faith, and, what is remarkable, it does it in the name of Christ. The great labor, for some time, has been to prove that Jesus was no Christian, and that, in point of fact, he was, if not an infidel, very much like a modern come-outer. Men amongst us—and to our shame be it said, we were once, in more respects than one, of their number—there are, who really believe they are honoring Christ as the Teacher of Truth, while they are denying every doctrine he taught, and while, in the poverty of their religious creed, they fall below the most stupid of heathen nations! Nay, we find them parading this poverty, making their boast of what should be their shame. If the great body of Christian believers, from the time of Christ down, have mistaken his doctrines, and given us something entirely different from the Gospel, then one should regard the Saviour as having been wanting in the essential qualities of a teacher, that of making himself intelligible; or else he provided with miserable skill and judgment for the preservation of the right understanding of his doctrine. In either case, we declare him unworthy of our confidence, and, as honest and brave men, we should reject him altogether. It is painful to one who has awaked from the sleep into which he had been drugged by the spirit of his age and country, to see how men, even in the name of Christ, have pared down the Gospel till nothing of it is left. We are, many of us, boasting of our success in this work, and swearing, in the very teeth of gainsayers, that we are true Christians, first-rate Christians, the only genuine Christians, while denying every distinctive doctrine and precept of the Gospel. With what ineffable disdain do we treat the simple follower of Jesus, who is content to believe with the Apostles, the Fathers, and the Church Universal! Why, we have grown infinitely too wise to fall into the absurdity of believing there was wisdom in the world before we were born. Nobody ever knew any thing of the true meaning of the

Gospel, till we were born ! We, for the first time, have seized its true significance, and, after all, it is no such mighty affair. It is all perfectly simple, and means merely, that, if one is good and does good, — then one is good and does good.* We have rejected from the Gospel all that was foreign to it, all that ignorance, superstition, false learning, false philosophy, and priest-craft have added to it; we have demolished hell; scouted the devil; laughed at the fall; reduced the Son of God, first, to a promising Hebrew youth, who was a successful Mesmeriser, and, finally, to a mythic personage, created by the creeds and fancies of men; we have, moreover, successively disrobed God himself of his justice, his truth, his sovereignty, his paternity, his providence, at last of his personality, and resolved him into a blind force, or a mere fate or irresistible necessity. And in all this we have been guilty of no heresy, of no error in doctrine, — have been, in fact, good, true, faithful, enlightened, liberal Christians, the reformers of the Church, and the restorers of primitive Christianity ! Surely, this is a wonderful age, and we are marvellous people.

If there is any one doctrine dear to a Christian heart, it is the doctrine of future retribution, the only doctrine capable of clearing up the confusion and apparent anomalies of this life, and of giving us, at all times, in the darkest moments, a ground for unwavering confidence in God. The man, who denies a future state of rewards and punishments for deeds done in this life, denies, in the plainest and fullest manner possible, Christianity itself, and saps the foundation of all morals, both theoretical and practical. The great evil we have now to contend with is this wide-spread doubt in respect to a future state of retribution. Men have ceased, to an alarming extent, to believe in future rewards and punishments, and we lose our hold on their consciences.

* See Parker's Discourse, *passim*. The statement in the text contains the whole sum and substance of the Christian Revelation, according to this erudite, eloquent, and *philosophic* divine.

There is a wide-spread feeling, that what people have heretofore feared is all a fable, and men have seriously published books to prove that there is no punishment for the wicked after death, because, forsooth, certain Greek and Hebrew words, translated *hell* in the English version of the Bible, did not, in their primitive use, designate a place of punishment. As well say that there is no such place as London, because the word *London*, in its primitive sense, does not mean a great city. Men everywhere around us say to themselves, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die, and there is an end of us"; or else they say, "Go to, who's afraid? God is good; our conduct cannot affect him; he is compassionate and kind, and is not willing that any should perish; and so he will not damn us; but as soon as we die, he will take us right into heaven, to enjoy inconceivable bliss, for ever and ever." So, through faith in universal annihilation, or faith in universal salvation, there is no longer any chance of touching a man's conscience, and arresting him in his wickedness. The law has no terrors for the wicked, and love can operate only on the redeemed. Hence the deplorable state of our morals, the terrible moral corruption spreading over Christendom. And now, here is a man who judges himself wise enough to instruct his countrymen, coming out with a work on morals, in which he makes it a reproach for moralists to rest any portion of their systems on considerations drawn from a future life!

We should like to have Mr. Hildreth show us how he would enforce the disinterested morality he contends for, by considerations drawn only from this life. He requires me to sacrifice myself for the good of others. Very well. I do not complain of him for this; but through what motive am I to do it? I do not ask him to assure me of a personal reward which I am myself to receive, but I do want him to show me that *this good of others, which I am to promote, is worth sacrificing myself for*. If you tell me the evil men suffer is only for this short life, to be succeeded, whether I

make an effort to remove it or not, by an eternity of bliss, I am very sure that I shall put myself to no great inconvenience to make them happy here; for their present sufferings will only enhance the relish of their future joys. If, again, you tell me that there is no hereafter, that this life is man's whole life, and that it is only for men's good, while on this side the grave, that I can labor, you make them such miserable abortions, and the greatest amount of good that can be procured for them so contemptibly little, that I cannot disturb myself on their account. "Poor devils," I must say, "ye are born in the morning, to be cut down at noon, and wither away in the evening; at best, mere insects, born to flutter an hour in the sun; — flutter on, and flutter as ye will; it's enough for me to take care of my own wings." A cold and heartless selfishness would possess me, and I should be utterly incapable of a benevolent emotion, or a disinterested act. If I am to act for others' happiness, you must show me that it is worth acting for; that it may be hazarded; that my acts are needed to secure it; and that it may continue for ever. In seeking to save others from misery, if I am to seek with much earnestness, I must feel that they are exposed to an infinite loss, that it is not from the petty ills of this short life merely, but from the pains and woes of eternity, I must save them. Hence, we regard the moralist, who sneers at a state of future rewards and punishments, as guilty of the grossest wrong. He is undermining the very foundation of morals, depriving morals of all sanction, and virtually letting men loose in the wildest license. We have no charity for such a man, — no excuse. No community can tolerate him, without the greatest conceivable danger to its institutions, to its peace, to its moral and religious life.

But we have no disposition to pursue Mr. Hildreth further. His system professedly belongs to the class of moral systems, usually denominated the *sentimental*. He makes all moral distinctions originate in the sentiment of benevolence, and makes the moral character of the act depend entirely on its producing pleasure or

pain to beings other than the actor. 'This would seem to place virtue in disinterestedness, and to demand perpetual self-sacrifice. But Mr. Hildreth, after all, is none of your self-sacrificing moralists. He thinks it as great an absurdity for one to sacrifice himself for the love of man, as for the love of God ; but how he really saves himself from inconsistency in this, it is not, at first sight, very easy to perceive, yet, if we comprehend him, we shall be able to clear him from contradiction. We must understand, in the first place, that Mr. Hildreth recognizes no right and wrong, independent of man himself. The notion, that there is, independent of man, a good which he is under obligation to seek, which he does not make, but which he perceives, by means of his natural power, or by means of supernatural instruction, he regards as false and puerile. This is what he condemns, as the *Platonic* theory. Let it be understood, then, the right is not something we are bound to do, but simply an affection of our nature, which we have agreed to call right. Now, considering our actions in relation to their motive, or subjective principle, they are divisible into five classes : 1. Meritorious actions ; 2. Duties, or obligatory actions ; 3. Indifferent actions ; 4. Permissible actions ; and 5. Vicious, criminal, or wicked actions.

Duties, or obligatory actions, are those actions beneficial to others, which are performed by the greater number of any given society. Meritorious actions are those which are performed by only a few in a given society, and which argue in those who perform them more than an ordinary force of the sentiments which operate beneficially to others. *Permissible* actions, though injurious to others, are such as the majority do not judge it necessary to refrain from doing ! Vicious, criminal, or wicked actions are those which are performed by but few, and are more injurious to others than is the ordinary conduct of the majority. Indifferent actions are actions with a double result, being injurious to some, and beneficial to others ; if we fix our attention on the injury they do, we shall class them as wrong ; if on the

good, as right. One would suppose, therefore, that these actions could hardly be called *indifferent*. But that is Mr. Hildreth's affair, not ours.

Well, now, a man that does his duty, is he not a moral man? Duty is a beneficial action, to perform which is to practise as well as the majority. If, then, I conduct as well as the majority, I do my duty. I do, then, all that can be demanded of me. But it is very certain that the majority practise very little of this self-denial, contended for by the disinterested moralists; therefore it is not a man's duty to sacrifice himself for others. But, to attain to the highest excellence of character, must he not? We, assuredly, shall not disagree with Mr. Hildreth, in regard to a distinction between duties and meritorious actions; but we suppose he will concede to us, that it is man's duty to do right. Now, if he places the right in acting in obedience to the sentiment of benevolence, we see not how he can make the distinction he contends for. The right being exclusively in the sentiment of benevolence, it must needs demand the exclusive exercise of that sentiment; and that sentiment, become exclusive, is the self-denial which Mr. Hildreth contends duty does not demand. If there be any thing certain in Mr. Hildreth's theory, it is, that a man is moral only in the exercise of benevolence. If it is man's duty to exercise benevolence at all, then how will he prove that a man can be *meritorious* in the exercise of benevolence? For, we suppose, no man will contend, that one is *meritorious*, unless he does more than his duty. The distinction between meritorious acts and duties, with all deference to Mr. Hildreth, we think, is pointed out with more clearness and justice in the New Testament. There came one to Jesus, and said, "Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" Jesus answered, by pointing him to the demands of the moral law, specifying its several precepts. "All these," answered the young man, "have I kept from my youth up; what lack I yet?" "If thou wouldst be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me." The young man, in complying with

the law, did his duty, was just, and could inherit eternal life ; but, in doing this, he was only just ; he had not attained to the highest degrees of excellence. To become perfect, it was necessary that he should do more than the law demanded, that he should rise from justice to love. If I am rich, it is not my *duty* to give what I possess to the poor. The law does not demand this, but Christian love does, and it is my privilege to do so, and will be set down to my merit, not in discharge of my debt.

But Jesus did not measure a man's duty by the conduct of the majority. Here, again, is a serious defect in Mr. Hildreth's system, and shows that he carries his demagoguism into morals as well as into politics. The standard, with him, is the conduct of the majority. Duty is that which is done by the majority of a given community, that which makes a man as virtuous as the majority ; meritorious actions are those which the majority agree to applaud, and criminal actions are those which the majority condemn, as sinking below the practice of the majority. A fine doctrine, this ! and a man holding a respectable rank in the community where he lives has the effrontery to avow such a demoralizing doctrine, — a doctrine which ought to be condemned, in the severest terms, by every one who has the least sense of what is due to himself, or to his fellow-men. The law to which a man must conform, in order to discharge his duty, is not the practice of the majority, nor the *opinion* of the majority, which is always better than the practice, — but the law of God, and which demands precisely the same things in all ages and countries, and of every individual with the ordinary faculties of a human being.

The general state of mind, in which Mr. Hildreth writes, may be seen in this statement : "To believe a man against our own senses and reason is a high compliment. Hence the merit ascribed by theologians to implicit faith." Now, if Mr. Hildreth knows any thing at all of what theologians call implicit faith, or rather, faith in God, he knows this statement is not

true. They have never yet supposed a man could, in any respect, pay our Heavenly Father a compliment. Theologians are not such consummate simpletons as all that comes to. I demand implicit faith in me on the part of my child, because there are a great many things which he must do or avoid doing, the reason of which he cannot comprehend. This notion, which has latterly prevailed, that you must appeal to a child's reason, and show him the reason of whatever you demand, is of a piece with all the rest of our modern inventions. The first lesson to be taught a child is obedience, — ay, blind obedience, if you will, — for, till after years of training, your child will be utterly unable to comprehend the reasonableness of your command. Your command, your wish, must be your child's reason. To give him, till considerably advanced, any other reason, is to destroy the foundation of that respect, that reverence, for one's elders and superiors, of which we as a people have so little, and without which there is, and can be, no solid worth of character. Now, this same trust, which I demand of my child in me, God demands of us all in him. We can know what he commands; but the reason of the command, or wherefore he commands what he does, we cannot always know, and are, for the most part, incapable of comprehending. It should, therefore, be enough for us, that he commands. His command should always be a sufficient reason for obeying. The mind, that would seek to go behind the command for its reason, is essentially impious and atheistic. Just as if, in the nature of things, a more conclusive reason were possible, for doing a thing, than that God wills it! The will of God is, not theologically only, but philosophically, the ultimate reason itself; and when you have got to the ultimate, why seek to go beyond?

So, again, with regard to matters of belief. Show me that God has said it, and you show me that it is true; for it is impossible for God to lie. His word is truth, and the highest possible evidence of truth. This is the view theologians take of what so scandalizes our author. What is sneered at, as implicit faith, is the most

reasonable thing imaginable. Is it unreasonable to believe a proposition on sufficient evidence? Does such belief derogate from the *rights* and *dignity* of the mind? Of course not. Then what do I surrender, when I believe my Heavenly Father on his word? Nay, suppose, as I firmly believe, the Church to be the divinely commissioned interpreter of God's word, what do I surrender in submitting to the decision of the Church, that I do not equally surrender when I believe any proposition on adequate evidence? If I believe at all, it is always on authority; and what higher authority can I have in any case than the authority of God, or of the Church authorized by him to speak in his name? We do not believe God's word, because by so doing we compliment the Almighty, but because, as reasonable, nay, as rational beings, we can do no less. But enough; we have already spent more time on Mr Hildreth than his book deserves.

ART. IV. — *The Novelties which disturb our Peace. Four Letters addressed to the Bishops, Clergy, and Laity of the Protestant Episcopal Church.* By JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont. Philadelphia: Hooker, 1844. 12mo.

THE Anglican Church, from which the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country derives, appears to have been founded on compromise. In organizing it, and settling its articles, canons, homilies, and liturgy, there were two tendencies to be consulted and conciliated: One, the Catholic tendency, which would retain as much of the Catholic Church, and separate as little from Rome, as possible, with the rejection of the papal supremacy; the other, the Protestant tendency, which would retain as little of Catholicism, and depart as far from Rome, as possible, without resigning the Christian name altogether.

The internal history of Anglicanism is the history of the struggles and alternate victories and defeats of these two tendencies. Henry the Eighth, the first to break with Rome, was a Catholic, saving so far as concerned the papal supremacy, and making the monarch the head of the Church. He wrote in defence of the Catholic faith against Luther, and made the profession of Protestantism a capital offence. Under his reign, the Catholic tendency was sustained in the Church, and very few changes were made at the demand of Protestantism or in accordance with its spirit.

Under Edward the Sixth, the son and successor of Henry, the Protestant spirit gained the ascendancy, and the Church of England was made a *Protestant Church*, and conformed, substantially, save in outward organization, to the model of the Protestant and Reformed Churches of the continent. Important changes were introduced into its doctrines, discipline, and ceremonies. Severe denunciations of the doctrines, discipline, and usages of the Romish Church were pronounced, and the greater part of religious antiquity was disowned. Mary followed, reopened communion with Rome, and did what she could to restore the ancient Catholic order. The daughter of Katharine of Arragon inherited many of the better qualities of her mother, and deserves a more honorable mention in history than she receives. She was devout, sincerely attached to the Church, but her injudicious zeal weakened her own cause, and strengthened the Protestant tendency of the country.

Elizabeth, daughter of Henry and Anne Boleyn, had strong Catholic tendencies, and would, most likely, have continued the Anglican Church in communion with Rome, if she could, on Catholic principles, have maintained her right to the crown. But, in the eyes of the Holy See, and of all good Catholics, her birth was illegitimate. She was, therefore, obliged to be a Protestant, in order to secure her seat on the throne; and, in return, compounded with her conscience by being in all other respects as Catholic as possible. Under her reign, the Anglican Church received its definite form, and

was finally settled. It was less Catholic than under Henry, and more so than under Edward. The Catholic tendency, in reality, predominated, though the Protestant tendency was strong, and powerfully resisted it. Neither, however, could entirely suppress the other; and the principle seems to have been finally adopted, and acted upon, of making the basis of the Church so broad, and of expressing its faith in terms so general and indefinite, that the great body of those affected by either tendency might come within its pale. The Thirty-nine Articles have been said to be "articles of peace," and they seem to us to have been drawn up, not for the purpose of defining the faith of the Church, but of leaving it so equivocal that either of the two parties might conscientiously interpret it in its own favor.

The Catholic tendency, though powerfully resisted, maintained, however, under Elizabeth and the Stuarts, the predominance in the Church, if not in the kingdom; and for a moment, under Archbishop Laud, — a much calumniated prelate, — it appeared not improbable that the Anglican Church herself might return to the communion of the Holy See. But in the Revolution of 1688, Protestantism gained the victory, and, with the accession of the House of Hanover, was firmly, and, we fear, permanently, established. During the whole of the eighteenth century, the most inglorious period of the Anglican Church, it reigned without a rival; the Catholic tendency seemed to have wholly died out; and scarcely a sign of life was discernible, if we except the spasmodic twitches and contortions of the Evangelicals, till the recent movement of the Oxford divines.

After the revolutionary fanaticism, which marked the conclusion of the last century, had in some measure subsided, and men began to feel the impotence of the Naturalism which had been its concomitant, a reaction in favor of religion and the Church commenced throughout Christendom. This was seen in the movement of the Evangelical party in Germany, to revive the old forgotten symbols of the early Protestants; but more especially among the Catholics of Germany and France. The

man who contributed, perhaps, more than any other to this reaction was the Abbé de la Mennais, then a genuine Catholic priest, and not unworthy of his high and sacred calling. His *Essai sur l'Indifférence en Matière de Religion* was a clap of thunder from a cloudless sky. It startled the world from its sleep of death to the fatal consequences of the Protestantism, Philosophism, Deism, Atheism, and Indifferentism, which they had followed, and which could be averted only by a sincere and hearty return to the Church of God. That book sealed the doom of French infidelity, and, under Providence, has been a powerful means of preparing a religious future for the French people.

Oxford felt, no less than Paris, the reaction against the Rationalism and Infidelity which had been so madly fostered and so widely diffused. A devout spirit, a meek, humble, self-denying, Christian spirit, was reawakened, and, with this, the old Catholic tendency revived. Always, in the history of the Anglican Church, do we observe, that, just in proportion as learning, piety, religious zeal and devotedness revive, as its members become more simple-minded, less worldly, more self-mortifying, more devout, more willing to spend and be spent in the cause of Christ, do the old Catholic tendency and party revive, and acquire new force and prominence. It is only as men grow fanatical, or cold, worldly, proud, arrogant, self-conceited, self-willed, rationalistic, turbulent, or disorderly, that the Protestant tendency and party predominate. The movement of the Oxford divines, though not in all respects unexceptionable, was yet, at bottom, a truly religious movement. Its exponents felt something of the old Christian spirit working in their hearts, — something of that spirit which had tamed the savage and barbarian, enriched the history of the race with myriads of saints and martyrs, covered Europe over with the monuments of zeal for God and of love for man, and made the whole earth hallowed ground, — and they felt that they, too, might be sons of the great Christian family, and heirs of its sacred traditions and precious memories.

This movement renewed, in the bosom of the Anglican Church, the old struggle between the Catholic and Protestant tendencies, which that Church had accepted in its origin, but which it had never reconciled. We have watched this movement with alternate hope and fear; but, alas! at present, only the fear remains. For a moment, we ventured to hope that the Catholic tendency would carry the day, and the Anglican Church become, in very deed, a living branch of the Church Universal; but, unhappily, that Church is under the Erastian curse; completely subject to the secular power; bound hand and foot; and, what is worse, seems to love her chains, and to glory in her shame. The civil power in England is, and must be, Protestant. The crown swears to defend the Protestant religion, and to maintain the Protestant succession. The king, nay, the *queen*, is the spiritual head of the Church, and no good can come of it till it breaks its accursed thralldom, and reasserts and maintains religious liberty. We see no hope for the Anglican Church, till there is requickened in her bosom the old martyr spirit; till her sons come to feel that they are the descendants of those to whom rich livings, the pride, pomp, and power of kings and civil rulers, nay, bonds, imprisonments, and death, were but the veriest trifles, when in the way of Christian duty, and, above all, when in the way of Christian sanctity. Restore us, O God, this glorious martyr spirit! restore us the power to count all things but dung and dross, if we can but win Christ, and merit that crown of life which thou hast laid up for them that love thee, and which thou wilt give to all who fight the good fight, and finish with honor the work thou hast given them to do! O, is it true that the race of English saints expired with the separation from Rome, and that no saint adorns the English calendar, born since that fatal epoch?

In this country, the Episcopal Church is, providentially, free from all subjection to the state, and in possession of the most perfect religious liberty. Here there is no Protestant sovereign to repress her Catholic

tendencies, and prevent her from developing the Catholic elements she has saved from the general wreck of the sixteenth century. With double interest, therefore, have we watched, and do we still watch, the struggle between the two hostile tendencies,—and the more so, because we ourselves, alas! are without a home. Feeling our own sad condition, we naturally turn towards the Episcopal Church. It is professedly the Church of our ancestors; it speaks our own mother tongue; and to enter it is not to go among strangers, to desert one's friends and kindred. In it, we have felt we might sit down with our own kith and kin, with our friends and neighbours. We have asked ourselves, What is to be the result of the present struggle? Will the Church succumb to the Protestant tendency? Will she shake off her Protestantism, and take her stand on truly Catholic ground? Will she become a true mother to us, afford a home to us, who have been storm-tossed on the tumultuous sea of sectarianism, — poor shipwrecked mariners, cast naked and starving upon a foreign strand, waiting for the blessed angels of mercy and charity to come to our relief?

We have feared and hoped, and hoped and feared, and nothing has tended more to depress and dishearten us than these Letters by the able and accomplished Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont. We had felt, that, whatever might be said of the irregular origin of the present Anglican Church, she might, in her American branch, at least, so develop her Catholic elements as to be able to satisfy the Catholic faith and longings of a soul which has burned to abjure Protestantism. We had counted on Bishop Hopkins, a zealous Churchman, as one likely to stand forward in the contest, and to become a powerful champion of the Christian movement commenced by Froude, Newman, and Pusey. We are grieved and disappointed at finding him, on the contrary, taking the lead in the opposition, and contending, with all his zeal, wit, eloquence, learning, and ability, for views which we had supposed quite too ultra-Protestant for the great body of even the so-called

Evangelical sects. We feel these Letters the more, for they seem to us to have some foundation in the articles and faith of the Episcopal Church, and because we are not able to refute them, without placing that Church, in some respects at least, in contradiction with herself. They show us that she does really contain a Protestant element, which is not reconcilable with her Catholicism.

Yet, on the other hand, these "Novelties," of which the Bishop speaks, are evidently no novelties. They are, and have been from the first, maintained by the greatest and most authoritative names in the Anglican Church, and are supported by its liturgy, canons, and homilies. It cannot, we think, be denied, that the Episcopal Church is somewhat deficient in unity, and that it is now suffering from the vague and indefinite terms originally adopted for the sake of peace. But what in these days should be the duty of a true Churchman? Should he seek to enlarge the Protestant element, and to widen the breach, even at best too wide? Or should he not rather seek to free his Church from the inconsistencies which, in troublous and unsettled times, were suffered to creep in, by bringing out its Catholic elements, and placing it as nearly in harmony with religious antiquity as the nature of the case will admit?

We can make many allowances for Bishop Hopkins' Protestantism. He has been engaged in a controversy with the Roman Catholics, in defence of the Protestant Reformation, and that reformation is not defensible on Catholic principles. But is it necessary to defend it? In point of fact, is it defensible on any principles compatible with established ecclesiastical order? Our Oxford divines are severe enough, in all conscience, against Rome; but they have not succeeded, and, so far as we are able to see, cannot succeed, in justifying the reformers in their separation from the Holy See. If we understand their church system, they hold that the Church is not an aggregate body, but a body corporate, and, therefore, that it can exist and act only in its corporate capacity. The unity of the Church, in their

view, is not merely the unity of faith, the unity of spirit, of discipline, of usage, but also the unity of the body, that is, of the corporation.

They hold, indeed, as do all Catholics, that the Church is herself subject to the law communicated through Christ and the apostles, — the law given originally by the Great Head of the Church, from which she may not depart, and contrary to which she may decree nothing. But then she is the witness, the keeper, and the interpreter of the law. Though she does not make the law, she authoritatively declares what the law is, and from her decision there lies no appeal. She is, then, so far as concerns her members, supreme in all matters pertaining to faith and practice. Hence, whatever she decrees must, for them, be the law, the word of God, to which they may offer no resistance, and in no case refuse obedience.

Now, prior to the Reformation, the Church either did or did not exist. If it did not, then either Christ founded no Church, or the Church he founded had failed. If he founded no Church, he made no provision for our salvation, and therefore cannot be called our Saviour; if he founded a Church and it has failed, then he himself has failed, and cannot be relied on, for he declared his Church should not fail.

If the Church did exist, it existed, according to our Oxford divines, as a corporation. Was the Church of England this corporation? or only a member of it? If it was it, its acts could bind all the faithful throughout the world. Will this be pretended? But if she was not it, in its unity and integrity, she could not, of herself alone, speak and act in its name, and with its authority. She could speak only in the one voice of the whole. How, then, could she separate herself from the rest of the Church Universal, without resisting the authority and breaking the unity of the Church? The act of separation could be orderly only on condition of being authorized by the Church in its corporate capacity. But it was authorized only by the Church of England, whose acts were not, and could not be, the acts of the

Church, in its corporate capacity. On what ground, then, can it be pretended that the act was not disorderly and schismatic ?

When we define the Church to be a corporation, we necessarily assume it to have some visible centre, a visible head, and a visible order ; for otherwise it would have no unity, no individuality, and no corporate faculty. There would be no intelligible distinction possible between the acts of the Church, and the acts of a disorderly assembly of individuals claiming to be it, and to speak with its authority. Was this visible centre, this visible head, in England ? Was England the centre and head of the ecclesiastical order ? Was it from England that all circulated, as the blood from the heart to the extremities ? Of course not. Rome, it cannot be denied, was the acknowledged centre of unity, and the Pope the acknowledged visible head of the ecclesiastical body. Where was the authority competent to set this order aside ? Could there be any authority competent to do it, but the Church herself acting in her corporate capacity ? But the Church could thus act, only when acting under and through the corporate head, that is to say, through the constituted authorities, as its legal organs. The members of the Church, when acting without or against authority, are a disorderly or revolutionary body. They are the Church, only when acting according to its order, under the established authority, and through legal forms. But the Church of England, in her act of separation, acted without and against the established order of the Church, against its legal authority. How, then, could her separation be justified, save on mobocratic or revolutionary principles ?

It may be alleged that the Church of Rome had apostatized, that the Pope had transcended his powers, and exercised an authority which was illegal, oppressive, and demoralizing. Be it so. But where was the authority to take cognizance of the fact, and to institute measures for redress ? Only the Church in its corporate capacity, of course ; for in any other capacity the

Church does not exist. Irregularities are never to be irregularly redressed ; for the redress itself would be an irregularity, requiring to be redressed. Now, the Church of England, not being the Church, but only a member of it, was not competent to sit in judgment on Rome and her Bishop, nor to undertake, on her own responsibility, to redress the abuses she might believe to exist ; for a part can never erect itself into a tribunal for judging the whole ; since, save in union with the whole, the part does not even exist.

All that England had a right to do, on Catholic principles, was, to exert herself, as a member of the Catholic Church, in a legal and constitutional way, in submission to the constituted authorities, to redress such abuses as she believed to exist. To attempt, in church or state, to redress abuses by rejecting the constituted authorities, and breaking up the established order, is to attempt revolution ; and the right of revolution, we all know, is incompatible with the right of government, for the one negatives the other. If you assert your right to revolutionize the Church, you deny the supremacy of the Church, which you began by asserting. We say, again, therefore, that we do not see how our Oxford divines can justify the proceedings of the English Church in separating from the corporation of which she was a member, if they assume the unity of the Church as a corporate body.

Shall we be told, as we have been, that the Church of England was originally a free and independent Church, possessing within herself all the rights and prerogatives of the Church of Christ, that she originally owed no allegiance to the Roman See, or the Roman Pontiff, and that in the sixteenth century she merely asserted her ancient freedom, and suppressed the errors and corruptions caused by the papal usurpations ? We reply, that this is not historically true, either in relation to the ancient order, or in relation to the Reformation ; and, moreover, if it were, it would falsify the whole church theory of the Oxford divines themselves. They hold the Church to be one body, and not a body aggre-

gate, but a body corporate. To assert the independence of the Anglican Church is to assert her existence as a church polity complete in itself. Then she was either the Catholic Church in its unity and integrity, or the Catholic Church is not a single corporation, but an aggregate of several corporations. The first will not be pretended ; the second denies the unity of the Church as a corporation ; which we understand the Oxford divines to assert.

Here, we suspect, is the original fallacy in the reasoning of our Anglican divines. They assume, consciously or unconsciously, that each *national* Church is one independent church polity, complete in itself. That the temporal powers have always favored this doctrine, there is no question ; and that their struggles to reduce it to practice have occasioned all the calamities which have befallen the Church since the days of Constantine, there is just as little question. But this doctrine is incompatible with the freedom and independence of the spiritual power, which demands a common centre of unity, unaffected by geographical lines, or national distinctions. This the temporal power saw clearly enough ; but the freedom and independence of the spiritual power was precisely what the temporal power did not want. It would have no power in the nation not subject to itself. It would itself be supreme in spirituals, as well as in temporals, and rule according to its own will. But this it felt was impossible, if the clergy or their superiors held their appointments, or investments, from a power independent of it, and if accountable to a tribunal it could neither constitute nor control. Here is the secret of the struggles of the temporal powers against the ecclesiastical. The haughtiest monarch dared not lay violent hands on the humblest parish priest, and the monk's cowl symbolized a mightier power than the diadem. This was not to be endured ; it was too great a restriction on civil despotism ; and the temporal power, therefore, sought with all its force to maintain each national Church, independent of all foreign ecclesiastical authority, in order to be able to subject the Church in

its own dominions to its own will, and make it the tool of its ambition, or the minister of its vices, corruptions, and oppressions. This is the secret of the long continued struggles of the ecclesiastical and civil powers, the one to maintain the unity, the other to break it up into separate and independent national establishments, on the principle of dividing to conquer.

The distinction of national Churches was not, in the original constitution of the Church, that of separate and independent church polities, — for this were pure Independency, — but merely a distinction for the necessities and convenience of local administration. The Church, in her true, normal constitution, knows no geographical lines or national distinctions ; and the apparent independence, or partial independence, of national Churches, which we sometimes meet in ecclesiastical history, is an anomaly, an irregularity, which the Church has not been able to bring within the rule against the resistance, and too often armed resistance, of the temporal powers.

But admitting that our Oxford divines cannot, on their church theory, and, we may add, on the true Catholic theory, defend the original separation of the Anglican Church from the rest of the Church Universal, does Bishop Hopkins succeed any better ? The Bishop is a sincere Protestant ; he avows it, and glories in it. He reverences the men who labored in the sixteenth century to free the Church from the corruptions of Rome. He believes that their estimate of the Church of Rome was the true estimate, and he is not ashamed to say so. He is filled with their spirit, and would honor and continue their work. All this is manly, and honorable to him as a Protestant bishop. But has he been able to strike out a ground of defence more tenable than that of the Oxford divines ? He rejects their theory of the Church, and places the unity of the Church, not in the unity of the corporation, but in the unity of the faith. The Church is not a body corporate, but a body aggregate ; and all professedly Christian bodies or associations, which maintain the apostolic faith, are integrally portions of the Church of Christ, and together constitute

the one holy Catholic Apostolic Church. This, if we understand him, is the Bishop's view.

Taking this view, the Bishop contends that separation from Rome was not only justifiable, but a high and imperative duty, because Rome had apostatized from the true faith, and had become so corrupt in doctrine, as well as idolatrous and superstitious in practice, that no one who valued his Christian character could longer continue in her communion. It is, he tells us, on this ground, and this alone, that Protestantism is to be justified, and in this we are unable to dispute him.

But, if we take this ground, we must admit, first, that there is a standard of orthodoxy; and, second, that there is also, somewhere, an authority competent to say what does and what does not conform to that standard. As to the standard, we will raise, at present, no difficulty. We will accept the Protestant doctrine of the sufficiency of the Scriptures, and say, that the standard is the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, *rightly interpreted*. But who, where, or what, is the authority competent to say what is, or what is not, their right interpretation?

To this question one of three answers must be returned, for only three answers are possible, namely: 1. The Church; 2. The State; 3. The Individual Reason. If the Bishop adopts the first answer, and contends that the Church is the authoritative interpreter, as his own Church teaches, he must abandon his notion of the Church as a body aggregate, and concede it to be a corporation. For the Church cannot act, has no function, at all, unless it exist as a corporation, as an individual, a personality, with an official voice, and an official organ through which it may speak.

But, if the Bishop recoil from his aggregate church, and concede it to be, after all, a body corporate, he must also concede it to be either a one single corporation, or several distinct, separate, and independent corporations. If he assume it to be a single corporation, he exposes himself to all the objections we have just urged against what we have called the Oxford theory. The Church

of England was not this one single corporation, and therefore could not speak in its name, or with its authority. She, then, was not competent to receive the impeachment of Rome and her Bishop, or to convict them of heresy. But, on the Bishop's own principles, till she had convicted them of heresy, she had no right to separate from their communion; for the separation, he tells us, was justifiable only on the ground that Rome and her Bishop had apostatized from the orthodox faith, — corrupted the pure word of God.

Protestantism assumes that the Church herself, in her corporate existence, had become corrupt and heretical. The party to be tried for heresy was, then, the Church herself. Protestantism must impeach and convict the Church herself of heresy, before it can justify itself. But before what tribunal can it bring its charges against the Church, and demand conviction? Before the written word of God? But the Church is the authoritative interpreter of the word, and it is her very interpretation that is in question. She herself is the highest court for the trial of herself, and before what court can you try her? By impeaching her you deny the authority of the only tribunal competent to take cognizance of the accusation you bring against her.

Granting, then, that Rome and her Bishop had corrupted the pure word of God, since she was the centre of unity and her Bishop the visible head of the corporation, there was no Church before which either could be summoned to answer to the charge of heresy, no legal tribunal that could, against their consent, or without their authority, take cognizance of the fact. For any number of Churchmen coming together without being convoked by their authority, however numerous or respectable, would not be the Church, any more than a political caucus is a legal convention; and their acts would be no more the acts of the Church, than the resolutions of a mob, or a disorderly assembly, would be the enactments of the State.

If the Bishop abandon the notion of the Church as a single corporation, and assert the existence of distinct, separ-

ate, and independent church polities, he falls into Independency, of which, we doubt not, he has as much horror as we ourselves. Each of these polities must be complete in itself, and supreme over its own members. They must be equals. Then what is decreed by one stands on as high authority as what is decreed by another. What one decides to be orthodox is as orthodox as that which is decided by another. Rome is equal to England, and England is equal to Rome. Rome decrees one interpretation, England another. Which is right? Which is wrong? Where is the umpire to decide between them? Why shall I assume the interpretation of Rome to be less orthodox than that of England? or that of England more orthodox than that of Geneva? Why shall I hold the decision of the Episcopal Church to be more authoritative than the decision of the Presbyterian Church, the Congregational Church, or the Unitarian Church?

But only those Churches are authoritative in which the pure word of God is preached. Agreed. But what is the pure word of God? What the Church declares it to be. Agreed, again. But *what* Church? The true Church. Agreed, once more. But which *is* the true Church? That in which the pure word of God is preached. Here we are, turning for ever in a circle. Each Church, doubtless, declares its own doctrine to be the pure word of God; all the Churches are equal; by what authority, then, is the doctrine of one declared to be orthodox, and that of another to be heterodox?

Shall we say those Churches are to be regarded as true Churches, whose doctrines are accepted by a majority of the whole number of Churches? This is to abandon the ground of the sufficiency of each Church for itself, and to make something beside the Church a competent interpreter of the word of God. It subjects each particular Church to the will of the majority, and makes the criterion of truth a plurality of voices. How was it when nearly all the particular Churches, except Rome and Alexandria, were Arian? when, during the temporary lapse of the Pope, St. Athanasius was almost the

only Catholic Bishop left? If the majority are to decide,—then, if the majority establish Arianism or Socinianism, Arianism or Socinianism must be held to be orthodox, and all who adhere to the Nicene and Athanasian creeds must be unchurched, and declared to be no portions of the body of Christ. The Bishop's argument presupposes that a Church may lapse into heresy. If one may, why not another? And then what guaranty have we that the majority have not departed from the faith, and that, in point of fact, the pure word of God is preached now only in a feeble minority of the so-called Churches?

This doctrine of separate and independent Churches, each a competent interpreter of the word of God, gives us as many competent, authoritative interpreters, as there are separate bodies calling themselves Churches. It lays the foundation for all the sectarianism which now desolates Christendom. The decision of one neutralizes the decision of another. Orthodoxy is one thing at Rome, another at Geneva, another at London, another at Edinburgh, and still another at Boston. We lose, on this ground, not only the unity of the body of Christ, but the unity of faith itself; that very unity, which Bishop Hopkins, and all who believe in the Church at all, hold to be essential to the very *being* of the Church.

Will the Bishop adopt the second answer, and seek an authoritative interpreter in the STATE? To make the State the authoritative interpreter of the word of God would be to make it supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, to destroy religious liberty, to deny conscience, to rekindle the flames of persecution, and to give the State the same right to burn for heresy, that it has to imprison for theft, or to hang for murder. Moreover, it would not answer the Bishop's purpose. The States must all be held to be mutually independent, and each, therefore, to be free to enact, within its own dominions, such reading of the word of God as it pleases. So we should have, under another form, all the evils of Independency. Italy may enact Catholicism; Geneva, Calvinism; Prussia, Lutheranism; England, Episcopacy;

Scotland, Presbyterianism ; France tolerate all religions, and the United States recognize none. One State may establish Trinitarianism, another Unitarianism ; one decree justification by faith, another justification by works. The subjects of each nation must adopt the State religion, on pain of heresy, civil disability, punishment here, and damnation hereafter. Where would be the umpire between independent States ? What uniform standard of orthodoxy would be possible ? What means of maintaining unity of faith would be left us ? Nay, what right should we have to undertake to convert to the Gospel the subjects of even a heathen prince, against his consent ? Or what right would a subject of the Grand Turk, for instance, have to embrace Christianity ?

This answer cannot be accepted, at least so long as we remember Henry the Eighth. Then nothing remains but the third and last answer, namely, the Individual Reason. This constitutes each individual his own judge of what is the pure word of God. And the genuine orthodox faith must be held to be what each individual judges it to be. This sets up the individual above the Church, justifies dissent in all its forms, nay, the absolute Individualism and No-churchism of our modern Come-outers. The reason of one man must be held to be equal to the reason of another, and one man's views can no more be called orthodox or heterodox than another's ; heresy and schism become unmeaning terms. No established order in church or state can be maintained ; no reverence, respect, or subordination exacted. All falls into disorder, where each man is at liberty to do whatever is right in his own eyes.

The Bishop is too good a Churchman, at least too strenuous an advocate of Episcopal authority, to be able to accept this answer. The proposition, the *novel* proposition, which he puts forth in his last Letter, for changing the constitution of his Church, and establishing a Central Board or Council, clothed with more than papal powers, proves very satisfactorily that he is no friend of undue individual liberty, and no enemy to the

most plenary ecclesiastical authority. What, then, does he gain by rejecting the Catholic theory? He wishes to maintain the Church, to maintain it as an authoritative body, supreme over faith and conscience, over words and deeds. And can it be necessary for us to tell him, that the Church is maintainable as an authoritative body only on the Catholic theory? The legitimacy of Episcopal authority is defensible only on the ground of its divine institution, and, we will add, only on the ground, that the Church, as a corporate body, is founded by Christ himself, who miraculously preserves it from error in faith or practice, and that Episcopacy is absolutely necessary to the *being* of the Church, as well as to the *order* of the Church. Whoso is not prepared to take this ground is not prepared to be an Episcopalian,—except at the expense of his logic. When, therefore, Bishop Hopkins rejects this ground, — when, in order to keep clear of Rome, he lays down principles which place any Congregational minister in as high church relations as he himself holds, he but mocks our understandings by calling upon us to become Episcopalians. He has, he can have, no solid argument, drawn from the armory of the Gospel, to show why, by becoming Episcopalians, we should be any more in the Church than we are by remaining in the Congregational Church.

But, we shall be told, if we adopt the Oxford theory, we must go to Rome. Well, if we must have a Church, and cannot have one without returning to the Roman communion, then, let us go to Rome. Either accept No-churchism and say no more about it, or have the courage to accept and avow principles on which a Church is defensible. It may be a great humiliation to return and submit to the Church which we have been for three hundred years warring against, and many of us may not yet be prepared to do so; but it is far better to return and submit to Rome than it is to remain under the dominion of absolute Individualism, the real man of sin, the very anti-Christ, dragon, old serpent, the devil, who was to be let loose against the saints, and who would, if possible, deceive the very elect. We

own that we are waiting for our Episcopal friends to show us some ground on which we may defend the Reformation, or rather, the reformers, in separating from the Roman communion ; but we must tell Bishop Hopkins, and we do it with all becoming respect, that to Rome we certainly ought to go, if his is the only ground of defence his Church has to offer.

ART. V. — *Come-outerism : or the Radical Tendency of the Day.*

THAT all our social arrangements are very imperfect, and that there is ample room for the freest, fullest, and most energetic reforming spirit, no man in his senses can doubt. Even here, in this country, where we boast of our political enlightenment and our advanced social state, we are far from having realized the highest moral, political, or social ideal. There are causes at work among us, which, though in some respects securing a temporary and local prosperity, must ultimately, if not arrested, deprive us of all our boasted advantages. Our industrial system is working gradually, but surely, the subjection of the great mass of the operative classes ; and when our new lands shall have been exhausted, and the price of land become so high that the laboring man can no longer hope to become a proprietor, as is already, to no inconsiderable extent, the case in the older States, we shall find established all over the country an industrial feudalism, of which the military feudalism of the Middle Ages was but a faint prelude. All is settling down into this new feudalism, and the whole legislation of the country, in relation to banks, tariffs, and corporations generally, is rapidly hastening it. The tendency this way is so strong that there is, at present, no power in the country able to resist it. We take up a Whig newspaper and run the eye over the programme of Whig principles and measures, and we marvel to see

how admirably all is devised to secure this result ; and these principles and measures will prevail, substantially, let which party will succeed in the election. The business interests of each of the great parties are the same ; and no party, except it enlist its due proportion of business men for its leaders and managers, can be of sufficient importance to exert any influence on legislation, and the general policy of the government. Your Wrights and Buchanans, when the Whigs need help to fasten an iniquitous tariff on the country, stand always ready to assist them ; and a Democratic party, pledged against it, will, with a majority in Congress of nearly two to one, be unable to repeal or even essentially to modify it.

Under a political point of view, we have little to hope. Our institutions have resulted from our condition, from the general equality which originally obtained amongst us ; they have not created that equality, and they are impotent to preserve it. Our government does less to aid or secure our general social prosperity and well-being, than does the Prussian government for the Prussians, or the Russian for the Russians. Prussia and Russia started in the race of nations but a little prior to ourselves ; — for we must not date our national existence from the Declaration of Independence, — and the comparison between them and us would be far from flattering to our national vanity.

In regard to religion, the case stands still worse. Religion, in any high and significant sense of the word, hardly exists among us. We have no Church, no faith ; we have only miserable sectarianism, indifference, hypocrisy, or fanaticism. We have no memories that go back to the founding of the Christian Church. Our religious establishments date from 1517. All before that we virtually disown. Our sects are mainly preoccupied each with the struggle for the ascendancy. They generate very little piety, command very little religious zeal, and sustain themselves, for the most part, either by leaguings with mammon, or by the application of artificial stimulants, and cunningly devised revival

machinery, which produces now and then a sort of galvanic motion, but no genuine religious life.

Such being the real state of the case with us, it is not astonishing that our land should be overspread with pretended reformers of all sorts, with men and women uttering one long and loud, deep and indignant protest against the whole existing industrial, political, and religious order, or rather, disorder. The existing order is really only a wild disorder; and it is perfectly natural that men and women, who see this fact, and feel it, should lift up the voice, and exclaim, "Come ye out, come ye out from the midst of Babylon, and be ye no longer partakers in her iniquity; drink ye no longer of the wine of her abominations!" Here is the origin, and here the good side, of what has received, we know not from whom, the uncouth name of *Come-outerism*. Viewed solely in this light, as a protest against the existing disorder, and an earnest demand for efforts to realize a higher and truer ideal, we confess that *Come-outerism* is worthy of sympathy and support.

But this is not the only aspect under which we are to consider *Come-outerism*. This is its ideal side, not its real; what we may term it in our closet speculations, but not what we shall find it, when we go forth to meet it in actual life. Men may have a zeal for God which is not according to knowledge, and fancy, nay, verily believe, that they are serving God, when they are in reality only following the devil disguised as an angel of light. And such we believe to be actually the case with our *Come-outers*. We believe them wholly deceived, and, so far as capable of exerting any influence at all, capable only of retarding the very end they are professedly seeking.

In speaking of *Come-outerism*, we use the word with considerable latitude, to characterize a wide and deep tendency of our times. As it presents itself to our minds, it is simply a continuation of the revolutionary spirit of the last century, — and why may we not say, of the Protestant spirit of the sixteenth century, of which the French Revolution was only one of the neces-

sary expressions? The Come-outers seem to us to be the Jacobins of the eighteenth century, the Independents and Fifth Monarchy men of the seventeenth, and the Protestants of the sixteenth.

All Christian men and women are and must needs be reformers, for, if they were not, they would not be Christians. There have always been reformers in the Church and in the State, and always will be till Christianity fails. But there are two principles of reform, or rather two different methods of seeking reform. One method is, to accept the existing order, and through it, by such modes of action as it tolerates or authorizes, to seek the correction of abuses, and a more perfect development. The other method is, to resist the existing order, to abjure its laws, and to attempt to introduce an entirely new order. The first we may term the CONSERVATIVE method of reform; the second, the REVOLUTIONARY method. Gregory the Seventh is a notable instance of the conservative reformer; Luther of the revolutionary reformer.

Which of these methods is the true one? Which is the one we have a right to adopt? Which is the most likely to be effectual? If a dozen years ago we had been asked these questions, we should have decided in favor of the revolutionary method, both on the ground of right and of expediency. Most young men, of more benevolent feeling than actual experience, and more enthusiastic zeal than practical wisdom, we believe, are prone to decide in the same way; while, on the other hand, men, as they grow older, as they take a wider survey of things, and feel more deeply the necessity of moral obligation, of stability in institutions, and regular and determinate modes of action, are, for the most part, disposed to decide in favor of the conservative method. Hence, we frequently find the man, who in his youth was a flaming radical, a staunch conservative in his maturer years. And this is usually, in our times, urged as an accusation, and such a man is pointed at as a renegade, as having in his age forgotten the dreams of his youth, and deserted the cause of human improve-

ment. The crude notions of youth are, therefore, supposed to be more worthy of our respect than the sober and chastened convictions of age! But, when we see the young radical, the youthful revolutionist, converted into the staid and stanch conservative, and for "Liberty" substituting the cry of "Order," we are not necessarily to infer that he has forgotten the dreams of his youth, that his heart has grown insensible to the wrongs and outrages of which man is the cause or the victim, or that he is less able, less willing, or less determined to sacrifice himself for the progress of his race. All that we are at liberty to infer is, that he has satisfied himself that the revolutionary method is not the true one, and that he can do more good, and more effectually realize the end contemplated in his young dreams, by adopting the conservative method.

There may be times when the old order has become corrupt, and must give place to a new order; but no man has the right, *on his own individual authority*, to attempt its destruction. Jesus does not even authorize his Apostles to make direct war on either Judaism or Paganism, though both were to give way to the Gospel. He authorizes them to do only what they may do, as quiet, orderly, and peaceable citizens. So the Apostles authorize no resistance to the Roman government, but command their followers to be "in subjection to the powers that be." They were to trust to the silent, but effectual, workings of the truth in the minds and hearts of men to bring about in a regular and peaceful manner all needed political and social reforms. They were never to resist authority actively; but, if they must resist it at all, it must be by passively suffering its unjust penalties. If the existing authorities required of them that which they could not yield without proving false to God, they were indeed to withhold obedience, but at the same time meekly submit to the penalty these authorities might choose to inflict.

The revolutionary spirit is essentially at war with the religious spirit. The religious spirit does not oppose reform, does not oppose progress, for it is itself a perpet-

ual aspiration of the soul to God, that is to say, a continual hungering and thirsting of the soul after righteousness, after higher and yet higher degrees of sanctity: but it does oppose the spirit of rebellion and revolution. The meek, quiet, orderly, peaceable spirit, that would overcome the world, not by slaying, but by being slain, is the true religious spirit; the bold, daring, rebellious spirit, that recognizes no established order, and will submit to no fixed rule, is what the Scriptures everywhere teach us to regard as the *Satanic* spirit. One feels this at almost every page of the Old Testament. The rebels, the revolutionists, the innovators, the Come-outers, are everywhere condemned: but never are reformers condemned. Young King Josiah is held up to us as a pattern prince, and he is a most zealous and indefatigable reformer.

The Church has also taken, always, the same view. She has, from the first, enjoined submission to the constituted authorities, as if no good could come from the disobedient and rebellious;—obedience of children to their parents, obedience of servants to their masters, of subjects to the magistrate, of citizens to the State, of the faithful to their pastors. She held out always that all were under law, and that the great virtue, the parent of all the virtues, was obedience. Enforcing this lesson of obedience with maternal authority and maternal affection, she tamed the savage, she softened the barbarian heart, she spread the Gospel through heathen lands, and covered the earth over with monuments of religious zeal and benevolent affection. So long as her sons obeyed her, so long as they submitted to her discipline, and meekly received the law at her hand, she was able to carry on her glorious work of regeneration,—and the progress of the race, in all that truly adorns and enriches humanity, was steadily and rapidly onward.

But the Anakim remained in the land. The giants, that is, the *earth-born*, and mighty men of old, forgot that the first of Christian graces is humility, and the first of Christian virtues, obedience; they felt that submission was a degradation, even a debasement, and re-

solved that they would rule, and no longer serve. Like Lucifer and his rebel hosts, they set themselves up against authority. They challenged supremacy with the Almighty. Then broke forth the revolutionary spirit, and, with a large portion of the professedly Christian world, Christian virtue was assumed to consist, not in obedience, but in defiance. Submission to superiors was anti-Christian. There *were* no superiors. This showed itself, in the sixteenth century, in ecclesiastical rebellion. Luther defied the Pope, and he and his followers, together with Zwingli and Calvin, shook off the authority of the Church and set up for themselves. The ecclesiastical rebellion was followed by civil rebellion, in the insurrection of the peasants; after an interval, in the revolt of the Netherlands; then in the English rebellion. The revolutionary spirit, checked for a moment, increased in intensity, and soon, in the eighteenth century, broke out all over Europe, and finally culminated in the French Revolution. Voltaire, it has been gravely argued, by a popular writer, in a religious periodical, continued the work of Luther. Luther overthrew the infallibility of the Pope; Voltaire, the infallibility of the written word, and finally emancipated the mind from its thralldom, and proclaimed, henceforth and for ever, absolute freedom of mind.

That our modern Come-outerism is the offspring of this very Satanic spirit, there can be no doubt. This spirit has taken full possession of modern literature. All our popular literature is Titanic, and makes war on the Divinity. It is profoundly revolutionary. What else is the dominant spirit of the more applauded portions of German literature? Kant, Schiller, even Goethe, the Privy Councillor, with his calm, conservative exterior, are of the old Titanic or Anakim race, the children of Cain, not of Seth. What else shall we say of Byron, Shelley, Bulwer, and even Carlyle? or of the nightmare school of France, with its Victor Hugo, De Balzac, and George Sand? And of what other parentage are your Owens, Fouriers, and Saint-Simons?

The watchword of the whole party affected by this

spirit, whatever its Protean shapes, is **LIBERTY**. This is the angel of light, whose disguise the devil has chosen and in which he walks abroad, to and fro in the earth, seeking whom he may devour. Liberty is a sacred name ; the name of all that is dear, precious, and thrilling to the human heart ; the name of that to which all that is generous, noble, and praiseworthy in our nature aspires ; the name of the very end for which we were made, — for our highest end, as our highest good, is, to become free, to become able to “look into the perfect law of liberty.” Once make it appear that yours is the cause of liberty, and you rightfully enlist all our sympathies on your side, and prove, that, in fighting against you, we are fighting against God. Whoso blasphemes liberty blasphemes his Maker. All, therefore, that Satan has to do is, to persuade men that his cause is the cause of freedom ; and then he can make even their consciences work for him, and all that is noblest and most energetic in their nature urge them on in his service.

The specific form of what among ourselves is called *Come-outerism* has been determined by the Abolition movement. The providential mission of this country is liberty ; the realization of liberty, not of classes, castes, or estates, but the liberty of man as a moral, intellectual, social, and religious being. Here Christianity was to do her perfect work, in freeing man from every species of bondage, and of ushering him into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. This is the end Providence has appointed us. But this is precisely the end the devil would defeat. Liberty is precisely the thing he hates. He must defeat liberty, or have no foothold on this continent. How shall he defeat it ? By making direct war upon it, that is, by direct and open opposition to our deepest and holiest instincts ? The devil is too cunning for that ; for he knows perfectly well, that, were he to do so, the whole land would perceive his real character ; would detect him, and know him to be the arch enemy of mankind, and therefore be prepared to withstand him. He can ruin liberty only in the name of liberty, accom-

plish his purposes only by appealing to our purest and holiest instincts, and making us believe and feel, that, while we are serving him with our whole hearts, we are really not serving him, but God. He must contrive to usurp the place of the Almighty, and to make himself believed to be God, and worshipped as God. He must then chime in with our sentiments, our instincts, even stimulate our devotion to liberty, and defeat liberty by compelling us to seek it in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or by improper means.

The error of the Abolitionists is not, that they love liberty, or that with heart and soul they seek to realize it, and for the black man as well as the white man. The religion of Jesus knows no distinctions of caste or of color. All are children of one common Father, have one common Saviour, and one and the same moral destiny. The end they seek — we mean the sincere and honest among them — is praiseworthy, is a strictly lawful end; but they forget that they are never to seek even a lawful end by unlawful means. Here is their error. In seeking to abolish slavery at the South, they have found both the Church and the State in their way; that is, they have found both the Church and the State in the way of their doing it in the time and manner they propose. But is man made for the State and the Church? or are the Church and the State made for man? Is not liberty the very end for which man was made? Has not every man a right to be free? Can any State, or any Church, which opposes freedom, which prohibits me from rushing to the rescue of the captive, from breaking the fetters of the bound, of bidding the slave go free, be of God, or in any sense worthy of my support? No. Then down with the Church! Down with a corrupt ministry! Down with the State! Down, as we heard an Abolition leader exclaim in a public meeting, Down with the star-spangled banner! Down with the army and navy! Down with the Executive! Down with the Judiciary! Down with the Legislature! Down with all your governmental and ecclesiastical establishments! And up with the Rights of Man!

Now, we are perfectly willing to admit that the State and the Church exist for man, and that the true freedom of man is paramount to either. We are perfectly willing to admit, that, in case either should become really hostile to human freedom, it would cease to be worthy of our support. But who has the right to decide the question? Here is manifest the Satanic spirit of Come-outerism. It assumes that the individual is his own judge; that, when I have decided for myself that a certain end is, in itself considered, good and holy, I have a right to seek it against all established authority. The Constitution is in my way, and I get up, as actually did, some time since, a leading Abolition orator, in Faneuil Hall, and exclaim, "My curse on the Constitution!" Here, I set up my own individual conviction, or my own individual crotchet, and assume that I have a right to follow it, let it lead where it will. I recognize no authority but that of my own conviction, and claim the right to do whatever I please. I am wiser than Church and State; I am above Church and State; and there is no law to which I owe obedience, but the law which I am to myself. This is the Satanic element of Come-outerism. The Come-outer can justify himself only by making good his claims to a divine commission, and to immediate and plenary inspiration. No authority but that of God can absolve a man from his obligation to obey the existing order; and he must show that he has that authority, or be convicted of the Satanic spirit. Have our modern Abolitionists a warrant from the Almighty to set aside Church and State?

But this is not all. Suppose the Come-outers, for instance, could get rid of the State, could trample the star-spangled banner in the dust, abolish the Constitution, abolish all forms of law, wipe out all traces of outward government, and proclaim universally the rights of man, what would they gain? What protection would they have for the rights of man? What would prevent the strong from oppressing the weak, the cunning from overreaching the simple? Even the Come-outers themselves cannot in their own affairs get on without or-

ganization, and must have their committees, and their moderators. But is there nothing in the way of freedom but human government? Is it government that causes all the slavery there is? And, if the restraints of government were taken off, and all men left to their individual passions, instincts, convictions, and crotchets, would each man stand up a true freeman, in the glorious image of his Maker? Would no one seek to gain any advantage over another? Who will pretend it? It is government and law that protect these very men themselves, even while reviling government and law,—and us also from Come-outer vengeance, while defending law and order.

Suppose, again, the Come-outers could succeed in destroying the Christian ministry, in demolishing the Church, and resolving all into a perfect moral and religious chaos, what would they gain? Is there no sin in the human heart but is caused by the Church and the clergy? Do the Church and the clergy plant all these vindictive passions in our breasts, cause all our selfishness, our worldly-mindedness, our wrongs and outrages one upon another? It were madness to pretend so. Abolish, then, the Church and the clergy, and the cause of the evil would remain untouched. We should have all the indwelling sin, the inbred corruption, all the lusts, which now cause all the evils of which man complains, or to which he is subject. So, even, if the individual had a right to set aside the State and the Church on his own responsibility, he would gain nothing, and would, to say the least, find himself in no better condition than he was before.

It is always lawful to seek to redress wrong, to labor to remove evil, whatever or wherever it is, *but only by lawful means*; and what are lawful means, the individual is not his own judge. We all of us, from the highest to the lowest, owe obedience to authority, to the State in civil matters, and to the Church, authorized to speak in the name of Christ, in spiritual matters; and I have no *right* to use any methods or means of redres-

sing wrongs, to labor for any ameliorations, but in submission to these.

From this conclusion, however, many, who are by no means reckoned among Come-outers, will dissent. The truth is, and there is no use in seeking to disguise it, Come-outerism is only the common faith of the country pushed to its last consequences. Thousands and thousands of those who condemn, in no measured terms, Garrison, Rogers, Foster, Abby Folsom, and their immediate friends and associates, adopt and defend premises, of which the wild notions of these are but the logical conclusions. In politics, the great majority of our countrymen assert the sacred right of revolution, and hold that government derives its just powers from the assent of the governed; in religion, nearly all of us hold to the right of private judgment, that the individual is morally as well as politically free to choose his own religion. Doubtless, in practice we deny these principles, doubtless we resist their practical application, but they are the deliberately, the solemnly proclaimed faith of the country, and no man can maintain his standing in our community who calls in question their theoretic soundness. Assuming individualism in religion, and no government without the assent of the governed, and the right of revolution in politics, we defy any man, who can reason logically, to escape the conclusions of our Come-outers. We may say there is no occasion for the extremes to which they carry matters, we may dispute about this or that practical point, but we cannot object to their doctrines. They are consistent; we who oppose them are inconsistent. They have the courage to be true to their principles. We cowardly shrink from the legitimate consequences of our own faith.

Here is the danger. If there was nothing in the national faith to serve as the basis, the logical *data*, of Come-outerism, we should have no fears. But every people, in its collective life, tends to carry out, in their logical order, the great, fundamental principles on which

that life is founded ; and though practical good sense may for a time arrest the tendency, it can never prevent it from ultimately reaching its end. We are the children of revolution in the State, and of dissent in religion. We see nothing sacred in government, we feel nothing binding in ecclesiastical establishments. Our youth are early imbued with a sense of the supremacy of the individual ; and all of us, who think seriously at all, grow up with the conviction, that our own judgment is in all cases to be our rule of action. When we step forth, in the glow and enthusiasm of youth, to write or speak to our countrymen, it is with this conviction burning in our souls. We would stand on our own two feet. What is antiquity to us ? What is it to us what others have believed, or do believe ? What to us the voice of the Church, — a mere association of individuals, and of individuals no wiser or better than ourselves ? What to us the State, also a mere association of individuals ? and what the laws, made by our servants, and in nine cases out of ten by men who know not half so much as we ? Here is the tone, the feeling, with which we enter upon life ; and this tone, this feeling, is in perfect consonance with the settled faith of the country. What wonder, then, that men engaged in what they believe a good cause should, on finding themselves resisted or not aided by Church or State, assume the right to set Church or State aside, and to proclaim the absolute freedom of the individual in regard to either ?

Our countrymen, if they would but stop a moment and consider, would read their own condemnation in this very horror or contempt of Come-outerism, which they feel when disclosing itself in its real character, and standing forth before them in its nakedness. Doubtless, there are sounder elements in our national faith than these which we have pointed out ; doubtless, there are sound religious principles, and the foundations for a deep and genuine respect for law and order ; but still, Come-outerism, in its principle, is — seek to disguise or to palliate the matter as we will — the active, dominant

faith of the country. Is it not time, then, to ask ourselves, and very seriously too, if, with this faith active and dominant, it is possible, in the nature of things, to maintain a fixed and permanent order in either Church or State? Have we seen the worst? Have we reached the lowest deep? Are not, in point of fact, matters growing worse each year? Is not law losing its hold on our affections? Are not principles boldly avowed, and bravely defended, in high places as well as in low places, which make no distinction, intelligible or possible, between the acts of the mob and the acts of the State? Who will question, that, in the recent disturbances in Philadelphia, the majority of the citizens sympathized with the rioters? On what principle, then, can an advocate of the doctrine set up by Mr. Dorr and his friends condemn them? On what principle can our no-government men, our Come-outers, either those who hold to the absolute supremacy of the majority, or those who hold to the supremacy of the individual, justify the authorities in calling out the military to suppress them? And where is this matter to end?

There are two great doctrines which in their nature are opposed one to the other, and one or other of these we must take. A compromise between them may be attempted, often is attempted, with serious and praiseworthy motives, but never with success. One or the other must predominate, and we must have the courage to accept one or the other, and to accept it with all its legitimate consequences. Either we must accept the conservative doctrine, and give to authority the sole right to take the initiative in all reforms, and suffer the individual to work only under and through law; or else we must accept pure and absolute individualism, proclaim the absolute freedom and independence of individual reason, individual conscience, individual whim or caprice, and individual action, leaving each individual to answer to his God for his entire life, as best he may, — which is simple, unadulterated Come-outerism.

Now, here is our difficulty. We will as a people adopt, simply and entirely, neither the one nor the other.

Some of us will be strict conservatives in politics, but absolute Come-outers in religion and morals; others, strict conservatives in religion and morals, but absolute Come-outers in politics. We affirm a principle, follow it to a certain extent, in regard to certain things, and condemn all who, believing in the soundness of the principle, would carry it out in all its legitimate consequences. Now, this is miserable folly and poltroonery. Either your principle is sound, or it is not. If it is sound, you have no right to stop short of its legitimate consequences; you have no right to say to us, "Thus far, but no farther." If it is unsound, you have no right to act on it at all. But be it one or the other, you need not flatter yourselves that you can restrain the mass who adopt it within your prescribed limits. Logic is invincible; and, in spite of all your wise saws about extremes, all your preaching of moderation, and the imprudence of pushing matters too far, they will carry out the principle, and go to the very extreme it demands. There is no such thing as pushing a sound principle too far. If your principle will not bear pushing to its extreme, you may know that it is false, and that the error is, not in pushing it too far, but in adopting it at all.

But, in our folly and timidity, we deny this. The good people of the country, the practical people, the worshippers of common sense, the *via-media* folks, who believe the panacea for all ills is compounded of equal doses of truth and falsehood, courage and cowardice, wisdom and folly, consistency and inconsistency, will admit nothing of all this. They will permit us to condemn results, when we must not touch causes; the consequences, when we must respect the principle. When the principle goes a little farther than the mass are prepared to go, but still in the direction they are going, we may condemn the extreme, but not it. We may declaim against Come-outerism, we may denounce or ridicule the Come-outers, show up their follies and extravagances, and the great multitude will applaud; but let us trace Come-outerism to its principle, let us condemn that principle, and set forth and defend, in

opposition to it, the only principle on which we can logically or consistently combat *Come-outerism*, and forthwith we ourselves are condemned. The very multitude, who applauded us to the echo, turn upon us and say, "Why, friend, we did not mean that. This is carrying the matter to extremes, and all extremes are dangerous, and your extreme seems to us no less so than the one you are opposing."

Nor is this all. It is impossible to make up the true issue before the public. If you take the conservative side of the question, and resolutely resist the radical tendency of the day, you are instantly declared to be an enemy of the people, an enemy of reform, the enemy of progress, the advocate of the stand-still policy, the friend of old and superannuated institutions, of crying abuses, of iniquitous privileges, — one, in fact, who would war against the laws of God, resist the whole tendency of the universe, and stay the mighty tide of improvement. You are overwhelmed with obloquy; you are driven from the field by the hoots and hisses of a whole army of popular declaimers. He who speaks for law and order, he who demands submission to authority, and forbids impatient zeal, impatient benevolence, to move, till it has received a commission from authority, can bring no echo to his words. The heart of the multitude does not thrill at the sound of his voice, or respond to his eloquence. In consequence of this, through fear of being misapprehended, of being placed in a false position, of being accused of opposing that for which their hearts are burning, and, through a natural diffidence, a distrust of their own judgments which is produced by their very principles, many, who see the evil, keep silent, shrink from the task of interposing themselves before the multitude, and of doing their best to arrest what they see and feel to be a ruinous tendency.

On the other hand, he who takes the radical tendency, — provided he does not leap too far at a single bound, — who calls out for liberty, for reform, for progress; who speaks out for man, for humanity; declaims against tyrants and oppressors; paints in the glowing

tints of a fervid eloquence the wrongs and outrages of which man is both the cause and the victim ; denounces the State, defies authority, sneers at the Church and its pretensions, at fat and lazy monks and priests, with their doctrines of submission, and mulish lessons of patience and resignation, touches a chord that vibrates through the universal heart. He has at his command all the materials of the most effective eloquence. The young, the ingenuous, the ardent, the enthusiastic are kindled. Mass after mass ignites, and the whole nation flames out in a universal conflagration. In a country like ours, he can enlist all passions, good as well as bad, and render himself irresistible. All the inducements are, therefore, on the side of radicalism ; whoever would coöperate with his countrymen, whoever would lead the multitude or use them for good purposes or evil, must espouse it, and support it with all his energy. We have but to proclaim the supremacy of man, to call out for freedom, and demand the institution of the worship of humanity, and thousands hang breathless on our words and respond to our tones. Change our ground, take the conservative side, and he, who yesterday was the master spirit of his age and country, speaks only to listless ears ; his power is gone ; there is no eloquence in his voice, no magic in his words. The few who may applaud, who may hope to use him for their own purposes, half despise him, and he sinks into insignificance. Hence, all conspires to push on radicalism to its legitimate results. Christianity gives place to Socialism, and the ever-blessed Son of God, to your Owens, Fouriers, or Saint-Simons.

Now, here we are ; the great mass of us, unwilling to accept, to accept fully and unconditionally, the conservative method, countenancing the radical method in its principle, and opposing it only in its results ; while all the active and energetic tendencies of the country conspire to swell its force and consolidate its dominion. What is to be done ? What is our resource ? Where is our safety ? One or the other of the two principles must predominate, must become supreme ; and the ad-

vantage is now all on the side of the radical tendency, however much it may be decried in colleges and saloons; and not only with us, but throughout Christendom. The great active causes in Europe are working in harmony with it, and even the conservative press of England is beginning to be affected by the socialist tendency, and the young Catholics of France and Germany are, in but too many instances, carried away by it. Is it not time to pause, and make up our minds to accept bravely one tendency or the other? Peace between the two is out of the question. The human race aspires to unity, and society cannot, and will not, consent to be torn for ever by this destructive dualism.

For ourselves, we have made our choice. We began our career with the radical tendency. We accepted it in good faith, and followed it till we saw where it must necessarily lead. We recoiled from its consequences, and sought, by an impotent eclecticism, to reconcile the two principles, to harmonize authority and the independence of the subject, till we found our speech confounded, and saw the attempt was as idle as that of the builders in the Plain of Shinar, who would build a tower that should connect earth with heaven. Nothing remained but to take our stand on the conservative side, and submit ourselves to authority, and take the ground that reforms are never to be attempted in opposition to established authorities; that is, on individual responsibility alone. We abandon no love of progress, we give up no hope of improvement, but hold that improvement is to come from high to low, not from low to high. It is God that descends to man, the Word that becomes flesh; not man that ascends to God, not humanity that becomes Divinity.

The question is, no doubt, a grave one; it has, no doubt, two sides, and men may honestly differ in their decisions. But to one decision or the other they must come, and that right early, or it may be too late. We have wished to state the question, and show that this Come-outerism, which so many condemn, and, in our judgment, so justly condemn, is in reality only the le-

gitimate logical result of the great political doctrine, that government derives its just powers from the assent of the governed, and the kindred doctrine of the supremacy of the individual reason in matters of faith. The right of private interpretation and government by consent of the governed once granted, no logical mind can stop short of Come-outerism ; and if you add the Quaker doctrine of individual inspiration, of the "light within," you not only legitimate Come-outerism, but establish it on a divine foundation, and clothe it with divine authority.

But, after all, we will not suffer ourselves to despair either of the country or of humanity. We do, in the profound darkness which envelopes the land and the age, behold a gleam of light. One ray, at least, breaks through the gloom, and reveals to us the glorious truth, that there lies a bright heaven beyond, in which rides in his majesty the Sun of Righteousness. The reaction, we have elsewhere pointed out, in favor of religion and the Church, the deep and absorbing interest which many are beginning to feel on the great question of the Church, unsteady and uncertain as all may be as yet, is a favorable indication that we may possibly have reached the lowest deep, and that the upward tendency is commencing ; that Providence has not wholly abandoned us, nor given us up to a reprobate mind ; and that the great and conservative spirit of the Gospel is still powerful, and will ultimately overcome the world, and subdue all things to the Lord and his Christ. We call upon the religious-minded, the lovers of the Lord, and the true friends of humanity, to hope and work, to pray without ceasing, and continue in well-doing. Let our trust be not in man, nor on an arm of flesh, but in God ; let us submit ourselves to him, lay aside human vanity and human pride, and walk in the way he has ordained, and the evil will be arrested, and the good retained.

ART. VI. — *Letters on the Ministry, Ritual, and Doctrines of the Protestant Episcopal Church, addressed to Rev. Wm. E. Wyatt, D. D., Associate Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Baltimore, and Professor of Theology in the University of Maryland, in Reply to a Sermon exhibiting some of the principal Doctrines of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States.* By JARED SPARKS, formerly Minister of the First Independent Church of Baltimore. Second Edition. Boston: James Munroe & Co., 1844. 12mo. pp. 240.

OUR own general estimate of the Protestant Episcopal Church, when viewed in relation to unity and catholicity, may be easily collected from a foregoing article. We are compelled to regard it as a *Protestant* communion; and we are unable to find any ground on which Protestantism, taken as a separation in doctrine or communion from the Holy See, can be defended, without rejecting all notions of the Church as an organic body. We know not what new light may break in upon our minds, but, so far as at present informed, we are compelled, by what seems to us to be the force of truth, to look upon the separation of the reformers from the Roman communion, in the sixteenth century, as irregular, unnecessary; and, we must add, as a serious calamity to Christendom. We deny not that there was a necessity for a thorough reform of manners; but we cannot but think and believe, that, if the reformers had confined themselves to such reforms, and to such modes of effecting them, as were authorized or permitted by the canons of the Church, they would have much more successfully corrected the real abuses of which they complained, and done infinitely more service to the cause of religion and social progress. Their separation, if not a terrible sin, was at best a terrible mistake, which all sincere lovers of the Lord and his Spouse should deeply lament, and over which no one should permit himself to exult.

Taking this view of the Protestant Reformation, we

are compelled to regard all Protestant communions as schismatic in their origin, at least, as irregular and censurable. From the charge here implied, we can find no special grounds for excepting the Protestant Episcopal Church. Her pretensions to Catholicity we do not find supported; and although she retains much of the old Catholic faith, and many Catholic elements rejected by her sister communions, yet she cannot, and even dares not, call herself *the* Catholic Church. We have no wish to disguise the fact, — nor could we, if we would, — that our ecclesiastical, theological, and philosophical studies have brought us to the full conviction, that, either the Church in communion with the See of Rome is the One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, or the One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church does not exist. We have tried every possible way to escape this conclusion, but escape it we cannot. We must accept it, or go back to the No-church doctrine we put forth in our somewhat famous, or rather, notorious, Essay on the Laboring Classes. Our logic allows us no alternative between Catholicism and Come-outerism. But we have tried Come-outerism to our full satisfaction. We are thoroughly convinced in mind, heart, and soul, that Christ did institute a visible Church; that he founded it upon a rock; that the gates of hell have not prevailed, and cannot prevail, against it; and that it is the duty of us all to submit to it, as the representative of the Son of God on earth.

But, notwithstanding this, we have felt that the primary question for us, who have been born and brought up in Protestant communions, is not so much, Which is the true apostolic Church? as, What is the apostolic model? and that our first work should be, to bring our respective communions, in their constitution, doctrine, discipline, and usage, into strict conformity with that model. This may, perhaps, be disputed; but certainly we must believe that to ascertain, from our own stand-points, what is the apostolic model, and to labor to conform our respective communions to it, cannot be a work unprofitable, nor unacceptable to the Great Head of the Church.

We take it for granted that no serious Protestant can be satisfied with the present state of our Protestant world. The foundation of all moral and social well-being is in religion ; and religion cannot coexist, at least, not in its efficacy, with our sectarian divisions, dissensions, and animosities. Union is loudly demanded. We hear the cry for it from all quarters. But union in error is out of the question. We can unite only on the truth, and, as Christians, only by conforming in all things to the apostolic model. Then, what is this model? This question necessarily opens up the whole question of the Church, — the great question of what it really is, of its place and necessity in the economy of Providence, and its means and method of recovering sinners and aiding the growth and sanctity of believers. This question is to be answered only by a philosophic appeal to the Apostles and Fathers, to the Bible interpreted by the light of ecclesiastical antiquity.

The Church is the divinely instituted body for the recovery of sinners, and the growth and sanctification of believers. It is not an anomaly in God's universe, but contemplated by the original plan of creation, and essential to its complete realization. All the works of the Creator, and all the events of Providence, presuppose it, and point to it, as that in which they are to receive their fulfilment. It is necessary, on the same ground and for the same reason that the Incarnation was necessary, that is to say, because man can commune with God only by virtue of some medium through which he is revealed. No man hath seen God at any time ; no man can see him and live ; and no man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals him. We behold the glory of the Father only in the face of Jesus Christ, who is the revelation of God. We see nothing without a medium. I can behold no object but through the medium of that which is distinguishable from both myself who behold, and the object beheld ; namely, the light. Light is neither myself nor that which I see, but the simple medium of sight, without which there would be no sight. So the only begot-

ten Son of God is the light by which I behold the Father, by which the invisible becomes visible, the inapproachable becomes accessible. The Gospel is all here in the mystery of the Incarnation, — “the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh.”

We are obliged here to separate from our Unitarian brethren, with whom we have for many years been in some degree associated, among whom we have so many friends, and to the learning, ability, singleness of purpose, and great moral worth of many of whom we can bear full and willing testimony. Yet we owe it to them and to ourselves to say, frankly, that we cannot reconcile the denial of the Incarnation, the proper divinity and proper humanity of Christ, “the mystery of godliness,” with faith in Christianity at all. The Gospel, according to our Unitarian friends, appears to us to be *another* Gospel, and wholly incompatible with the Gospel of our Lord, and wholly incompatible with any sound doctrine of life. Whoso denies that the Word, consubstantial with the Father, was made flesh and dwelt among us, denies the faith once delivered to the saints; and whoso perceives not the reason and necessity, in the economy of Providence, of the doctrine of the Incarnation, and of the union, without confusion, of the two natures, the human and the divine, in the one person of Jesus, it seems to us, must needs perceive nothing of the reason and necessity of the Gospel, nor of the profound significance of Christian redemption.

But for the same reason that it was originally necessary that the WORD, which is God, should be incarnated, that is, embodied in space and time, so that we, who are creatures of space and time, might have a medium of communion with that which transcends space and time, — a medium of access to the Father, — is it still necessary that the Word should continue to be embodied and dwell among us. The incarnation of the Word two thousand years ago would not avail us, if there were no present incarnation. Jesus, independent of all present embodiment in space and time, would be to us precisely what he was before he was born of the Bles-

sed Virgin. He would be to us pure spirit, for all is pure spirit that pertains to eternity, and therefore invisible and inaccessible. We should, then, have no more regular or certain way of coming into a spiritual relation with the Father of spirits than we should have had, if he had not come at all. The whole rests on this great fact, that we can commune with spirit only as embodied, that is to say, through the medium of a "prepared body." Hence, when Jesus says, "Lo! I come to do thy will, O God!" he adds, "For a body hast thou prepared me."

The radical necessity of the Church is in the radical necessity of this "prepared body"; and the radical idea of the Church is, that it reproduces and continues the incarnation of the **WORD**. It is, as St. Paul says, the "body of Christ"; and in it we find continued the same union, without confusion, of the human and divine, which was in Christ himself. As Christ was the revelation of the Father, the light by which human eyes may behold the Divinity, mortality behold immortality, so is the Church the revelation of Christ, the light by which we behold him in whose face shines the glory of the Father. Hence, Jesus, addressing his disciples, as the Church, says, "Ye are the light of the world."

In the Church is ever present the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, but who is one with the Father and the Son. As in the days when Jesus, as son of Mary, tabernacled in the flesh, we would have approached him bodily, and sat at his feet in order to come to God and learn of him; so now we must approach the Church, the reproduction and continuation, so to speak, of his body, and learn his will, receive his spirit, and by him be united to God, the Father of life and Fountain of blessedness. Such is our radical conception of the Church. It is to Christ what Christ was to the Father; and as the Son spoke in the name and by the authority of the Father, because the Father was in him, and he in the Father; so the Church speaks in the name and by the authority of Christ, because he is in the Church and the Church in him.

The radical conception of the Church, as the body of Christ, is necessarily that of an authoritative body, but of a body whose authority is divine, not human. Here is the source of the error of Mr. Sparks's work on "Episcopacy." Mr. Sparks is a Unitarian, and takes up the subject from the Unitarian point of view. As a Unitarian, he cannot conceive of the union of perfect God and perfect man in the one person of Jesus; and for the same reason, he cannot conceive of the union of the human and divine, without confusion, in the Church. Consequently, as he sees in Jesus only man, he can see in the Church only human authority; and this authority he very properly rejects. His work is not properly a work against Episcopacy, but against the Church as an authoritative body, and all the doctrines that would tend to make it an authoritative body. He denies the right, not merely of Episcopacy, but of the Church herself, to claim or exercise any authority over the individual reason and conscience, and therefore, in principle, if not in fact, her right to exercise any control over the life and conduct of her members. The Church, with him, therefore, disappears, and can at best be replaced only by a voluntary association of believers.

But, if there is any truth in the principles we have laid down, Mr. Sparks not only rejects the authority of the Church, and therefore the Church herself, but the Gospel of Christ, and denies, virtually, that God through Christ has made any permanent provision for the salvation of sinners, and the growth and sanctification of believers. The question he raises is not a question between Episcopacy and Congregationalism, but between Church and No-church, between apostolic Christianity and no Christianity.

But leaving Mr. Sparks and his Unitarianism, conceding to him that no *human* authority has any right to control us in faith or discipline, yet asserting that the Church represents the authority of Christ, or rather, is the human medium through which Christ exercises his divine authority, as his body which was crucified was the medium through which he revealed his divine

Sonship, we may still ask, Where is this authority lodged? Who are "the earthen vessels" to whom it is committed? Is it committed to the brotherhood, or to the apostolic ministry? Here is the true question between Episcopacy and Congregationalism. Both admit the Church; both admit it to be an authoritative body; and both admit its authority to be not its, but Christ's; that is, not its authority in so far as it is human, but only in so far as it is divine. Both agree that no human authority is legitimate, and that the only authority which is legitimate is Christ's authority. Both agree, also, as to the nature and extent of this authority. The difference is solely as to its depositaries and administrators.

Congregationalism asserts that the authority is committed to the great body of the faithful, that is, to the brotherhood. This view is plausible, and seems to be countenanced to some extent by the opinions and practices of some individuals or portions of the primitive Church. But the great body of the Church has never accepted it in the purely Congregational sense. There may have been individuals who have contended for it; there may have been, here and there, a local congregation that virtually practised on it; but it was the exception, not the rule; an irregularity, an anomaly, not the established order.

Moreover, this view labors under several serious practical difficulties. The faithful must be the depositaries of this authority as individuals, or as a body corporate. If as individuals, does each individual possess it in all its plenitude? If so, you have absolute individualism, and, therefore, no ecclesiastical authority at all. Is it lodged with the majority? Then you transfer to the Church what *Dorrism* is in politics, and enable any number of individuals, however disorderly, if they are the majority, to rule, and to administer the authority as they please; and, moreover, as we have elsewhere said, you have no criterion by which to distinguish between the acts of the faithful, and those of others professing to speak in their name.

If you assume that they are intrusted with this au-

thority only in their corporate capacity, that is, as one single corporate body, how will you bring together the whole body, which at this moment are so many millions, and enable them to act as a single corporation, with an official voice, through an official organ?

If you assume the faithful to be divided into separate congregations, and that each is an independent polity, possessing in itself the right to claim and exercise all the prerogatives of the Church of Christ, we demand the principle of this division. May any number of individuals, at their own pleasure, come together and resolve themselves into a Christian congregation, and, therefore, into a Church of Christ? Will such congregation be a true Church? If so, you must treat it as a Church, and extend to it all the courtesy, civility, fellowship, due from one Christian congregation to another. Suppose, then, a number of real infidels should come together, and resolve themselves into a Christian Church, and their infidelity to be Christianity, you must extend your fellowship to them; for you have no right to judge them. A case bearing some analogy to this has actually occurred in our own neighbourhood. We know a Congregational Church whose minister is to all intents and purposes an unbeliever, and yet that Church claims the fellowship of sister Congregational Churches, and our Unitarian friends so interpret Congregationalism that they feel that they cannot disown either the Church or its minister.

If you say, that there must be some authority outside of the congregation competent to decide whether it be or be not a Christian Church, you depart from Congregationalism. But assume such authority, — Where is it? The practice is, we believe, for the Churches already existing in the neighbourhood, officially to recognize the new congregation. Whence the right of the neighbouring Churches to do this? Is the new Church, when recognized, a true Church? If so, according to your own principles, it is independent, and possesses plenary powers as the Church of Christ. On what ground, then, in case it becomes heretical, can you so far judge it as

to withdraw fellowship from it? On what ground, moreover, does this recognition by neighbouring Churches introduce the new congregation into the family of Christian Churches? They must themselves have been recognized by other Churches, and these by others still; and where will you stop this side of Churches founded by the Apostles themselves? The Churches recognizing must themselves be apostolic, or their recognition is good for nothing. How establish this apostolic character, without establishing their lineal descent from apostolic Churches? Congregationalism, then, as well as Episcopacy, is obliged to resort to APOSTOLICAL SUCCESSION.

In the great questions concerning the Church, and the regularity of Protestant Churches, we have here, so far as we can see, all the difficulties usually alleged against Episcopacy, and, if the Protestant Episcopal Church cannot make out the regular succession of her bishops, still less can Congregationalism make out the regular succession of Congregational Churches. Partial as our education has made us to Congregationalism, we should be loath to undertake its defence on any ground whatever. For the same reason, if for no other, that we reject the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the people, would we reject the sovereignty of the brotherhood. We would much rather — if it must come to this — be under one tyrant than many. Moreover, we cannot conceive of a Church with the authority lodged in the brotherhood. The minister, if commissioned by the congregation, is not placed by the Holy Ghost over it, is not immediately accountable to Christ, but mediately, through the very body over which he is nominally an overseer. How can I rebuke, warn, reprove, discipline, teach with authority, the very body from which I derive my authority, and which may revoke it at will? Make your clergyman absolutely dependent on his congregation, receiving his authority from it, and accountable to it for his doctrines, and for the manner in which he discharges his duty, and you deprive him of all authority as the minister of God. His congregation are

his masters, his critics, his judges; and every time he preaches, he is virtually on trial, and the question is, whether his congregation shall acquit him or condemn him, continue him in his pulpit, or dismiss him, and send him forth to the world branded with their disapprobation. The evils of Congregationalism glare upon us from all sides, and deeply are they felt by not a few of our brethren; and sorry are we to find Bishop Hopkins and his brother Evangelicals taking a ground, we were about to say, even below that of our old-fashioned Congregationalism. Practically, the Congregational minister ceases, in New England, to be the minister of Christ to the congregation. He is no longer a bishop, or overseer, placed by the Holy Ghost over the congregation. The congregation is his overseer; and in cases not a few, he becomes, is forced to become, or leave his charge, the mere tool of one or two ignorant, conceited, perhaps worldly-minded, but wealthy and influential members of his flock, or of some four or five good sisters, who indemnify themselves for their abstinence from the pleasures of the world, by getting up and managing all sorts of societies for the general and particular supervision of the affairs of their neighbours. Woe to the poor man, if he refuse to coöperate with the restless, the gossiping, the fanatical members of his congregation, ready to do any thing and every thing but lead "quiet and peaceable lives, in all godliness and honesty." He must be foremost in their daily and nightly *religious* and *philanthropic* dissipation, or else, alas! it will be instantly discovered that he is an unfaithful minister of Christ, unadapted to the wants of his congregation; and, broken in health, broken in spirit, poor and friendless, with a wife and children, it may be, to provide for, must be dismissed in disgrace, to make way for another, — a dapper little man, right from the seminary, and with just as little religion in his heart, as brains in his head.

No, we have had enough of Congregationalism. Not a few, if we may judge from the letters we receive, of our ablest and best Congregational divines are fully

satisfied of the utter impracticability of the Congregational scheme. It has run itself out, and we are sorry to see the war that is raging against Episcopacy. We may not, indeed, be able to accept the Anglican Church, or her American daughter, as the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church; but she has departed less from the apostolic model than the other Protestant communions. The lay delegation admitted by the Protestant Episcopal Church of this country, led on by her Duers, already begins to show the evil one day to be expected from it; and the original cause of her separation from the rest of the Catholic Church, and the Protestant elements she originally accepted to conciliate the Protestant party, are now showing themselves, by destroying the simplicity of her speech, compelling her to speak with a double tongue, and rending her bosom with, we fear, an invincible dualism; but still she retains many of the essential features of the Catholic Church, and, if we are to unite on any ground out of the Roman communion, she must be the nucleus of union for all that portion of Protestantism which speaks the English tongue. She has it in her power, if she will but free herself from her Protestant elements, bring out her Catholic elements,—elements which have survived the Goths and Vandals,—in their truth and consistency, to perform no mean part in recalling us all to the unity of Christendom, to the unity of the Church, and enabling us of the Anglo-Saxon race to feel that the term of our banishment has expired, and that we may henceforth dwell in the home of our fathers.

ART. VII. — *The Presidential Nominations.* — *Texas.*
— *Mr. Calhoun.*

IN our previous numbers, we have felt it our duty to say some things which could not but be unpleasant to many individuals in the party with which we are in the

habit of acting ; but, happily, recent manifestations and the decisive action of the Democratic Convention, at Baltimore, for the nomination of candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, relieve us from the necessity of repeating them, and go far to prove that we somewhat underrated the independence and patriotism of the party itself, and placed less confidence in its wisdom and civic virtue than we might have done. It gives us no little pleasure to find that we were partially mistaken, and that, contrary to our fears, the party has had sufficient energy, even under the most unfavorable circumstances, to break through the caucus system, to spurn the dictation of selfish managers, and to make its own honest sentiments heard and obeyed. Light breaks through the darkness which hung over the future ; somewhat of our old confidence in the people revives, and once more can we hope and work.

We have nothing more to say of Mr. Van Buren. He is now a private citizen, and, as such, we wish him the peace and repose which belong to his time of life, and the full enjoyment of all the honors his public and private virtues have merited. His injudicious friends, such as the *Washington Globe* and Colonel Benton, who have wished to use him for their own questionable purposes, have received a lesson from which we trust they will profit. If they do not, it will be for a very obvious reason. Enough has been said. There has been enough of mutual recrimination, enough of ill temper, and we sincerely rejoice that all may now unite as brothers, and do our best to save our common country and her institutions.

We shall attempt no eulogy on the distinguished gentlemen the Convention has nominated. If they are not those we should have preferred, they at least meet our warm approbation, and will receive our earnest support. Mr. Polk is a man of considerable political experience, a gentleman in his manners, irreproachable in his morals, sound in his political views, and, if elected, will make an able and efficient executive officer, and administer the government in a manner alike creditable to

himself and honorable to his country. His external policy will be wise, firm, just, and patriotic; and his internal policy will tend to restore us to the old republican platform, and to promote the interests of the whole country, not merely of a favored section or class. With Polk and Dallas for our candidates, we can enter on the campaign with heart and hope, and feel, that, in elevating them to the first offices in the gift of the people, we are really doing a service to our country and republican freedom.

We do not permit ourselves, in this Journal, to enter far into mere party politics, but we cannot refrain from expressing our gratitude that there is now, to say the least, a reasonable hope of saving our country from the serious danger there would be in electing the Whig candidates. We do not adopt all the notions of our Democratic friends concerning the first principles of government; we do not, if we may so say, accept their political philosophy; but we rarely fail to approve their leading measures of policy, whether domestic or foreign, and we feel, at all times, that the government and the country are safer in their hands than in those of the Whigs, even when the Whigs place at the head of affairs their purest and ablest men. In many of the abstract principles of government, we coincide much more nearly with the Whigs than we do with the Democrats; but the Whigs as a party are thoroughly, and without any mitigation, the party of modern Feudalism. The Democratic party fails to resist this growing Feudalism with the requisite energy and firmness; — the Whigs do not resist it at all, but hasten its growth by all means in their power. If we cannot hope, even from the Democrats, all we wish for the true interests of all classes, we can hope nothing at all from the Whigs. There is not one of their distinctive measures but will tend directly and with fatal force to consolidate the power of the industrial lords, and to reduce the operative classes to a state of virtual serfage. This is the character of the Whigs in their best estate, under their best and most patriotic leaders. What, then, shall we say of them un-

der the lead of such men as Henry Clay and Theodore Frelinghuysen? These two gentlemen represent the very worst and most dangerous elements of Whiggism, and, if they come into power, they bring with them Whiggism in all its unmitigated iniquity.

Messrs. Clay and Frelinghuysen represent what we may term ultra-Whiggism. Mr. Clay is unquestionably a man of ability. He is a splendid orator; he has great power over the men with whom he comes into immediate contact; but he is no statesman. He is ambitious, but short-sighted; bold, daring, but incapable of appreciating general principles, or of perceiving the relation between effects and their causes, when these causes are not near at hand. Yet he is abashed by no inconsistency, disturbed by no self-contradiction, and can defend with a firm countenance and without the least misgiving what every body but himself sees to be a political fallacy, or a logical absurdity. Refute him, demonstrate with mathematical certainty that his proposition is false, confront him with names, dates, figures, and he stands unmoved, unconscious of what you have done, reiterates his proposition in a bolder tone, reasserts it with growing confidence, and pours forth the full tide of his rich and suasive eloquence in its defence. You stand aghast. What can the man mean? His insensibility confounds you, and you almost begin to distrust your own demonstration against him, though as certain as the demonstration of a problem in Euclid. In regard to right and wrong, he manifests the same singular self-possession. He is no more disturbed by being convicted of moral insensibility than of intellectual absurdity. He sees no moral absurdity in determining right and wrong by parallels of latitude, and in declaring a thing to be right on one side of a given parallel and wrong on the other. A man of rare abilities, but apparently void of both moral and intellectual conscience, who finds no difficulty in withstanding, when necessary to his purposes, the eternal laws both of logic and morality, and therefore a man whom no power under that of the Almighty can restrain, he must needs

be the most dangerous man to be placed at the head of the government it is possible to conceive. There is no foreseeing what he would do, or would not do. Not a few, even of the Whigs, feel that he is an unsafe man; even the manufacturers themselves support him with fear and trembling; the noblest of all the Whigs has denounced him on more occasions than one, and now only "damns him with faint praise."

Mr. Frelinghuysen is quite a different man; and, while agreeing with Mr. Clay in all the obnoxious measures to which Mr. Clay himself stands pledged, he represents certain other elements of the Whig party, from which still more evil, if possible, is to be apprehended. Mr. Frelinghuysen is not only a Whig in the worst sense of the term, but he is also the very impersonation of narrow-minded, ignorant, conceited bigotry, — a man who boldly attacks religious liberty, demands the unhallowed union of Church and State, and contends that the government should legally recognize the religion of the majority, and declare whatever goes counter to that to be *contra bonos mores*. He concentrates in himself the whole spirit of "Native Americanism" and "No-popery," which displayed itself so brilliantly in the recent burning of the Catholic dwellings, seminaries, and churches, in the city of Philadelphia.*

* We found this charge on Mr. Frelinghuysen's speech in Congress on the Sunday-Mail question, and on a book, now lying before us, entitled, "*An Inquiry into the Moral and Religious Character of the American Government*," (New York: Wiley & Putnam, 1838,) which, we presume, it will not be denied was written by him. This work is exceedingly declamatory in its character, and remarkably deficient in clear, distinct, and definite statements; but no man can read it without feeling that its author would withhold all political rights, whether to vote or to be voted for, from all persons except members of what are called Evangelical sects. "Has it not," it says, "become a cant among us, that *as electors* we have nothing to do with men's religious sentiments; no right even to inquire about them? Twenty gods, or no god, or the God that made the worlds, is quite indifferent; *Papists and Protestants are all one; Socinians, Jews, and Evangelical believers, are all one*; yes, and the tattooed cannibal of the South Sea, were he to honor our asylum of liberty by seeking a lot in its blessings, would enter at once into the same

We see personified in the Whig candidates modern Feudalism, political profligacy, and canting, fanatical religious bigotry. Their success would be fraught with

family circle of undistinguished and indistinguishable unity ; free alike to live among us, and to rise above our heads ; for the doctrine is, that whoever is entitled to sit in the shade of the constitutional tower has a right also to scale its walls." The meaning of this, vaguely as it is expressed, it is not difficult to divine. It is "Native Americanism" and "Evangelicalism." The author, it is true, does not formally advocate a union of Church and State, nay, he, in words, expresses his dissent from such union ; but he expressly contends for a "*political religion*," which of course must be a test of political rights, and that this political religion must be the religion of the majority. He transfers, boldly and avowedly, to religious matters, the doctrine, that the majority must govern, and that the minority must submit. It is true he attempts to make a distinction between what he calls *ecclesiastical Christianity*, and the *ethics* of Christianity, but it is a distinction which can amount to nothing ; for the ethics of a religious denomination are founded on its dogmas, and, in enacting the ethics, you do necessarily, by implication at least, enact the dogmas themselves. Enact what the majority define to be Christian ethics, and you necessarily enact the Theology, Christology, and Anthropology of the majority, for these are the foundation and source of their ethics. The practical effect of Mr. Frelinghuysen's doctrine would be, to establish the religion of the majority as the law of the land, and to declare every man destitute alike of civic virtue and of moral virtue, who should dissent from it, and presume to worship God after the dictates of his own conscience.

We foresaw, many years ago, that the attempt would be made to transfer the doctrine, the majority must rule, to religion and morals, and thus to revive the practice of boring the ears and tongues of Dissenters, banishing Baptists, and hanging Quakers ; and this has been with us a strong motive for waging the uncompromising war which we have waged for many years against this doctrine. Once let this doctrine of the right of the majority to rule become universal in regard to political matters, and it will inevitably be transferred to religious matters, and the minority must yield up all their religious rights to the will of the majority, as Mr. Frelinghuysen contends they should.

The great principle with us is religious liberty. The government is to confine itself strictly within the sphere of temporals, and leave spirituals exclusively to the Church and individual conscience. It has no right to discriminate between one denomination and another, or to give one the least preëminence over another. This is the Christian doctrine ; this is the settled doctrine of this country, and which makes the glory of our country, for ours is the only country on earth which has ever adopted it. It has cost ages of struggle and sacrifice to establish this doctrine, and shall we now basely abandon it? Shall we give our support to a party which

the most serious danger to our political institutions, to social equality, and to religious freedom. All is hazarded. As matters now stand, all that is dear to our hearts, as freemen and as Christians, is involved in the approaching contest. We of the Republican party have committed many faults; we have on too many occasions proved ourselves unworthy of the sacred cause intrusted to our keeping; yet the all-beneficent Providence has not wholly cast us off, but graciously gives us one more opportunity to atone for past delinquencies, and to win new honors. The holy cause of political, social, and religious freedom is once more committed to our charge. The sacred deposit is placed in our hands, and at our hands will the Supreme Judge demand it. Every man of us must feel the sacredness of the trust, and remember that "THE LORD SEETH." There must be no cowards, no traitors, no laggards. A high and solemn duty rests on each one of us to rebuke political profligacy, and religious bigotry and fanaticism; to do all that man in honor and honesty may do to save this country, this chosen land of Providence, to the freedom of the human race, to make it the "home of virtue, an asylum to the oppressed, and a name and a praise in the whole earth."

Nor is the external policy involved in the approaching contest less important than the domestic. No good can be realized on this continent, unless we succeed in maintaining, in all respects, in the face of all other nations, entire and absolute national independence. It is our interest, as our duty, to cultivate peace with all nations, but peace only on terms compatible with na-

brings forward, for the second office in the gift of the people, the very leader of the bigots and fanatics who would wrest it from us? God forbid! Let us rally around the banner of RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, and signally rebuke the traitor to his God and his country, who would establish a political tyranny over faith and worship. If we do not thus rally, we may expect ere long to see the churches of all the denominations, which the majority may decree to be non-evangelical, smouldering in their ruins. St. Michael's and St. Augustine's, in Philadelphia, throw a strong light on the fate that awaits every house of worship not dedicated to the faith of the majority for the time being.

tional independence and national honor. We had trusted that Mr. Clay, however faulty might be his internal policy, would nevertheless prove himself, in his relations with foreign governments, a true American patriot ; but his recent letter on the annexation of Texas to the Union proves that we can no more rely on his patriotism than on his republicanism. The base betrayal of the true interests of his country, the dastardly crouching to the red cross of England, and infamous leaguings with a band of fanatics at home, who have officially declared that the union of these States ought to be dissolved, and that they are prepared to accomplish their objects over the ruins of the American Church, of which that letter affords the damning proof, deserve not only the utter detestation of every American heart, but the most signal rebuke from the whole Union, — a rebuke which he and his supporters will feel, ay, and not soon forget.

We have no room for the discussion of the Texas question, but happily that question has already been amply discussed by greater and better men than we, and whose voice will have authority where ours could not gain a hearing. We cannot, however, refrain from expressing our regret that slavery has been allowed to play so conspicuous a part in the discussion. We want Texas annexed to the Union, but for reasons wholly foreign to the question of slavery. We want it as the key to our southwestern frontier ; because we cannot, with a due regard to our means of national defence, suffer it to pass actually or virtually into the hands of Great Britain or of France ; because we want it for the benefit of our coasting trade, as a market for our northern manufactures, and as the means of preserving to ourselves the market of the great valley of the Mississippi, and of opening to us the rich markets of Mexico ; because the Texans are our brothers, and wish to be received as members of our great family of freemen. We want it, also, to preserve the proper balance between the Atlantic States and the interior, which the rapid growth of the great West will, in a few years, without the annexation of Texas, wholly destroy. Here are

our reasons, at least some of our reasons, for favoring annexation, and these have no connection with slavery. For ourselves, we feel very little interest in the slave question, in itself considered. The danger to our Union, to the sacred cause of human rights, is not now in negro slavery, but in the principles and measures of the Abolitionists, which, if carried out, would prove a far greater calamity than slavery is or can be, even allowing it to be all that the Abolitionists allege. The remedy they propose would prove infinitely worse than the disease. Still, we say, very frankly, that we see no beauty or comeliness in slavery that we should desire it, and we assure our Southern brethren that we will help them adopt no measure for the sake of perpetuating it. It is their affair, and they must take the responsibility of it.

But, while we say this, we say also that we will resist, even unto blood, if need be, any and every effort to abolish slavery over the ruins of the Constitution and the sacred institutions of religion, or, what is no better, *through the direct or indirect intervention of a foreign power*. We are an independent nation, and the supreme judge for ourselves of the wisdom or justice of our institutions and practices. We suffer not Great Britain, nor any foreign government, to teach us officially what is or is not our duty. No foreign government shall be suffered to intermeddle with our concerns, even so far as to aid us in correcting what we ourselves may believe to be wrong and in need of redress. In regard to foreign nations, our country is infallible, and all her institutions are sacred.

We here express what we understand to be the purport of Mr. Calhoun's patriotic letter to the British minister, for which he has received so much and such unmerited abuse. We read that letter with a glow of patriotic pride; we felt thankful that we had at length one minister of state, who dared speak the language of national independence, and rebuke the insolent foreign government which had presumed to send its minister here to read us a moral lecture. In relation to foreigners, we are ONE PEOPLE, and acknowledge no distinction

of Free States and Slave States. Every citizen, whether of South Carolina or of Massachusetts, is alike entitled to the protection and defence of the whole. All our institutions, not excepting the domestic institutions of the South, under this relation, are alike national and sacred ; and an attack on any one of them by a foreign government is an insult to the whole nation. Such an insult was the avowal made officially by the British minister of the views and intentions of his government on the subject of slavery ; and we envy no American citizen who did not feel it to be an insult, and an insult offered by a haughty, insolent, and canting rival. It was this insult Mr. Calhoun rebuked in his letter to Mr. Packenham, and in terms as dignified as they were pointed and severe. Is there an American so lost to all sense of national dignity and respect as to blame him ? What if Great Britain had made an official communication to our government that she looked upon our banking and factory systems as wrong, as hostile to Christian principles of liberty and political economy, and that it was her desire, and she would be unceasing in her efforts, to abolish them ; would our bankers and manufacturers have blamed Mr. Calhoun for reminding the British government, through its minister, that this was our own affair, and that no foreigner could be allowed to intermeddle with it ? What abuse, indeed, would not have been heaped upon his head, and deservedly too, if he had not repelled the national insult ?

But it is said Mr. Calhoun entered into a defence of slavery. He did no such thing. He offers in his letter not one word in defence of slavery. He merely told the British minister that British *philanthropy* might be better employed ; that, if allowed to accomplish the end avowed, it would bring no substantial benefit to the negro race, which the British government proposed to take under its especial protection ; for the actual condition of that portion of the race held to service was not a little superior to that of the portion nominally free. And who of us, who have ever visited a Southern plantation, doubts the fact ? The condition

of the slaves at the South, we all know, is far superior to that of the free blacks at the North. The silly, sickly, restless sentimentalizers at home and abroad, who are ready to sacrifice the *substance* of freedom to secure its mere *name*, would do well to ask themselves, whether they have yet discovered a relation in which the black race can live on the same territory with the white, at all superior to that in which they now live at the South. We have had enough of cant and humbug. Mock us not with the mere name of liberty; give us the substance of freedom, and do what you will with the empty name. The Manchester or Leeds operative is nominally a freeman; how much more real freedom has he than Quashy, on the Southern plantation? Great Britain is now importing negroes, it is said, from the coast of Africa into her West Indian colonies, with the avowed purpose, by the multiplication of laborers, of reducing the price of labor to the very minimum of human subsistence. How much better than slaves are laborers forced by the lash of hunger to toil for the mere minimum of human subsistence? And what right has England to read us a lecture on slavery? Let her look at home. The great mass of her population are reduced to a state of moral and physical degradation unknown in any other European country. Her paupers are one out of every seven of her whole population; while even in Italy, of whose degradation we hear so much, they are only one to every twenty-five. She has reduced Ireland to a state of beggary, her hundred millions of East Indian subjects to the lowest destitution; she has commenced the work of doing the same to the Chinese; she is plethoric with the spoils of the defenceless everywhere, fat with the life-blood of every nation she could overawe; and yet she has the impudence to send her minister here to read us a moral lecture on slavery! and we, degenerate sons of noble sires, miserable cravens, applaud her for her generosity and noble philanthropy, and hurl our censures only at the patriotic minister of state who has ventured to rebuke her insolence and vindicate his country!

Mr. Calhoun contrasted the condition of the slaves and free blacks, not for the purpose of defending slavery, but for the purpose of showing the British minister, *emphatically*, that this subject of slavery involved considerations of which no foreigner can judge, and that, if slavery is an evil, it is an evil of which we alone can judge as to the proper time, measures, and mode of redress. This letter was called for, was proper, and manly. If some of the statistics on which he relied may be successfully disputed, they were still sufficiently accurate for all the purposes of his argument; and enough others, which nobody can question, can be adduced whenever they shall be needed.

We are exceeding our limits; but we must warn our friends to beware of courting, in this or any contest, the aid of the fanatical Abolitionists. Can a man touch pitch and not be defiled? The time has come when we must take our stand firmly for our religious institutions, for our country, for our *whole* country, and the noble Constitution of this Union, and be true to them, though we find ourselves opposed to every modern fanatic, who, because he has got the crotchet of philanthropy in his head, fancies himself privileged to scatter firebrands, arrows, and death, at his pleasure. There must be no misgiving, no swerving. The times are perilous. It is the day of trial. May God in mercy aid us, and grant that we may all prove equal to the holy trust committed to us; that we may shrink from no struggle, from no sacrifice, but be ready at any moment to give up all, even life itself, at the demand of our country, of republican freedom, and religious liberty!

ART. VIII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND MISCELLANIES.

1. — *Symbolism : or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their Symbolical Writings.* By JOHN ADAM MOEHLER, Dean of Würzburg, and late Professor of Theology at the University of Munich. Translated from the German, with a Memoir of the Author, preceded by an Historical Sketch of the State of Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany for the last Hundred Years. By J. B. ROBERTSON, Esq., Translator of Schlegel's Philosophy of History. New York: Dunnigan, 1844. 8vo. pp. 575.

WE are at a loss which most to admire in this book, the varied and exhausting erudition of the author, his singularly impartial judgment, or the philosophical acuteness and depth of his intellect. No work, to our knowledge, has appeared in modern times, that can compare with it, whether as containing a clear and impartial statement of the respective doctrines of Catholics and Protestants, or a just appreciation of the great theological and philosophical principles involved in these doctrines themselves, or in their discussion. The author was a Doctor of the Catholic Church, and his exposition of Catholic doctrines has been received with the greatest favor in that Church, and is accepted by those well qualified to judge of its justness. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find, in the whole compass of Protestant literature, a single writer who has given any thing like so full and so fair an exhibition of the leading principles of the several Protestant sects. There is no Protestant that may not study his own faith to advantage in his pages.

The great advantage of this work is, that it enables us to study the Protestant and Catholic doctrines in their mutual contrast. Protestants, in these days, are rarely able to grasp the essential elements of Catholic theology. This theology is foreign to the ordinary range of their thoughts, and belongs to a region of whose reality they have scarcely a suspicion. It pertains not only to another, but to a higher order of thought than that in which they habitually live. Protestantism starts with truth in its diversity and particularity, — Catholicism with truth in its unity and universality. But starting with truth in its diversity and particularity, the human mind is utterly unable to attain to unity and universality; and hence the utter inability of a purely Protestant mind of attaining to a true understanding and just appreciation of Catholic theology. The difficulty is to be overcome only by placing, in the light of Catholic unity, Protestant and Catholic doctrines side by side in their mutual contrast, and by referring each to its principle. This is done by the author of the work before us in a manner which leaves little to be desired.

The difficulty of the Protestant, in understanding and appreciating Catholicism, is not experienced by the Catholic, in understanding and appreciating Protestantism. The Catholic, we have said, starts from truth in its unity and universality. He starts, then, in possession of the truth and the whole truth, so far as concerns its princi-

ple, and he can easily make the application of the principle to each particular question that comes up. He has only to follow the invincible laws of logic, in order to determine what is the truth in the particular case presented. He has no difficulty, then, in understanding Protestantism, in decomposing it, and selecting out its elements of truth, and rejecting its errors. We must not suppose that Protestantism has no truth. No Protestant sect, however far it may have departed from unity and catholicity, but retains much truth, and very essential truth; but no one contains the whole truth, that is, truth in its unity and universality. It is always truth in its diversity and particularity. This truth the Catholic does not reject; he accepts it; but he does not accept it as something which he had not before. The Catholic is a Catholic, not an Eclectic. The Eclectic assumes that all sects, schools, and parties have each a special truth, and so far the Catholic agrees with him. But, the Eclectic adds, no one has the whole truth, and each should borrow of the other to eke out its own deficiency. Thus, Catholicism has its truth, which Protestantism has not; and, Protestantism has its truth, which Catholicism has not. Here, the Catholic does not agree with him; for he contends that he has, through the revelation of God, truth in its very unity and catholicity. He has, then, an unerring standard by which to try all parties, schools, and sects. And having the truth in its unity and universality, he can easily comprehend and appreciate all sects, for he has already in his possession the special truth of each, and more than the truth of all united. It is easy, then, to see why he does not experience the difficulty in comprehending Protestantism, that the Protestant does in comprehending Catholicism. It would be impossible for a Protestant mind to run over the several Protestant sects, and state and appreciate their several doctrines, even from the Protestant point of view, so fairly and so justly as they are stated and appreciated in the work before us; for no Protestant has, or can, as a Protestant, rise to, an intellectual elevation high enough to command a view of so broad an horizon as he needs to survey.

Let it not be supposed from this, that Catholicism, though it undoubtedly satisfies a higher order of intellect, demands a higher order of intellect for its comprehension than Protestantism. All great truths are simple, and no truth is comprehensible till seen in the light of its unity and universality. An ordinary mind easily seizes and appreciates, in this light, truths which baffle the profoundest intellects, when contemplated only in the darkness of diversity and particularity. It undoubtedly requires a higher order of intelligence than any Protestant has ever exhibited, starting with diversity and particularity, to attain to the unity and catholicity of truth; and, in fact, a higher order of intelligence than the human mind itself. The Catholic has not attained to it, nor does he believe man can attain to it, by his natural powers. Truth in its unity and catholicity has been given him by Divine Revelation, and preserved from Christ and the Apostles by the one Holy Catholic Apostolic Church. He has, therefore, no natural superiority, claims no natural superiority.

ity, of mental endowment. Not unto him the glory, but unto God, through his Son Jesus Christ, our Lord.

No one can read the work before us without feeling how much higher and broader is Catholic theology than Protestant theology; nor can any one read it without feeling how much freer and fuller scope Catholicism gives to our reasoning powers than Protestantism. No Protestant can reason; not because of any natural deficiency, indeed, but because he has no principles which he dares push to their remotest logical results. At every moment, he is obliged to arrest his logic, and throw in an arbitrary qualification, lest he be driven into some fatal extreme. His garment of salvation is never of a single piece, woven without seam from top to bottom, but a mere patchwork, of all sorts of stuffs and colors. — But we did not intend running into this train of remark. Our purpose was merely to draw the attention of our readers to the work before us, — a work which whoever would become acquainted with the doctrinal differences of Catholics and Protestants, or with the great theological book of our age, must read, and which every one would do well, not only to read, but to study. It is a profound work. No man, after reading it, can be what he was before. It is one of those works which stamp themselves on their age, and make an epoch in the history of the human mind. We shall take the earliest opportunity of bringing it again before our readers, and of attempting to give them a fuller account of what it proposes to do, and of what it has done. The work may be had in this city, of Donahoe & Rohan, No. 1, Spring Lane.

2. — *D'Aubigné's "History of the Great Reformation in Germany and Switzerland," reviewed: or the Reformation Examined in its Instruments, Causes, and Manner, and in its Influence on Religion, Government, Literature, and General Civilization.* By M. J. SPALDING, D. D. Baltimore: John Murphy. 1844. 12mo. pp. 379.

THIS is a work that was much needed. M. D'Aubigné's work has been circulated very extensively, and very generally read. It was highly desirable that a work of a moderate size, supplying its deficiencies, and correcting the more gross and important of its errors, should be prepared and sent out to counteract, in some degree, the false impressions it could not fail to make on all not thoroughly versed in the real character of the Reformation. Dr. Spalding has given us, in this volume, just such a work as was needed, and a work which cannot fail to do great service to the cause of truth. It is written in good taste and temper, with great calmness and candor, and proves the author to be a man of learning and ability. We have read it with deep interest, and we have found little to dissent from, either in its speculations or in its statement of facts. It is one of the best essays on the Reformation, the character of the men who introduced it, the means they employed, and its effect on

religion, morals, manners, liberty, literature, and general civilization, that we have met with, and we recommend to all who have read M. D'Aubigné to procure and read it. If any one has looked upon M. D'Aubigné's work as any thing more than a flippant romance, characterized by some ingenuity and considerable smartness, the work before us, if he will read it, will undeceive him, and satisfy him, that, as a history, it deserves not the least confidence.

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3. — *The First Ten Cantos of the Inferno of Dante Alighieri, newly translated into English Verse.* Boston: William D. Ticknor. 1844. 8vo. pp. 83.

WE notice this specimen of a translation of Dante, for the purpose of urging the author, as we do most sincerely, to lose no time in giving us the whole of the *Divina Commedia*. Every man is said to be sent into the world on some errand, to perform some task creditable to himself and serviceable to his country or his race. We know not what other missions may have been assigned Mr. Parsons, but we are sure that he ought to regard it as his especial mission to reveal the great Christian poet of the Middle Ages to the English mind and heart. We cannot speak of the original, for our Italian is not equal to its difficulties, and our pursuits give us no leisure to master them. But we know something of Dante, of the age in which he lived, of his general spirit and character; and this translation, as far as it goes, reproduces him very much as we had pictured him to ourselves, and we feel that it is faithful, and not wholly inadequate. Through it breathes the Dantean spirit, and runs the Dantean thought; and the verse, if somewhat rugged, is appropriate, and moves forward with a calm majestic march rarely equalled in English versification.

Dante stands out alone, the poet of Christendom, to Christianity what Homer was to Grecian Paganism. He is the *Christian* poet, with the Christian's deep sorrow, pure love, and sublime hope; and not only the Christian poet, but the Christian poet after the genuine *Catholic* type. The attempt of some moderns to find in his poem an incipient Protestantism merely proves their own ignorance of Catholicism. He who was the apostle of unity, who wished to model the State after the Church, and give to the universal temporal power a visible head, placed in Rome by the side of the spiritual head of the Church, — he a Protestant! Grant that he now and then blames the reigning pontiff, that he directs the withering curse of his immortal lines against some of the occupants of St. Peter's chair, others have done as much; St. Bernard has done as much himself, than whom a better Catholic never lived. But, however severely Dante attacks the Pope, he never attacks the Papacy. The new and increasing attention now paid to Dante is a favorable symptom; an indication that Christendom is about preparing to be true to herself, and to study her own antiquity, instead of that of Greece

and Rome,—Christian antiquity, in preference to Pagan antiquity. In those Middle Ages we have all so despised, there is much on which a Christian can linger with a grateful heart; much to which he can point as a triumphant proof that God was with our fathers.

We pray Mr. Parsons to accept our thanks for his translation, and the assurance that we believe he will do good service to the country, and to the cause of literature, by completing it. We have only one suggestion to make; it is, that Dante was a Catholic Christian, and any Protestant interpretation of his invectives will be false and unjust.

4. — *Mores Catholici; or Ages of Faith.* By KENELM H. DIGBY. Cincinnati: Published by the Catholic Society for the Diffusion of Religious Knowledge. 1841. 8vo. Vols. I. and II.

WE have received from Messrs. Donahoe & Rohan, of this city, a copy of the first two volumes of the American reprint of this work,—all that have as yet, we believe, been issued. The entire work makes five large octavo volumes. The great interest and value of this work are very generally admitted, and can be questioned by no one who has the least faith in the gospel; and yet it is a work which can find little support in “the spirit of the age.” Mr. Digby seems really to believe that mere worldly wealth and prosperity are not the loftiest objects of human pursuit; and, what may strike our readers as almost, if not altogether, incredible, he cordially assents to the declarations of our Saviour,—“*Beati pauperes*,”—blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven; blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth, &c. To find in these days a man who really believes poverty better than wealth, humility than pride, and truth and righteousness than a “respectable standing,” or a “commanding position,” is so rare an occurrence, that we doubt not that most of our readers will stare at us with quite a stare of incredulity, when we tell them that Kenelm H. Digby, Esq., is such a man; and, moreover, has here written a long, learned, and eloquent work, to prove that the ages when men believed the gospel and practised its precepts, were superior to these our own blessed days of spinning-jennies, railroads, paper-money, and universal mammon-worship. The work is able, but we cannot recommend it to the public. It is mild, gentle, poetical, pervaded by a true loving spirit, alive to all that is beautiful, true, or tender in God’s universe; but it pays no respect at all to mammon or his worshippers. It is not in harmony with the spirit of the age. It is old-fashioned, superannuated. It seeks to demonstrate historically that the ages of faith, that is, the ages of the Church prior to Luther, prove the truth of the Beatitudes, and that it is really the part of wisdom to “seek first the kingdom of heaven and its righteousness.” In other words still, it really attempts to show from historical data, that the “Dark Ages” were preferable to our ages of light. Men will get, now and then, strange crotchets in their heads. Even men of talents, of

learning, of great purity and tenderness of soul, may now and then be led to adopt strange whims and vagaries. Yet, if there should chance to be lingering still a simple-minded believer in Jesus, one who counts the love of God more precious than silver or gold, to such a one we can recommend these volumes as replete with the deepest interest, as refreshing as the bubbling fountain to the thirsty traveller over the parched desert. If we assume Christianity to be worth any thing, this is one of the best books lately written.

5. — *Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life, designed particularly for the Consideration of those who are seeking Assurance of Faith and Perfect Love.* By THOMAS C. UPHAM. Boston: D. S. King. 1843. 16mo. pp. 464.

THIS work deserves more than the passing notice which is all that we are now able to give it. We welcome it, and are glad to know that it has been received with great favor by the public, and that a new edition of two thousand copies is now in press. This speaks well for the public. It proves that people are beginning to look once more to a religious life and to a real and living communion of the soul with God, — that there is a real return towards spirituality, as distinguished from mere sentimentality and intellectuality. Yet, while we heartily sympathize with the general spirit and aim of this volume, we cannot but look upon it rather as the expression of a desire for a holy life than as the expression of that life itself. It does not come up, in its celestial tone and divine spirituality, in its angelic sweetness and the exquisite tenderness of its devotion, to the old ascetic books of the Church. It cannot supply the place of "The Following of Christ." Nevertheless, it is well as far as it goes, and will tend to wean our affections from things of the earth, and to place them on things above. All works which teach us to believe in the possibility of holiness are valuable; for no man will ever attain to that which he believes to be unattainable.

6. — *The Library of American Biography.* Conducted by JARED SPARKS. Second Series. Vol. I. Boston: Little & Brown. 1844. 16mo. pp. 398.

WE welcome this new series of Sparks's Library of American Biography. It is a work of a national character; for nothing can be of higher national utility than for a nation to record, and hold up to admiration and imitation, the lives of her distinguished sons. The present volume contains the lives of Robert Cavelier de la Salle and Patrick Henry, — the first by Mr. Sparks himself, the latter by the Hon. Alexander H. Everett. The life of La Salle can hardly be said to belong to American biography; for La Salle was born, and

lived, and died, a subject of France. Yet his name is intimately connected with an interesting portion of our country, and his life has more than the usual stir, incident, and interest of a romance. The Life of Patrick Henry is well written, and pleases us much better than the "Life" by Wirt. Wirt's "Life" is too eulogistic, too fulsome in its praise, and entirely wanting in just discrimination. Mr. Henry was a great and good man, but he was human. Mr. Everett, it seems to us, has written his life with a very just appreciation of his talents and character, and assigns him his appropriate rank. Upon the whole, we regard it as a favorable specimen of biography, and we wish we could have the lives of several other distinguished men from the same classic pen.

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7. — *An Elementary Treatise on Mineralogy: comprising an Introduction to the Science.* By WILLIAM PHILLIPS, F. L. S., M. G. S. L. and C., Honorary Member of the Cambridge and Yorkshire Philosophical Societies. Fifth Edition, from the Fourth London Edition, by Robert Allan; containing the latest Discoveries in American and Foreign Mineralogy; with numerous Additions to the Introduction. By FRANCIS ALGER, Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, &c., &c. Boston: William D. Ticknor & Co. 1844. 12mo. pp. 662.

WE do not think very highly of Phillips's Treatise on Mineralogy, and we cannot understand Mr. Alger's motive for selecting it for republication. But with the amendments the original work received from Mr. Allan, and the still more important amendments from Mr. Alger himself in the edition before us, conforming it to the present state of the science, it is probably the best elementary treatise on mineralogy within the reach of the English student. Mr. Alger's additions are very important; they comprise descriptions of about a hundred and fifty new species, and extending to over three hundred pages. He appears to have performed his duty as editor faithfully and conscientiously, and we thank him very cordially for his labors. We shall hope to be able to return to this work in our next, and notice it at greater length, and in a manner more worthy of the real contributions its editor has made to the science of mineralogy, as well as of the great interest and value of the science itself.

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8. — *European Agriculture and Rural Economy. From personal Observation.* By HENRY COLMAN. Vol. I., Part I. To be completed in Ten Numbers. Boston: A. D. Phelps, 124, Washington St. 1844. 8vo. pp. 80.

WE have read this introductory number of Mr. Colman's promised Report on European Agriculture and Rural Economy with a

good deal of interest and satisfaction. We trust Mr. Colman's labors and writings will do somewhat to awaken a taste for agricultural life. It is much better to cultivate the earth under the broad canopy of heaven, than to be cooped up in a cotton mill, or to stand behind the counter making change and measuring tape.

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9. — *Letters on the Spanish Inquisition ; a rare Work, and the best which has ever appeared on the Subject.* By M. LE COMPTE JOSEPH LE MAISTRE. Translated from the French, with a Preface, Additional Notes, and Illustrations, by T. J. O'FLAHERTY, S. E. C. Boston : Donahoe. 1844. 12mo. pp. 178.

WE cannot say that we exactly approve of the taste or temper of Mr. O'Flaherty's notes, but the work itself is one of very considerable value, and throws much light on the real character of the Spanish Inquisition. We commend its perusal to all those among our Protestant friends who are in the habit of adducing the Inquisition as one of their standing proofs that the Pope is Antichrist, and the Catholic Church the Scarlet Lady of Babylon.

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10. — *Masonic Melodies ; adapted to the Ceremonies and Festivals of the Fraternity.* By THOMAS POWER, Past Grand Secretary of the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts. Boston : Oliver Ditson. 1844. 8vo. pp. 105.

FOR one man to write and adapt to music 114 melodies is no slight task, especially when undertaken with "malice aforethought"; yet Mr. Power has acquitted himself very creditably. These Melodies are all serious, and some of them have considerable poetic beauty. In sentiment they are appropriate. A brother remarked to us the other day, that they would do well for Unitarian hymns. Mr. Power deserves, however, the thanks of every member of the masonic fraternity for the very acceptable present he has made in furnishing the fraternity with a series of melodies, which, if they do not contain all the religious fervor some could wish, at least contain no sentiment offensive to piety or morality.

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11. — *Fireside Poetical Readings, illustrative of American Scenery, rural Life, and historical Incidents, and also of religious Feelings, designed as a domestic Offering.* Collected and published by DEXTER S. KING. Boston : D. S. King. 1843. 12mo. pp. 313.

THIS book is evidently all the product of one and the same mind. It is a very pleasant volume. Its author is a man of a good deal of

poetical sensibility, and of a sweet devotional spirit. Many of his pictures of American cottage life are exceedingly well done, and betray the hand of a master. We regret that we have no room for extracts.

12. — *The Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church.* By the REV. JOHN LINGARD. The First American, from the Second London Edition. Philadelphia: M. Fithian. 8vo. pp. 324.

WE notice this book, the merit of which is well established, as one of considerable interest in the Anglican controversy now going on, and as a work of exceeding interest to all of us who are not altogether ashamed of the Church of our ancestors.

13. — *Coningsby, or the New Generation.* By B. D'ISRAELI, Esq., M. P. Author of "Vivian Grey," "Young Duke," &c.

THIS is not merely an interesting novel, but a serious work, affording matter for much thought and reflection. Mr. D'Israeli has much improved since we met him in the "Young Duke."

14. — *Eva Macdonald ; a Tale of the United Irishmen, and their Times.* By T. D. McGEE. Boston: Brainerd & Co. 1844. 12mo. pp. 47.

THIS is a tale which indicates a good degree of talent on the part of its youthful author, and promises us in him, when his character shall have been more fully matured, a writer who will do great credit to the country, and no discredit to the "Emerald Isle," of which he writes, and from which he traces his birth.

* * Two articles promised for this number, namely, one on Justification by Faith, and the other on Constitutional Government, we have been obliged to omit to make way for others which we have believed to be of more immediate interest to the public.

We wish also to say again, in order to save ourselves from some inconveniences, that our pages are not open to contributions from others. The Review is intended to be substantially the product of one mind, and the editor is both author and editor. While, therefore, he very respectfully thanks his friends who have favored him with their communications, he must assure them, that to insert these communications would interfere with the plan of the work.